How should SOF be organized by Goh, Puay Hock (Francis).
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2011-06
How should SOF be organized
Goh, Puay Hock (Francis).













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Anna Simons 
  Erik Jansen 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2011 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  How Should SOF Be Organized? 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S)  Puay Hock (Francis) Goh   
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol Number ____N/A_____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) today provide policy makers with Economy of Force and Expansion of 
Choice options.  Unfortunately, not all countries are well positioned to capitalize on SOF as a strategic 
asset. Not all SOF organizations are appropriately structured at the national-level for the SOF system to be 
a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Organizational structure does matter.  Against this 
backdrop, this thesis addresses: how military SOF should be organized to ensure that they can be an 
effective and relevant national instrument?  To answer the question, the thesis examines four different 
organizational models used by SOF—Service-centric (Israel), National Military Staff Element (Norway), 
Component Command (France), and Service (Australia)—to elucidate their strengths and weaknesses. 
Implications are weighed and recommendations then made.  These should be particularly pertinent to 
countries contemplating or having just begun to transform their SOF. 
 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Special Operations Forces, SOF, Congruence Model, NATO SOF 
Study, Israel, Israeli SOF, Service-centric organization, Norway, Norwegian SOF, NORSOF, 
National Military Staff Element, NMSE, France, French SOF, SO Component Command, 
Australia, Australian SOF, SO Service, organization design considerations. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
173 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
HOW SHOULD SOF BE ORGANIZED? 
 
 
Puay Hock (Francis) Goh 
Major, Republic of Singapore Navy 
BEng (Hons), Nanyang Technological University (Singapore), 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























Gordon McCormick  
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) today provide policy makers with Economy of 
Force and Expansion of Choice options.  Unfortunately, not all countries are well 
positioned to capitalize on SOF as a strategic asset. Not all SOF organizations 
are appropriately structured at the national-level for the SOF system to be a 
whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Organizational structure does 
matter.  Against this backdrop, this thesis addresses: how military SOF should be 
organized to ensure that they can be an effective and relevant national 
instrument?  To answer the question, the thesis examines four different 
organizational models used by SOF—Service-centric (Israel), National Military 
Staff Element (Norway), Component Command (France), and Service 
(Australia)—to elucidate their strengths and weaknesses. Implications are 
weighed and recommendations then made.  These should be particularly 
pertinent to countries contemplating or having just begun to transform their SOF. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Organizations and their structure matter. They matter because 
organizations provide formal answers to some of the most universal 
human questions: who are “we” and who are “they”? Who gets 
resources—and resources of what type—and who does not? Who 
has power and what are legitimate ways for them to exercise it—
and what are the consequences for stepping outside the bounds of 
that legitimacy?       Jessica Glicken Turnley1 
A. BACKGROUND 
While it may seem to be a cliché to say that the strategic environment is 
totally different from the way it was two decades ago, it is nonetheless true. The 
harbingers of change are none other than the two watershed events—the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union (and by extension, the end of the Cold War) and 
the September 11 attacks.  To say the least, the world as a whole has, in one 
way or another, been affected by both these events.  Yet, the direct effects they 
had on countries around the world were quite different.  For example, for most 
countries in the western hemisphere—such as France and Norway—the end of 
the Cold War meant a significant, or perhaps total, reduction of conventional 
threats in their strategic environment.  On the other hand, for countries such as 
Israel, the effect was more indirect; the oil crisis in the 1970s probably played a 
more substantial role, while for Australia, it was not so much the end of the Cold 
War, but globalization that had a more substantial impact.  The same holds for 
the September 11 attacks.  Israel, for instance, had experienced terrorism and 
low intensity conflict (LIC) threats in its backyard since the 1970s. 
Notwithstanding these differences, a common theme accepted by the 
world today is that the turn of the millennium marked the start of a “New World 
                                            
1 Jessica G. Turnley, Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream 
(Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint Special Operations University, 2008), 9. 
 2
Disorder.”2  The security conundrums in this new world disorder are aptly 
described by Michael Evans as he writes, “The new geopolitical reality is 
characterized by the arrival of a bifurcated international security system—a 
system that is split between a traditional 20th century state-centered paradigm 
and new 21st century sub-state and trans-state strata.”3   The threats brought on 
by these new 21st century actors have been diffused, and, within them, terrorism 
and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats are front and center.  Against 
such a security backdrop, most, if not all, countries have come to acknowledge 
that Special Operations Forces (SOF) are key national instruments that can help 
resolve these challenges.  Additionally, especially true in this day and age, SOF 
are often also a useful policy tool in maintaining alliances (e.g., NATO and the 
EU).  Cumulatively, this gives SOF a new prominence as a unique and relevant 
national asset in this era.   
Unfortunately, while this may be so in theory, not all countries have 
positioned themselves well to capitalize on having SOF.  More precisely, not all 
countries have structured their SOF appropriately, in organizational terms, to fully 
optimize their employment and development.  Arguably, getting the organization 
right may not be the foolproof solution; but it is no doubt a critical one.  This view 
is reflected in the epigraph above, and is further reinforced by Morton Egeberg in 
the following: “Formal organization provides an administrative milieu that focuses 
a decision-maker’s attention on certain problems and solutions, while others are 
excluded from consideration. The structure thus constrains choices, but at the 
same time it creates and increases action capacity in certain directions”4 In 
essence, organizations and their structure do matter. 
                                            
2 Ian Ward, “Towards a Poethics of Terror,” Law, Culture and the Humanities, vol. 4 (2008): 
252; Michael C. Hudson, “Imperial Headaches: Managing Unruly Regions in an Age of 
Globalization,” Middle East Policy, vol. 9 (2002): 73. 
3 Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War 
1901-2005 (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, February 2005), 88. 
4 Morten Egeberg, “The Impact of Bureaucratic Structure on Policy Making,” Public 
Administration, vol. 77, no. 1 (1999): 159. 
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B. PURPOSE AND APPROACH 
In recognition of these realities, NATO commissioned a study in 2008, 
known as the NATO SOF Study, to provide NATO member nations with a 
“reference point to inform the continued optimization of national and NATO 
SOF.”5  Suffice it to say, the study’s focus was on the organization of SOF.  More 
importantly, this study is one of the few to focus on the organization of SOF in 
general and comparatively.6  Most studies that concentrate on organization are 
specific to a country.  Like the NATO SOF Study, this thesis attempts to also take 
the road less travelled.  More precisely, it aims to expand on the good work done 
by the NATO study to answer, in a more comprehensive fashion, the following 
research question: how should military SOF be organized to ensure that they can 
be an effective and relevant national instrument?7   
This research question is approached through a comparative case study 
method, with the following two objectives:  
• To elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of different 
organizational models used by SOF, which in turn, will help to 
establish which model is optimal.  Here, an organizational theory, 
known as the Congruence Model, is applied to four case studies 
where the strengths and weaknesses of each case and its 
organizational model are illuminated. 
• To generate key considerations vis-à-vis the design and 
establishment of a national-level SOF organization.  This involves 
                                            
5 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Coordination Center [NSCC], North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study [NATO SOF Study] (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, 2008), 3. 
6 Another scholarly work is the book Special Operations and National Purpose by Ross S. 
Kelly, but it does not specifically discuss the organization of SOF. 
7 To learn what the NATO study is about, see NSCC, NATO SOF Study.  The study focuses 
mainly on providing a clear set of roles and responsibilities for each of the three organizational 
models it puts forth.  Understandably, because the study relies mainly on primary source 
information, a lot of sensitive information is not disclosed.  Hence, some parts of the study are not 
as explicit as one would prefer.   
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using the insights garnered from the case studies. The insights will 
be further distilled and generalized into design considerations. 
At this juncture, it is necessary to explain why there are four case studies 
and what they are about.  The key reason is that there are four broad ways in 
which SOF can be organized at the national level.8  While it would be ideal to 
have more case studies for more robust results, time was the key limiting factor 
in this regard.  Consequently, one case for each model has been chosen.  The 
four organizational models this thesis investigates are: (1) Service-centric, (2) 
Special Operations (SO) National Military Staff Element (NMSE), (3) SO 
Component Command, and (4) SO Service.  
The first model refers to the way SOF has traditionally been organized, 
which is purely by service lines without any joint oversight authority. The latter 
three are taken from the NATO SOF Study, and their respective characteristics 
are as follows: 
• NMSE:  In terms of structure, the SO staff element sits at the 
national military staff level.  It is the focal point for the employment 
and development of SOF in the Ministry of Defense, with its primary 
role as the coordinator for all SO activities, plans, and requirements 
with agencies within and outside the military.  In this design, the 
military SOF units are under the full Command and Control (C2) of 
their respective services, and the NMSE has no authoritative power 
over them.  However, the NMSE does have operational control 
during special operations, but it does not have the capacity to 
control a joint special operation.9 (See Appendix A for more 
details.) 
• SO Component Command:  In general, the Component Command 
can be seen as an expansion of the NMSE.  It could either be an 
                                            
8 What this means is that any model in the world today should resemble one of these four 
models.  
9 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22–4. 
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addition to the NMSE that SOF already has at the national military 
staff level or an enlarged staff element itself.  Its status is similar to 
other joint Component Commands that a military has, such as a 
Maritime or Air Component Command.  Its main role is to “work in 
concert with the military services to integrate and unify their 
service-specific SOF capabilities into an effective joint operational 
capability under unified command for the actual conduct of special 
operation.”10  Similar to NMSE, the tactical SOF units are still under 
the administrative control of their services; however, the 
Component Command has the mandate to be involved in force 
management and production activities.  A potential challenge of this 
model is to “balance the operational requirement for joint integration 
and unified command with the force management requirements of 
the parent services.” 11 (See Appendix B for more details.) 
• SO Service: As the name implies, this model is about creating a 
separate SO service within the military.  It gives the SO 
Commander full “authority, control, and resources necessary to 
optimize national SOF capabilities.”12 However, as a service, the 
organization needs to now also take care of the raise-train-educate-
sustain functions of SOF, besides the operational matters.  This 
includes responsibility for the SO enabling personnel as well.13 
(See Appendix C for more details.) 
To this end, this thesis will argue that the optimal organizational models 
for SOF are the SO Component Command and SO Service.  The Service-centric 
and NMSE models should only be considered as transitory structures to help 
build up initial capabilities.  Further, this thesis also submits that while 
                                            
10 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 25. 
11 Ibid., 24–7. 
12 Ibid., 27. 
13 Ibid., 27–9. 
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organizational structure is indeed a critical design factor, other key factors such 
as national strategy, military doctrine, and political-military culture must be taken 
into account with regard to the establishment of a national-level SOF 
organization.  These factors form part of a larger set of design considerations this 
thesis analyzes in order to accomplish its second objective.   
C. SCOPE 
In terms of scope, there are three key things to highlight.  First, although 
already mentioned, it is worth emphasizing that this study is focused on SOF of 
military establishments only.  It deals with SOF from the Navy, Army, and Air 
Force.  Additionally, the organization that is being investigated is the macro-level 
structure, or what the NATO study calls the national-level organization.  Second, 
to make this thesis as general and applicable as possible, the following three 
criteria are applied to the case selection: (1) SOF of small to medium-sized 
militaries, (2) selection of SOF from different parts of the world, and (3) 
availability of secondary sources of information. While this thesis strives to fulfill 
the first two criteria, the latter proved to be the key limiting factor in selecting the 
cases, leading to the selection of Israel as the Service-centric case; Norway as 
the NMSE case; France as the SO Component Command case; and Australia as 
the SO Service.  Finally, as this thesis focuses on the organization and not on the 
operations of SOF per se, no need was seen to derive a standard set of 
definitions for SO and SOF.  Rather, the definitions used by each country will 
suffice.   
D. LIMITATION 
The greatest challenge for a non-classified study of this nature is that it 
relies solely on secondary, open-source information. Most SO and SOF today 
are still shrouded in secrecy.  Having said that, it is fortunate that there have 
been some books and theses (mostly from the Naval Postgraduate School) that 
examine SOF organization.  The flip side to the availability of this information is 
 7
that it is not necessarily current.  I have thus also used supplementary sources of 
information from articles, news reports, government releases, and defense 
analysis reports (e.g., Jane’s) to corroborate and verify the information presented 
when possible.  Nevertheless, errors and omissions cannot be avoided.  For this, 
I assume full responsibility. 
E. THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter II provides the details of the Congruence Model as well as the 
four-step analysis process that is applied to each case.  Chapters III and IV are 
case study chapters; they are structured to fulfill the thesis’s first objective.  
Chapter III concentrates on Israel as the Service-centric case and Norway for the 
NMSE case.  Chapter IV focuses on France for the SO Component Command 
case and Australia for the SO Service case. Beyond illuminating the strengths 
and weaknesses of each model, these two chapters also draw insights from each 
case to inform the subsequent chapter.  Chapter V, the concluding chapter, then 
uses these insights to further generate considerations that are essential to the 
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II. CONGRUENCE MODEL 
The interrelated issue of military structure and effectiveness 
confronts planners and commanders with some of the most 
intractable intellectual issues associated with organizational 
behavior.14 
Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray 
Getting organizations to operate effectively is difficult, however. 
Understanding one individual’s behavior is challenging in and of 
itself; understanding a group that’s made up of different individuals 
and comprehending the many relationships among those 
individuals is even more complex.  Imagine, then, the mind-
boggling complexity of a large organization made up of thousands 
of individuals and hundreds of groups with myriad relationships 
among these individuals and groups.15  
David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman 
It is uncommon to start off a chapter with two long quotes like those 
above, but they serve a purpose.  At a minimum, they serve as a preface; 
beyond that, it is hoped that they help to indicate the complexity involved in 
studying and designing effective organizations. Suffice it to say, the task is 
anything but easy and straightforward.  Fortunately, there are many “tools” 
available to leaders, managers, and researchers today to help them navigate the 
complex organizational terrain when they undertake this type of task.  One such 
tool is the Congruence Model, an established and simple organizing framework 
developed by David A. Nadler and Michael L. Tushman.16   As an organizing 
framework, this model acts more like a diagnostic than a measurement tool.  It 
                                            
14 Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness: The First World War 
Volume 1 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 1. 
15 David A. Nadler, Michael L. Tushman, and Nina G. Hatvany, Managing Organizations: 
Readings and Cases (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980), 35. 
16 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 36.  As an organizing 
framework, the model represents a generic model (i.e., with broad components of Task, 
Individual, Formal Organization and Informal Organization inherent in every organization), and 
hence can be applied to any organization. 
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helps one to understand (and identify) the different interacting forces that affect 
the effectiveness of an organization.17  More importantly, it can also help to 
establish considerations pertinent to the design of an effective organization.  For 
these reasons, I have chosen this as the most appropriate model for this thesis.  
This chapter now introduces the model; it describes what the model is, how it 
works, and how it will be applied. 
A. WHAT IS IN OPEN SYSTEMS THEORY? 
Given that the basis for the Congruence Model lies in Open Systems 
Theory, this section examines the theory first, before discussing the model itself.  
As an open system, an organization is made up of a set of interrelated elements, 
which comprise the following broad categories: inputs, transformation process, 
outputs, and feedback (see Figure 1).18  As a living organism, an organization is 
“dependent on the external environment to survive and is, therefore, open to 
influences and transactions with the outside world as long as they exist 
[emphasis mine].”19  As illustrated in Figure 1, the main idea is that an 
organization draws its inputs from the environment, puts them through the 
transformation process, which yields the output at the other end.  Also, because 
an organization is an open system, it interacts with the environment and these 
interactions appear in the form of feedback (e.g., the different loops in the 
diagram as shown).20   
Beyond understanding the mechanics of systems theory, it is also 
important to be familiar with some of the system characteristics. For the purposes 
of this thesis, three are relevant. The first is interdependence.  As the elements in 
                                            
17 Oliver Wyman, “The Congruence Model: A Roadmap for Understanding Organizational 
Performance,” Delta Organization & Leadership, 
http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/Congruence_Model_INS.pdf (accessed August 21, 
2010): 3–4. 
18 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 36. 
19 David P. Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance (New York: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, 1988), 8. 
20 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 36. 
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the system are interrelated, there is bound to be a degree of interdependence.  
This means that when one component of an organization changes, it produces 
“repercussions” that affect other parts, all because they are more or less 
connected.  More important, this also means that, more often than not, there will 
be more than one factor that affects the effectiveness of an organization, 
although it may appear otherwise. Because these factors should not be seen in 
isolation, any investigation needs to be thorough.21    
The second characteristic is utilization of feedback. According to David P. 
Hanna in his book Designing Organizations for High Performance, feedback 
allows the system to know whether it is on target.  Hanna further categorizes 
feedback into two main types for organization studies, namely negative and 
positive feedback.  Negative feedback is “deviation-correction feedback” since it 
helps the system to know if the output is “on course with the purpose and 
goals.”22 In contrast, positive feedback is “deviation-amplifying feedback” 
because it “measures whether or not the purpose and goals are aligned with 
environmental needs.”23  More important, he asserts that the need to differentiate 
and understand these two types of feedback is not just a matter of semantics; 
both can equally affect the survival of a system.24 Although many organizations 
know the value and potential of these feedback loops, not all capitalize on them 
to improve their organizational effectiveness.  This is clearly demonstrated by 
some of the cases this thesis examines.   
The last characteristic is adaptation.  A system will need to adapt to 
“maintain a favorable balance of input or output transactions with the 
environment or it will run down.”25  Hence, how adaptable an organization is  
 
                                            
21 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 37. 
22 Hanna, Designing Organizations for High Performance, 14. 
23 Ibid., 15. 
24 Ibid., 16. 
25 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 37. 
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reflects the inner workings and effectiveness of that organization.  This ability to 
adapt is especially critical today as the environment and its conditions can 
change so frequently and rapidly. 
B. WHAT IS THE CONGRUENCE MODEL? 
Now that we understand the open system theory and how it works, we can 
discuss the congruence model proper.  In this section, I describe and 
contextualize each and every component of the model vis-à-vis the focal points 
of this thesis.  To do so, let us again consider Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.   Congruence Model [From Nadler and Tushman, p. 44]    
1. Inputs 
On the left, we see four factors that, generally, constitute the “inputs” to an 
organization.  These are: Environment, Resources, History, and Strategy. As 
Richard L. Daft writes in his book Organization Theory and Design, an 
organization’s Environment normally refers to “all elements that exist outside the 
boundary of an organization, and have the potential to affect all or part of the 
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organization.”26  The Environment includes groups, other organizations, and also 
markets (such as the customer base) with which the organization interacts.27  
However, to be more specific, Daft further divides the Environment into two main 
categories, namely the task and general environments.  The former contains 
groups that “have a direct impact on the organization’s ability to achieve its 
goals,” while the latter contains those that influence the organization only 
indirectly.28  The focus in this thesis is on the task environment of the 
organization under investigation, namely the macro-level structure of the SO 
organization. Consequently, the Environment includes the threat environment of 
the country, the larger military organization to which SO belongs (this may 
include adjacent services, for instance when SO is a Service Command), the 
political master, and also the population from which it recruits. 
The second input is Resources.  This includes humans, technology, 
capital, and information.  Since SO organizations draw most, if not all, of their 
resources (e.g., recruits and other personnel, as well as funding) through the 
larger military organization (even for a Service Command), this input is grouped 
together with the Environment in this study.   
The third input is History.  This refers to “the major stages or phases of an 
organization’s development over a period of time . . . [and includes] key strategic 
decisions, acts or behavior of key leaders, nature of past crises and the 
organization’s responses to them.”29  How History affects the SO organization is 
largely a function of its relationship with either its larger military organization or 
the political master.  Therefore, as with Resources, History is considered under 
Environment. 
                                            
26 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design 10th Edition (Mason OH: South-Western 
Cengage Learning, 2008), 140. 
27 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 38. 
28 Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 140. 
29 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 39. 
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The final input is Strategy.  According to Nadler and Tushman, strategy 
may be the most critical input for some organizations.  This is because 
“[Strategy] determines the work to be performed by the organization and it 
defines the desired organizational outputs.”30  In short, Strategy refers to how the 
organization matches its resources to the prevailing environment; it comprises 
key decisions like the mission and purpose of the organization, services to be 
provided to the market, and output objectives.31  From the SO macro-
organization’s perspective, Strategy is synonymous with military doctrine, and all 
the associated government policies and legislation (e.g., Defense White Papers) 
governing the employment of SOF.32  
In sum, the inputs can be simplified into just two main components—the 
Environment (to include Resources and History) and Strategy.  Of note, these 
two components, either collectively or singly, will exact demands, impose 
constraints, and also provide opportunities for SO organizations.33  
2. Transformation Process 
The centerpiece in Figure 1 (on p. 12), also known as the Transformation 
Process, represents the core of the congruence model.  It contains the four 
generic components that describe most, if not all, organizations.  They are: 
Tasks, Individuals, Formal Organization, and Informal Organization.  According 
to Michael B. McCaskey, Tasks are the essential work carried out by an 
organization and its sub-units to produce goods and services, and they involve 
interactions and interdependencies among these sub-units to accomplish the 
                                            
30 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 40. 
31 Ibid., 39–40. 
32 Wyman, “The Congruence Model,” 7.  This paper asserts that “for government and non-
profit organizations, ‘corporate strategy’ often reflects a combination of the legislative mandate, 
which defines the public-policy objectives the organization has been created to address, and 
organization-specific priorities.” 
33 Ibid., 6.  Wyman’s paper asserts that only the environment will exact demands, impose 
constraints, and provide opportunities for the organization.  In contrast, this thesis deems that all 
the input elements are capable of doing so. 
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objectives.34  Because technology is often a key enabler or multiplier for these 
tasks, especially in the case of SO, this thesis considers technology a part of the 
Tasks component. 35 
The next component is Individuals, which refers to the humans who 
perform the organizational tasks.  Critical to take into account are things like a 
person’s knowledge and skills, needs and preferences, and perceptions and 
expectations.36  In this thesis, this component is termed Human Capital, as this 
more completely represents how human assets should be viewed. 
The third component is Formal Organization, which refers to “the range of 
structures, processes, methods, procedures and so forth that are explicitly and 
formally developed to get individuals to perform tasks consistent with 
organizational strategy.”37  For McCaskey, the Formal Organization also includes 
other management and control aspects such as rewards, training, development 
and selection mechanisms.38  Some authors in the field of organization studies 
prefer the term “Structure” to Formal Organization. Because the focal point for 
this study is the macro-level structure of the SO organization, this thesis likewise 
uses the term Structure in place of Formal Organization to help make the 
correlation more obvious. 
The final component is Informal Organization, defined as a set of informal 
and unwritten arrangements that co-exist alongside the formal structure, and 
comprise the “patterns of processes, practices, and political relationships” that 
embody “the values, beliefs, and accepted behavioral norms of the individuals” 
                                            
34 Michael B. McCaskey, “Framework for Analyzing Work Groups” (Harvard Business 
School, case 9-480-009, August 15, 1996), 6. 
35 Carl W. Stiner, “US Special Operations Forces: A Strategic Perspective,” Parameters, 
Summer (1992): 11-2.  General Stiner asserts that technology is a critical component of special 
operations as it can be “decisive in offsetting the enemy’s superiority in numbers, firepower and 
mobility.” 
36 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 41–2. 
37 Ibid., 42. 
38 McCaskey, “Framework for Analyzing Work Groups,” 7. 
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working in the organization.39  These informal arrangements can either 
complement or challenge the formal structure, and, as such, can affect the 
organization’s performance either positively or negatively.40  In the field of 
organization studies, these implicit forces are sometimes also known as 
Organizational Culture.  They can have a disproportionate effect on the 
effectiveness of a SO organization. 
According to Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture is: 
the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared 
by members of an organization, that operate unconsciously, and 
that define in a basic ‘take-for-granted’ fashion an organization’s 
view of itself and its environment. These assumptions and beliefs 
are learned responses to a group’s problems of survival in its 
external environment and its problems of internal integration.41  
As Schein points out, the environment “influences the formation of culture 
[initially], but once culture is present in the sense of shared assumptions, those 
assumptions, in turn, influence what will be perceived and defined as the 
environment.”42 In addition to having this influence on perception, Vijay Sathe 
submits that culture also has a powerful effect on attitudes and behavior, as 
these are the products of internalized beliefs and values (he calls them shared 
assumptions).43  Meanwhile, according to James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg, and 
Robert M. James,  
Culture is not an article of fashion, but an intrinsic part of a deeper 
organizational character . . .  Culture thus permeates many critical 
aspects of strategy making. But perhaps the most crucial realm is 
the way people are chosen, developed nurtured, interrelated, and 
rewarded in the organization.  The kinds of people attracted to an 
                                            
39 Wyman, “The Congruence Model,” 9. 
40 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 42. 
41 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985), 6. 
42 Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 51. 
43 Vijay Sathe, Culture and Related Corporate Realities: Test, Cases, and Readings on 
Organizational Entry, Establishment, and Change (Howewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1985), 
13. 
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organization and the way they can mostly deal with problems and 
each other are largely a function of the culture a company builds – 
and the practices and systems which support it.44 
For practical reasons, this thesis adopts the term Culture as these authors use it, 
in place of Informal Organization.   
3. Outputs 
The final segment of the model to be described is Outputs. Broadly 
speaking, Outputs refers to anything that the “organization produces, how it 
performs or how effective it is.”45  Consequently, Outputs should not only refer to 
the organization’s basic products, but should also include outputs at different 
system levels, such as the performance of groups and individuals, which 
ultimately can also affect the overall organization’s effectiveness. To this end, 
three factors are essential when assessing an organization’s effectiveness: (1) 
goal attainment, (2) resource utilization, and (3) adaptability.46  In this vein, Erik 
Jansen reminds us that an organization’s goals should not be focused only on 
outputs as a final product, but should also target the inputs (system’s resources) 
or processes (transformation process).  He adds that when evaluating internal 
process effectiveness, the factors to be taken into account should include human 
relationships and emphasis by the leadership (unity of effort), as well as 
economic efficiency (outputs vs inputs, which is similar to resource utilization).  In 
other words, the indicators that can be used are (but not limited to): work 
climate/culture, teamwork and group loyalty, trust and communication processes, 
and the reward and development system.47 
                                            
44 James B. Quinn, Henry Mintzberg, and Robert M. James, The Strategy Process: 
Concepts, Contexts and Cases (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988), 344. 
45 Wyman, “The Congruence Model,” 7. 
46 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 40. 
47 Erik Jansen, “A Synthesis of Hanna and Daft” (Powerpoint lecture for Organization Design 
at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA, April 2010).  Erik Jansen is a professor 
teaching Organization Design Theory at the NPS. 
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Table 1 provides a summary of all the components in the Transformation 
Process.  It includes the critical aspects of each component, which will be 
examined in the analysis to follow. 
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Table 1.   Summary of Transformation Process [After Nadler and Tushman, p. 
41] 
C. HOW DOES THE MODEL WORK? 
Having understood the components of the model, it is now time to answer 
the question, how does it work?  For people who are familiar with the concept of 
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“Strategy” (or “Grand Strategy”), the model’s premise in assessing an 
organization’s effectiveness should not be anything new as it is somewhat similar 
to this concept.  Basically, strategy is “the art of connecting aspirations with 
prudent plans and finite resources.”48 Or, simply put, it is all about “align[ing] 
ends, ways, and means.”49  In a similar fashion, what this model is concerned 
with is the congruence or alignment of each of the components with all the 
others, including Environment and Strategy.  The greater the congruence—or the 
tighter the “fit”—the more effective is the organization.50  This simple and yet 
powerful idea is best illustrated by the following analogy offered by a noted 
systems theorist, Russell Ackoff: 
Suppose you could build a dream car that included the styling of a 
Jaguar, the power plant of a Porsche, the suspension of a BMW, 
and the interior of a Rolls Royce.  Put them together and what have 
you got?  Nothing. They weren’t designed to go together. They 
don’t “FIT”.51 [emphasis mine] 
Although the congruence model might seem easy and intuitive to apply, 
the truth is far from what it appears.  As the epigraphs that introduce this chapter 
make clear, the task of analyzing an organization’s effectiveness is often 
complicated and arduous.  While things can be made more manageable with the 
help of the model, the task can still be convoluted.  Hence, what seems most 
prudent is to get inside the analytic process and lay out the critical steps involved 
in the tasks ahead, so that readers can better appreciate how the “ends” (in this 
case, the considerations) are to be generated. 
                                            
48 Shawn Brimley, “Crafting Strategy in an Age of Transition,” Parameters, Winter (2008–09): 
28.  
49 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National 
Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), viii. 
50 Wyman, “The Congruence Model,” 9. 
51 Ibid. 
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D. OPERATIONALIZING THE CONGRUENCE MODEL 
Here is a description of the four-step process adopted from Nadler and 
Tushman’s eight-step method: 
1. Identify Symptoms 
The first thing to do when examining a case is to gather all the 
symptomatic data, i.e., the symptoms of the problems.  These symptoms may not 
be the real problems or the causes, but they help shine a light on where else to 
look for more data if necessary.   
To identify the symptoms, the analysis needs to identify the indicators that 
can be used.  For this, the literature review has provided some guidance.  In 
addition to indicators of mission success, there are also other aspects like intra- 
and inter-group relationships between SOF and other service cultures, the 
reward system, and the training and development system.  These indicators 
should be measured against the desired or planned “outputs” of the organization 
to assess “fit.” 
2. Describe Organizational Components 
During this step, the process begins to trace the causes of the problems.  
Data are collected on the four organizational components and their respective 
key features (see Table 1). 
3. Assess Congruence (or Fit) 
Using the data, the congruence of each component with all the other parts 
is established.  Here, wherever misalignments (or problems) occur, they will be 
illuminated.  As the focal point for this thesis is the macro-structure of the SO 
organization, more attention will be paid to try to identify any misalignment 
associated with the Structure of the organization.  However, the thesis does not 
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discount or dismiss other misalignments as they are still important in helping to 
generate considerations that are essential to a good organizational design. 
4. Generate Insights and Considerations 
After assessing congruence, it is necessary to relate the results back to 
the symptoms.  From these “trails,” one can see where all the misalignments (or 
alignments for that matter) are that contribute to the problem(s).  In the final 
analysis, the considerations can then be generated.52 
In the following two chapters, the adapted model shown in Figure 2, 
together with the four-step process, will be applied to all four case studies.  The 
aim, again, is to generate useful insights that are pertinent to the design of a 
macro-level SO organization for optimal SOF employment and development.  
Subsequently, these insights will be further distilled and processed into 
considerations to be presented in the final chapter. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Adapted Congruence Model 
                                            
52 Nadler, Tushman, and Hatvany, Managing Organizations, 45-46. 
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III. SERVICE-CENTRIC AND NMSE CONSTRUCTS: LESSONS 
FROM ISRAEL AND NORWAY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding chapter, I explained the Congruence Model and the four-
step process. They are applied in the next two chapters to the case studies. 
Since this is the introductory chapter to the case studies, it is imperative that I 
also explain how the studies are organized. Each case study first presents the 
case’s peculiarities via the Congruence Model, which involves applying the first 
two steps of the four-step process. This requires describing the relevant 
Environment and Strategy as they impact SOF’s effectiveness.53 The case 
analyses then explain the outcome of the “traces” between components of the 
Model to show important (mis)alignments, before concluding with lessons 
learned from the analysis.  Further, to help readers become familiar with the use 
of the Model and the process, the Israeli case will be examined in greater depth; 
doing so should demonstrate how a full-blown study can be done using these 
analytical tools.  Because it is not necessary to go into such depth for every case 
for the purposes of this thesis, readers will see some differences in the level of 
details offered for Israel and the subsequent cases. 
This chapter uses Israel and Norway as case studies of two organizational 
constructs: the Service-centric and the National Military Staff Element (NMSE), 
respectively.  In these constructs, the military services continue to retain the full 
command and control (C2) of their respective SOF, which includes their long-
term development and planning. This is in spite of SOF’s expanded political 
utility, whence SOF have been used for national-strategic reasons beyond the 
purview of the individual services.   
                                            
53 What this means is that, for example, when I look at the Transformation Process, 
consisting of Structure, Tasks, Human Capital, and Culture for SOF, I will be describing the 
identified weaknesses associated with each organizational component, as well as their 
relationships with other components in the system to establish the linkages. 
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What these two case studies will reveal is that both kinds of structure are 
inadequate in terms of acting as the overarching organization for SOF.  They 
point to a need for an oversight authority for the long-term interests of SOF and 
to maximize the latter’s strategic utility.  However, such a body would need to be 
endowed with the requisite power to orient, harmonize, and integrate the various 
tactical SOF units in order to be effective.  Furthermore, insofar as SOF are 
considered strategic assets, these two cases also underscore the importance of 
having clear strategic guidance on the employment and development of SOF.  
Absent such guidance from the national leadership, the least the military should 
do is to ensure a clear division of labor between the different forces. 
B. ISRAEL 
To say that Israel was born in war is no exaggeration.  Including the War 
of Independence from 1947–1949, Israel has engaged in “no less than six full-
scale wars with its Arab neighbors.”54  Although disadvantaged in many ways, 
Israel has by most counts come out on top in these encounters.  This is by no 
means due to luck, but to Israeli supremacy in its conventional military power. 
More importantly, this military supremacy in the conventional realm helps Israel 
mitigate the traditional threats that it faces from its Arab neighbors; so much so 
that, by the early 1980s, these threats were no longer seen as imminent.55  
However, while traditional threats dwindled, new threats emerged and came to 
dominate Israel’s security agenda.  These were Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD) and Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC).  These changes in the strategic 
environment, together with other changes that have taken or are taking place on 
economic, political, and social fronts, pose numerous challenges to the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) as it enters the 21st century.  Paradoxically, for Israeli SOF, 
the sources of its organizational problems lie not with these new changes, but 
                                            
54 David Rodman, Defense and Diplomacy in Israel’s National Security Experience: Tactics, 
Partnerships, and Motives (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), 1. 
55 Mark A. Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc., 2000), 20–4. 
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rather with factors that are resistant to change. The latter are to be found 
predominantly in the areas of political-military relations and the IDF’s 
organizational culture.  As we shall see, the confluence of these two factors leads 
to several problems that affect Israeli SOF.  The most critical is the failure to 
adapt the macro-organization of Israeli SOF to the prevailing environment.  As a 
result, the Service-centric macro-structure becomes a thoroughfare for problems 
at the strategic level that are then passed on to the operational and tactical 
levels, thereby demonstrating how ineffective this structure is as an overarching 
organization for SOF. 
1. Environment 
a. Threat 
According to Nicholas Spykman, “it is the geographic location of a 
country...that define[s] its problem of security.” Therefore, a key factor that 
influences a state’s threat assessment is the state’s position in space, which is 
part of its physical geography.56  Implicit in this is the kind of relationship a state 
has with its immediate neighbors.  In Israel’s case, its war-ridden history with its 
Arab neighbors speaks volumes about its strategic threat environment.  In a 
space of less than four decades, Israel has waged no less than six full-scale 
wars with its Arab neighbors:  War of Independence (1947–1949), Suez War 
(1956), Six-Day War (1967), War of Attrition (1969–1970), Yom Kippur War 
(1973), and the First Lebanon War (1982).57  More importantly, Israel waged 
these wars for one sole purpose, which was to defend its right to survive. Hence, 
it is not surprising that Israel’s early leaders always viewed the conventional  
 
 
                                            
56 Emily O. Goldman, “New Threats, New Identities and New Ways of War: The Sources of 
Change in National Security Doctrine,” in Israel’s National Security Towards The 21st Century, ed. 
Uri Bar-Joseph (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 57. 
57 Michael C. Desch, Power and Military Effectiveness: The Fallacy of Democratic 
Triumphalism (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 96. 
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threats posed by its immediate neighbors as its fundamental security threats 
(bitachon yisodi).58  The statement below is indicative of the sentiments of these 
early leaders: 
In our case it is not only a matter of securing our independence, our 
territory, our borders, the regime – but securing our very physical 
existence.  Our enemies do not conspire only against our territory 
and our independence; we should have no delusions in regard to 
this matter.  They intend, as many of them have openly said, to 
throw us into the sea: put simply, to annihilate every Jew in the 
Land of Israel.59   
This notion that Israel’s existence is at stake is the first of three 
fundamental security assumptions made by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion 
when he was in power.  These assumptions formed the basis for Israel’s early 
pre-occupation with conventional threats, but they began to be challenged by 
both leaders and the populace after the 1967 war. The political and social fault 
lines formed after 1967 became even more apparent after the 1973 war, and 
more so still after the first (1982) Lebanon war.60 
The conventional power supremacy that Israel wielded over its 
neighbors, buttressed by two watershed events that took place on the world 
stage before the turn of the 21st century, helped to significantly reduce the 
likelihood of Israel being drawn into a conventional war.  The first of these events 
was the oil crisis in the 1970s, which allowed Israel to close its “material gaps” 
with its Arab neighbors, which further led to Egypt and Jordan becoming 
                                            
58 Sergio Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and The Intifadas: Dilemmas of a 
Conventional Army (New York: Routledge, 2008), 47. 
59 Ze’ev Drory, Israel’s Reprisal Policy 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005), 41.  This statement is made by Israel’s founding father, David Ben 
Gurion. 
60 Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1990), 27–33; Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy, 36-39.   The three 
assumptions are: (1) Israel’s existence is at stake, (2) Israel will always be quantitatively inferior 
to the Arab states in terms of material resources, as well as territorial depth, (3) Israel will not be 
able to decide the conflict through military means. 
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signatories to the peace agreements in 1979 and 1994 respectively.61  These 
peace agreements helped to mitigate the threats on Israel’s immediate southern 
and eastern fronts.  The second watershed event was the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, which stripped Syria of its main sponsor.  As a result, 
Syria’s increasingly obsolete military capabilities and its inability to modernize 
them meant that Israel no longer had to worry about this remaining conventional 
threat from the north.62  While threats in the conventional realm continued to 
lessen from the 1980s onwards, the security situation in other arenas took a turn 
for the worse.  Specifically, LIC and WMD threats came to take the place of these 
conventional concerns on Israel’s security agenda as the latter faded into 
oblivion. 
Before the first Lebanon War in 1982, Israel regarded LIC threats 
as “current security threats” (bitachon shotef), since they were considered more 
tactically than strategically threatening.63 In the 1960s and 70s, these attacks 
were normally small-scale infiltrations or terrorist kidnappings and hijackings. To 
Israel’s leaders, “terrorism hurts, it is annoying and disruptive, but it does not 
constitute a threat to the country’s very existence.”64 To counter these threats, 
the Israeli government looked to its military elites for solutions, and the answers 
were often in the form of high profile retaliatory operations.65  These actions, 
although not always successful, were sufficiently adequate to appease the  
 
                                            
61 The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed in 1979, while the Israeli-Jordanian peace 
agreement was signed in 1994.  See Gal Luft, “All Quiet on the Eastern Front? Israel’s National 
Security Doctrine After the Fall of Saddam,” Analysis Paper, no. 2 (Washington, DC: Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy, March 2004). 
62 Mehmet Okan Arikan, Transformation of the Israeli Defense Forces: An Application of the 
U.S. Military Transformation? (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004), 32-7. 
63 David Rodman, “Israel’s National Security Doctrine: An Appraisal of the Past and a Vision 
of the Future,” Israel Affairs, vol. 9, no. 4 (2003): 117. 
64 “Rabin Addresses Knesset on Terrorism,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service, October 
21, 1985, 16. 
65 Simon Reeve, One Day in September: The Full Story of the 1972 Munich Olympics 
Massacre and The Israeli Revenge Operation “Wrath of God” (New York: Arcade, 2000), 1-19; 
Yechiel Gutman, A Storm in the GSS (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Ahronot, 1995), 17. 
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electorate and keep the situation under control.  However, these LIC threats 
started to take on a different form with the first Lebanon War in 1982.   
Near the end of the 1970s, attacks carried out by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) from Southern Lebanon began to increase in 
number and intensity.  This infuriated the hawkish Israeli government under 
Prime Minister Menachem Begin, in which Ariel Sharon was Defense Minister 
and Rafael Eitan was Chief of Staff (COS).  They began to view the PLO as an 
existential threat for the first time in Israel’s history.  By doing so, policymakers 
“lowered the threshold for conflict to a level that ultimately made going to war a 
much greater probability.”66  As a result, Israel went to full-scale war in Southern 
Lebanon, a conflict which came to be known as the 1982 Lebanon War.  
Incidentally, besides being the first time LIC was seen as an existential threat, 
this was also the first time Israel engaged in a “war of choice”.  
This decision to engage in a war of choice represented a departure 
from Israel’s early fundamental principles; hence, it further aggravated the fault 
lines in the political and social consensus that had formed after the 1967 war.67  
More importantly, the Lebanon War incensed and radicalized many Islamic 
groups against Israel.  Chief among them was Hezbollah (or “The Party of God”).  
What was worse for Israel was that even after the war ended, the attacks from 
Islamic groups in Lebanon continued to grow in lethality and sophistication from 
the 1980s to the present.  This, ultimately, culminated in the Second Lebanon 
War in 2006.68 
Unbeknownst to Israel, a similar form of LIC was gestating in its 
backyard while it was fighting the threat in South Lebanon. Known as the 
Intifada, this other LIC would soon be waged by Palestinians living in the 
                                            
66 Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and The Intifadas, 64. 
67 Reuven Pedatzur, “Ben-Gurion’s Enduring Legacy,” in Security Concerns: Insights from 
the Israeli Experience, ed. Daniel Bar-Tal et al. (London: JAI Press, 1998), 153. 
68 Nicholas Blanford, “Hezbollah attacks force Israel to take a hard look at Lebanon,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review, vol. 11, no. 4 (1999), 32–7; Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and The 
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occupied territories.  The first Intifada occurred in December 1987, and the 
second in October 2000. The structural under-development of the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank, coupled with the unfair treatment meted out by the Military 
Government administering the territories, subjected the Palestinians to dire living 
conditions.  This, in turn, fostered a sense of injustice and antagonism and gave 
Palestinians a “particular [sense of] consciousness and identity” that coalesced in 
a united front against the Israeli occupation.69  The spark that set off the first 
large-scale uprising came on December 9, 1987 during a funeral-protest 
ceremony in the Jabalya refugee camp.70   
As the Intifada developed, because of Israel’s excessive use of 
force, Israel unwittingly contributed to the growth of new terrorist groups in the 
territories, much as had happened during the first Lebanon War.  Among the 
radical groups that emerged were Hamas (means “strength and bravery” in 
Arabic), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), along with PLO-affiliated groups (such as 
Force 17).71  The Intifada went on for six years before some form of order was 
restored in the Territories under the auspices of the Oslo Peace Accord in 1993.   
However, despite the peace accord, peace remained elusive 
between the “two states.”  Things finally came to a head, again, in October 2000, 
when both parties could not agree on the final-status agreement of the peace 
accord.  This then led to a second round of “uprisings” in the territories, known as 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada (or more commonly, the Second Intifada).  The new terrorist 
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groups were actively involved in this Second Intifada.72 In spite of Israeli efforts 
to get these threats under control over the past decade, the conflicts between the 
two sides remain unremitting until the present day.73 
As the LIC and terrorism threats were growing in the 1980s and 
1990s, another major development was underway in the arena of ballistic 
missiles and WMD.  Not only was there a proliferation of missiles, but also of 
WMD materials in the Middle East region.  This became a major concern for 
Israeli policy makers for two reasons: first, Israel was extremely vulnerable due to 
its “small size and highly concentrated population and industry.” Second, more 
distant states could now attack Israel “without the need to join a coalition 
including states contiguous to Israel.”74 In addition, policy makers were also 
worried about weapons from the former Soviet falling into rogue hands to be 
used against Israel. Consequently, the threats from this arena were also elevated 
and were seen as existential.75 
In sum, the threats that Israel has faced spread across the full 
spectrum from low to high intensity, and can be viewed in terms of circles: the 
inner ring comprises LIC threats from the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, as well as 
from Southern Lebanon. The second ring contains the conventional threats from 
Israel’s immediate neighbors. The third and last ring is composed of hostile 
states that have no common border with Israel, but can threaten it with missiles 
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and WMD. Today, according to Israel’s threat perception, the two non-
conventional threats, WMD and LIC, are the top two security concerns for the 
country. More disconcerting for Israel, the players involved, namely Hamas, 
Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, do not just operate singly, but also collaborate with 
one another or with other international terrorist groups.  In such a threat 
environment, Israeli SOF are not only relevant, but have become increasingly 
important as Israel’s political, social, and economic conditions also continue to 
evolve. 76 
b. Political-Military Relationship 
Few democracies in the world have Israel’s same kind of political-
military relationship, whereby the military wields a dominant influence over 
defense decision-making, as well as policy-making processes.  Essentially, there 
is no clear distinction between the political and the military spheres.77  Ironically, 
David Ben-Gurion, the founding father of Israel who always thought that the 
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military should be distinctly separated from the political sphere,78 unwittingly 
planted the seeds that yielded the political-military relationship we see today. 
Three of those seeds are: (1) the bitchonist (“securitist”) orientation that makes 
the IDF a critical part of the Israeli system, (2) the “purge system” that results in 
the “parachute” syndrome by which retiring young military officers seek 
government careers,79 and (3) the deliberate effort to keep the relationship vague 
to allow his personal control.   
During Israel’s founding years, Ben-Gurion was able to instill in the 
populace a view that the Arab threat was intractable and of a zero-sum type.  As 
such, he was able to make security and the state’s survival the central themes in 
the nation’s affairs, which then turned Israel into a “nation-in-arms.”80  For Ben-
Gurion, “the term security...included not only military organizations, but also 
anything associated with the survival, defense and development of Israel.”81  
More importantly, in his view society as a whole was responsible for Israel’s 
independence and existence; every citizen was to partake in the “nation-building” 
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process, and the IDF was the unifying instrument to achieve this end.82  Ben-
Gurion’s “securitist” orientation led to (1) universal conscription, (2) the IDF’s 
pervasiveness and encroachment into other realms of the Israeli system (such as 
education), and (3) the IDF being placed on a pedestal.83   
Due to the centrality of defense in the Israeli system and the 
prestige accorded to the IDF, Israel’s first generation of leaders often used the 
military as a policy instrument.  As noted by Udi Lebel: 
Defense policy in Israel has always been considered the most 
critical domain, providing Israelis with their most vital public 
product: security. The tool of security is the army, which has 
become endowed with a religious status . . . Security receives the 
lion’s share of the State budget, and defense policy is the key 
component determining the way citizens vote.84 
As a result, the IDF became more like “an army working as a partner in the 
political process, integrated with the civil power even beyond the national-
security field.”85  Also, because the civil system lacked the kind of strategic 
planning capabilities that the IDF possessed, this further encouraged political 
leaders to rely heavily on the IDF’s assessment and recommendations.  The high 
regard accorded to the IDF by both Israeli political elites and society was then 
further elevated after the 1967 war.  As noted by Stuart Cohen, “for some two 
decades after the mid-1960s, the relationship of the leading figures in Israel’s 
political, economic and judicial establishments toward the IDF was basically one 
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of symbiosis.”86  Inevitably, the IDF found itself “dragged into [the] internal 
political disputes within Israel.”  This was in part because many of the political 
parties tried to recruit senior military officers to be theirs.87  This recruitment 
drive, in turn, contributed to the parachute syndrome, which, to a large degree, 
was founded on the purge system implemented by Ben-Gurion to keep the IDF 
force young, innovative, and politically neutral.  Because of  “parachuting,” by 
2000, Israel had already had eight IDF senior leaders take the role of Defense 
Minister (DEFMIN), and, among them, three became Prime Minister (PM).88 This 
helped to even further politicize the role of the military in security decision-
making.89   
In the Israeli civil-military system, the key players are the PM, 
DEFMIN, Chief of General Staff (CGS), Cabinet and Knesset.  However, it is the 
relations among the PM, DEFMIN and CGS that prove to be the most 
problematic and have the most cascading effects in the decision-making realm.  
Due to the lack of a formal constitution that could clearly delineate the roles and 
responsibilities of these three players in the decision- and policy-making 
processes, the relationship among them is at best nebulous.  The reason for this 
can, again, be traced to Ben-Gurion, who intentionally left the relationships 
ambiguous during his tenure.  Although some efforts were made to try to rectify 
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the problems after he left office, they were nothing more than half-hearted. 90  
The situation was made worse when the PM-DEFMIN positions were split after 
the 1967 War.91   
Due to the creation of a DEFMIN separate from the PM, it is now 
the DEFMIN and CGS who fight to be the voice for the IDF. This competition 
often results in the military exploiting the unclear relationship to its advantage.  
By doing so, the IDF further entrenches itself in the realm of strategic decision 
and policy making, thus blurring the civil-military relationship even further.92  
As it is not my intention to trace the full development of the Israeli 
political-military system from its birth to the present, suffice it to say that what 
Ben-Gurion did in the early years, to a large extent, contributed to the current 
state of Israel’s political-military relationship.  The pervasiveness of the IDF in the 
early years, followed by the “parachuting” of generals into the political system, 
plus Ben-Gurion’s failure to correct the system before he left office, inadvertently 
paved the way for the IDF to make inroads into the political sphere.  Once this 
pattern was set in the Israeli system without being corrected, the IDF’s ability to 
wield disproportionate influence over the decision and policy making became an 
accepted norm.  In this way, “political deference to the military... [as] an enduring 
hallmark of the Israeli system” was crystallized.93   As a result, despite potentially 
profound changes in the broader environment and a substantial decline in the  
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status of the IDF after the 1973 war, the political elite have continuously failed to 
subjugate the military to their control. 94  Hence, the political-military relationship 
remains problematic.   
Pertinent to this thesis, this fraught relationship makes maintaining 
oversight of the IDF a huge challenge for policy makers, and it also causes 
substantial tension between political and military elites.95  The confluence of 
these dynamics then leads to the failure to construct a clear and consistent 
national security doctrine, which further allows the military to exploit and 
dominate the defense decision-making realm.  As will be shown later, leaving the 
military to decide the security strategy without clear guidance from the political 
echelon has resulted in the IDF’s failure to adapt to the prevailing strategic 
environment.  And, this failure to adapt has certainly affected Israeli SOF. 
c. The IDF 
We will now look at two key aspects of the IDF that have a 
significant impact on SOF—the IDF’s culture and resources (budget).  For IDF 
culture, “mission-command principles” coupled with the Bituism ethos, and a 
favorable environment for SOF both stand out.  The former affects the senior 
military leaders’ ability to think strategically, and hence can be argued to be the 
reason why Israel does not have a consistent and clear security/military doctrine 
for SOF.  For its part, the latter bodes well for SOF, as it means SOF is not  
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discriminated against by the conventional forces.  This is in contrast to the 
situation in some countries, for example the United States, where there is often a 
schism between SOF and the conventional forces.96   
In terms of resources, the tightening of the defense budget, coupled 
with the IDF’s preoccupation with state-of-the-art weapon systems and platforms 
pose challenges. Together, they affect SOF’s ability to maintain a technical edge, 
not only in terms of “hardware” (equipment) but also “software” (skill sets).  
Ultimately, as we will see, the favorable environment for SOF has not translated 
into guaranteed support in terms of the resources and attention SOF demand. 
(1)  Mission-Command Principles and Bituism.  One of Ben-
Gurion’s main concerns was Israel’s quantitative inferiority in terms of material 
resources and territorial depth when compared to its Arab neighbors.  To 
overcome these shortfalls, he believed Israel’s advantage would have to be 
found in its people.  Consequently, Israel placed a high premium on the 
qualitative edge of the IDF soldier, with an emphasis on strong leadership, 
competence, and hard training to produce the kind of “force multipliers” the 
country has needed when confronting its bigger enemies.  In addition to having a 
young and aggressive officer corps with strong leadership skills, IDF soldiers 
were also technologically literate.  With its mission-command ethos, the IDF 
concentrated on the operational and tactical flexibility needed to achieve 
battlefield victory over its Arab neighbors in the shortest possible time.   
The two key characteristics of the mission-command ethos 
are: (1) a command and control structure that decentralizes decision making to 
the lower ranks of command, and (2) dedication to objectives rather than rigid 
plans.  Combining the mission-command ethos with bituism (a Hebrew word  
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that means “to do”) yields an IDF organizational culture where “tactical autonomy” 
and improvisation are highly valued, officers are objectives-oriented, aggressive, 
and have strong initiative.97  However, as important and necessary as this culture 
is for maintaining the IDF’s tactical and operational edge, there has been a 
downside thanks to its entrenchment through all levels of officership. 
Because of the constant-conflict environment in which Israel 
finds itself, the IDF culture ends up encouraging in IDF commanders a focus that 
is often short-term and tactically/operationally-biased.  This undermines the 
imperative for leaders to think long-term and strategically vis-à-vis force 
preparation and planning.  Also, it retards leaders’ intellectual capacity “to learn, 
plan and reflect,” so much so that it often obscures leaders’ ability to appreciate 
their actions within the larger context of the war or conflict.  This culture even 
results in the IDF preferring “a pragmatic bituist (‘doer’) over a reflective 
thinker.”98 Consequently, IDF commanders too often allow themselves to be 
caught up with “pressing day-to-day problems” rather than being “troubled by the 
war to come,” and they “want to be everywhere, to decide everything, to invest 
the maximum in whatever engages them.”99  Significantly, this culture permeates 
all levels of the officer corps, from the Brigade to the Division, and even up 
through the General Staff Commanders.100  To some degree, it is because of this 
culture that Israel has continued to fail to redress its ambiguous political-military 
relations, as well as its national security/military doctrine.  
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(2)  Favorable SOF-Conventional Environment.  The IDF has 
an elitist culture that places the Israeli SOF in a favorable environment.  This is in 
part thanks to Israel’s long history of relying on its SOF or elite forces.  From the 
Special Night Squad under Captain Orde Charles Wingate, to the Pal’mach, and 
then to the more recent Unit 101 and the many Sayeret units, these are all 
special units that accept only the crème de la crème; the individuals of these 
units epitomize the elite warrior qualities of the IDF.101  To this end, SOF and 
elite units are the most popular with young draftees inducted into IDF.102   
Another indicator that underlines the IDF’s positive attitude 
toward its SOF is the career path of officers from these SOF units.  Many 
commanders of these units rise to become senior leaders not only in their own 
services, but also at the General Staff and national level. There was even a time 
when the IDF General Staff was “populated by special operations officers who, 
many say, represent the new IDF.”103 
(3)  Resources.  Unfortunately for Israeli SOF, the IDF’s pro-
SOF environment does not translate directly into guaranteed support in key 
areas such as budgetary resources.  This is exemplified in the IDF’s knack of 
allocating disproportionate budgetary resources toward high tech systems and 
platforms, rather than the lower cost equipment for SOF/ground forces.  The 
former is driven largely by the IDF’s offensive and technologically-biased military 
doctrine. This propensity to invest in state-of-the-art technology and platforms 
(predominantly for the Air Force) can be seen in the IDF’s most recent budget 
allocations and plans.  From 2008 to 2010, between 65–68% of the defense 
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budget allotted to procurement and R&D was spent on the Air Force. Further, 
even though there are plans to modernize the army as articulated in the Teffen 
2012 workplan, most of the modernization involves artillery and tank pieces, 
which are not totally relevant in the LIC domain.104 These figures serve to 
reinforce the assertion that the IDF’s top echelon is still very much tethered to its 
high-intensity and conventional warfare mindset, and has failed to adapt to the 
prevailing security environment.105   
To make matters worse for the SOF community, the defense 
budget as a whole is suffering from cutbacks by the government.  Since the 
1990s, there has been a steady decline in the defense budget, dropping from 
about 12% of the total budget in 1990 to a steady level of about 7% in the 
2000s.106  More recently, in 2009 and 2010, the Knesset instituted further cuts in 
the army budget. These cost-cutting measures are not meant just to address the 
recent downturn, but are here to stay. According to Jane’s defense report, the 
Knesset aims to trim more than US$3 billion from the defense budget over the 
next 10 years (2011 to 2019).107 Some may argue that SOF’s budget often 
makes up a small percentage of the overall defense budget, and, therefore, 
these factors should not have a significant impact on SOF. In the Israeli case, 
however, the proliferation of ad-hoc special/elite units to counter the LIC threat 
has complicated the situation and given rise to severe competition over the 
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already small SOF budget.108  In the end, this small budget may not be sufficient 
for all the SOF/elite units engaged in countering the LIC threat, and may result in 
a repeat of what transpired during the Second Intifada.   During the Second 
Intifada, SOF’s training and equipping were significantly impacted by a similarly 
tight economy and the IDF’s proclivity for high-tech standoff systems at the 
time.109 
d. Population 
Notwithstanding talk about the IDF becoming a more professional 
force, no such plans have come to fruition.110  The IDF (SOF included) remain 
heavily dependent on Israeli society for its draftees and reservists who make up 
the bulk of the force.  It is thus important to examine how societal changes in the 
21st century might affect Israeli SOF.  One particular issue is recruitment and 
retention, with an area of concern being youths’ greater focus on individualism 
versus more traditional “collectivism.” This is further reinforced by a changing 
Israeli national identity and the success of a “privatized” economy.  
In Israel’s formative years, the whole society had always stood 
behind the government’s concept of “milkhemet ein breira” (wars of no choice), 
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with budget cuts in the period of the second intifada, the IDF’s ground forces training exercises 
were drastically reduced, so much so that this significantly affected the readiness of the soldiers.  
Pertinent to SOF, “the course of training for elite units ha[d] been halved to one year.”  The 
“hardware” part of the equation was also severely affected.  For example, during Operation “Days 
of Penitence” in October 2004, a team of elite soldiers was sent into an urban area in Gaza for a 
two-week mission without proper “flak jackets.”  This led some soldiers to comment that “other 
than the air force, this is an army that is held together by masking tape and rope and there is 
always a lack of equipment.” 
110 Arikan, Transformation of the Israeli Defense Forces, 95-6.  The plans refer to the IDF 
moving away from tradition of being a “people’s army.” 
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as the threats from the second circle were indeed real and present.111  This 
facilitated the creation of a “people’s army” under the Defense Service Law in 
1949 that established “the three-tier military service system of conscription, 
permanent and reserve military service.”112  Further, this securitist orientation 
also gave rise to the “social evaluative system of Israel,” which incentivized the 
whole notion of contributing to the state’s security.113  As a result, “service in the 
IDF had gone beyond legal obligations, and it had in effect became Israel’s civil 
religion.”114  However, this collectivism and patriotism started to come apart in 
the 1982 Lebanon War, as the war represented a fundamental shift in Israel’s 
principles of milkhemet ein breira. Since then, there has been a growing division 
in Israeli society’s perception of its strategic environment and security policies. 
Many no longer see Israel as the victim of wars of no choice.  This deepening of 
social fault lines is reflective of changing demographics, among other causes.115   
Another development on the economic front has also affected 
social cohesion.  Following the privatization in the 1980s, Israel’s economy did 
well and contributed to material prosperity.116  Society became more self-
centered, leading to a greater focus on the individual and less willingness to 
                                            
111 Reuven Gal, A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier (London: Greenwood, 1986), 147.  According 
to Gal, this concept was formed as a result of two collective memories: “on the one hand, the 
living memory of the Holocaust and on the other, the recognition that the state of Israel, the only 
sovereign home of the Jews, was surrounded by Arab states waiting to take advantage of any 
Israeli weakness.” 
112 Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and The Intifadas, 31. 
113 Dan Horowitz and Baruch Kimmerling, “Some Social Implications of Military Service and 
the Reserves System in Israel,” European Journal of Sociology, vol. 15, no. 1 (1974): 265. 
Because of the pervasiveness of security in Israeli society, participation in security tasks, 
especially in combat roles, is seen as a reward.  In a way, the extent to which one contributes to 
the defense of Israel helps determine one’s socio-economic and political status. 
114 Arikan, Transformation of the Israeli Defense Forces, 59. 
115 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16-32.  According to Shafir and Peled, modern 
Israeli society has three main discourses – Republican, Liberal, and Ethno- nationalist. The 
Republican is associated with the early Ashkenazi elites and is about the shared ideals of 
Zionism. The Liberal is mainly a result of post-modern culture and is supported by economically 
strong Ashkenazi and sympathizers, such as immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, Arab 
citizens, and guest workers. Ethno-nationalists are usually Mizrahi Jews and the haredim. Some 
haredim only cooperate with the State for practical purposes. 
116 Weinraub, The Evolution Of Israeli Civil-Military Relations, 47. 
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sacrifice for the sake of the collective good. More importantly, this has affected 
younger Israelis’ attitudes toward their service in the IDF and SOF.  As Mark A. 
Heller writes: 
such conscripts, influenced by a broader social ethos of personal 
self-fulfillment, were increasingly likely to view military service as an 
opportunity to acquire professional skills and knowledge, or to 
develop social networks that would be useful in later life, rather 
than simply as a way to contribute to the security of the country. 117 
Further, the statistics Heller compiled point to a distinct decline in the draftees’ 
willingness to enlist for a full three-year stint of service, including for service with 
combat units.118  Ultimately, this may mean SOF will face greater challenges in 
recruiting and retaining the right kind of people going into the future. 
2. Israeli Security and Military Doctrine 
According to Ariel Levite,  
At the strategic and operational levels, military doctrine establishes 
the principles that guide the design of military force structure and 
operations...[and is] the connecting link between defense policy and 
national strategy on the one hand, and the operational plans of the 
armed forces on the other.119   
From this, it can be inferred that for the military to be an effective national 
defense instrument, military doctrine has to be aligned with national 
security/defense strategy. But, in the case of Israel, there is no such unequivocal 
national security doctrine and, surprisingly, there has never been one.120  
                                            
117 Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy, 47, 59. 
118 Pertinent to SOF, in the best secular schools known for producing Israel’s social, 
economic and political leaders, willingness to serve in combat units declined by 24% between 
1993 to 1998. 
119 Ariel Levite, Offence and Defence in Israeli Military Doctrine (San Francisco: Westview 
Press, 1989), 9–10. 
120 Rodman, Defense and Diplomacy in Israel’s National Security Experience, 2; Moshe 
Lissak, “Civilian Components in the National security doctrine,” in National Security and 
Democracy in Israel, ed. Avner Yaniv (London: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 64; Heller, Continuity and 
Change in Israeli Security Policy, 9.  According to these authors, Israel has never had such a 
Defense White Paper or the kind of guidance or doctrine normally issued by national authorities.   
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Instead, what Israel uses to guide the formulation of its military doctrine are 
security concepts based on the leadership’s interpretation of the strategic 
environment and some central assumptions inherited from the state’s earlier 
years.121  Because of this, and because of the dynamics in the political-military 
relationship at the leadership level (described previously), the IDF is left very 
much in control of decision making in the security realm.  As we shall see, given 
such latitude, the military tends to exploit this for its own organizational benefit.122  
Despite significant changes in the strategic environment, changes to 
military doctrine have been more evolutionary than revolutionary.  This can be 
explained largely thanks to the strong organizational culture and memory of the 
IDF, with leaders tethered to their offensive and somewhat conventional 
mindset.123  Moreover, there have been no real incentives for them to break 
away from this mindset as, given society’s growing sensitivity to the use of the 
“civilian army,” the associated issue of casualties in the IDF has also loomed 
large. Taking these two factors together, leaders only stand to benefit by 
                                            
121 Heller, Continuity and Change in Israeli Security Policy, 9-10. 
122 Ze’ev Drory, Israel’s Reprisal Policy 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation 
(London: Frank Cass, 2005), 4; Dan Horowitz, “Israel's War in Lebanon: New Patterns of 
Strategic Thinking and Civil-Military Relations,” in Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: 
The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, ed. Moshe Lissak (London: Frank 
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123 Avi Kober, “Israeli War Objectives Into an Era of Negativism,” in Israel’s National Security 
Towards The 21st Century, ed. Uri Bar-Joseph (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 186-7.  Israel’s 
earlier “offensive-defense” security concept was predicated on: first, Israel lacks strategic depth 
and hence is not able to absorb enemy attack; second, offense is a “force multiplier” because it 
“compensates for their [Israel’s] quantitative inferiority by initiating war and choosing the place 
and time of the confrontation;” third, offense is regarded as the only way in which battlefield 
victory can be achieved. Consequently, Israel’s military doctrine places a premium on early 
warning and offensive pre-emption to help the IDF take the battle to enemy territory, and also 
emphasizes a short war with minimum casualties.  One can argue that these concepts remain 
dominant in today’s IDF’s doctrine. This, to a large degree, is due to the deeply ingrained 
organizational culture, including the bituist ethos.  Also, the fact that many political-military 
leaders are veterans of previous wars means this offensive doctrine can provide other things like 
prestige and status. 
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continuing to emphasize the use of advanced standoff weapons systems and 
platforms in contrast to putting boots on the ground.   
Some authors describe this new concept as bringing fire, rather than the 
battle, to the enemy territory.124  We see evidence of this shift in the last three 
conflicts — namely the two intifadas and the Second Lebanon War.  Excessive 
firepower was employed even in LIC environments.125  Thus, worth examining is 
what this means for SOF.  To be sure, there has been at least one critical impact: 
namely, the neglect of Israeli SOF. This, in turn, has had at least two deleterious 
effects on optimizing SOF’s overall organization for the changed strategic 
environment. One, there has been a failure to clearly address the division of 
labor among SOF/elite units.  Two, budgetary resources for SOF have been 
scarce due to the IDF’s preoccupation with advanced standoff systems and 
platforms.  As a consequence of these Structural issues, problems have arisen in 
the Tasks, Culture, and Human Capital aspects of Israel’s SOF organization.   
3. Israeli Service-Centric SO Organization 
Having understood the kind of environment in which the Israeli SOF 
organization operates, we will now examine the SOF organization to see how 
well it is set up to negotiate this environment.  In Israel’s case, the macro-SOF 
organization is still a Service-centric structure, which means both administrative 
and operational C2 are tied to each individual service.  Rather than focus on 
each individual service level, this section of the chapter takes an aggregated look 
at all the SOF units from the IDF’s perspective.  Although there have been 
reports and talk about Israel setting up an oversight agency to coordinate all SO, 
                                            
124 Catignani, Israeli Counter-Insurgency and The Intifadas, 71; Avi Kober, “Israeli War 
Objectives Into an Era of Negativism,” 190-1; “Israel Defence Budget,” IHS Jane’s.  According to 
Jane’s Defence Report, the Teffen 2012 workplan continues to focus on advanced standoff 
weapon systems and platforms.  Although some of these systems are meant to address 
unconventional threats at the higher end, there is still a significant neglect of LIC.  Further, there 
is also no mention that SOF is considered part of this strategic standoff/strike system under the 
resource allocation process.  The resource allocation process also seems to still be service-
based rather than system- or solution-based.   
125 Ibid., 108–9, 188–9.  
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there is no evidence to confirm the existence of such a body at the time of this 
writing.126  Hence, if this section turns out to be dated, it should still serve to 
highlight the advantages and disadvantages of a Service-centric macro-SOF 
organization. 
In sum, the Israeli SOF comprise four key units—Sayeret Matkal (AMAN, 
Military Intelligence),127 Maglan (Army), Shaldag (Air Force), and Shayetet 13 
(Navy). 
a. Structure 
The biggest challenge in studying Israeli SOF is to try to separate 
those units that are truly special from those that are merely elite.  Due to the 
strong elitist culture in the IDF, coupled with the fact that there is no clear 
doctrine to delineate these forces, we can easily find units proclaiming 
themselves to be special or “expert” in certain SO-type missions.  To be sure, 
this is not a recent phenomenon; however, when LIC burst onto Israel’s security 
scene in the late 70s, this problem was amplified. Since the 70s, more units have 
been added to the fold, including those from other branches of the Israeli 
government, such as Intelligence and Police.128  
For the purposes of this thesis, I have chosen to start with the 
categorization given by Ami Pedahzur in his book, The Israeli Secret Services 
and The Struggle Against Terrorism, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.   IDF SOF and Elite Units129 [From Pedahzur, p. 5] 
From the figure, it is clear that the SOF units in Israel are Sayeret 
Matkal, Maglan, Shaldag, and Shayetet 13 (S’13).  These units have a direct 
connection to the top leaders in their respective services, especially during 
strategic operations. Furthermore, in some operations, the line of 
communications even reaches to the top of the IDF.130  By way of comparison, 
elite Army Sayeret units fall under the regional command and are further 
subordinated to their respective Corps or Division. Beyond the ability to 
communicate directly with those at the top, which is critical for a strategic asset 
like SOF, Israeli SOF are also well supported by their adjacent services during 
operations (e.g., by Intelligence and air support).  This is thanks to the inherently 
                                            
129 Sayeret stands for reconnaissance, and Mistaaravim means “to disguise oneself” and “to 
become Arab”, for the purpose of intelligence collection and clandestine operations. 
130 Ze’ev Almog, Flotilla 13: Israeli Naval Commandos in the Red Sea, 1967-1973 
(Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 48–51. 
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joint culture of the IDF.131  SOF’s ability to operate jointly with other services 
(either other services’ SOF or conventional forces) can be seen in many 
operations throughout the IDF’s combat history and is exemplified by the two 
examples below: 
(1)  Operation Bulmus 6 (July 19, 1969).  This was an 
operation conducted during the War of Attrition on Green Island located in the 
Gulf of Suez.  This operation involved the S’13 and Sayeret Matkal as the main 
combatants, while the conventional forces (helicopter, fighter aircraft, and 
artillery) served as the support forces.  The aim of the mission was to “liquidate 
the enemy force on Green Island and incapacitate structures and guns” on the 
island.132  In the end, SOF accomplished the mission successfully, which 
provided Israel with the strategic signaling it needed vis-à-vis Egypt.  More 
importantly, this operation showcased SOF’s ability to operate jointly at the 
component level, and also with the conventional forces.133  
(2)  Operation Spring of Youth (April 9, 1973).  This was a 
leadership-targeting mission conducted during Operation Wrath of God aimed at 
punishing the PLO in the aftermath of the Munich Massacre.  This mission 
involved four key parties—S’13, Sayeret Matkal, the Paratroopers 
Reconnaissance unit, and Mossad agents. Essentially, the S’13 was to deliver 
the Sayeret Matkal and the paratroopers to the Beirut shore where they would 
then meet up with the Mossad agents who would guide them to their objective.  
The aim of the mission was to assassinate three senior Fatah members living in  
 
 
                                            
131 This joint culture has been built into the IDF since its formative years.  Due to the 
asymmetry of forces between Israel and the Arab states in conventional warfare, Israel has come 
to accept that it needs to gain superiority in other areas in order to upend the Arab forces.  One 
key to achieving this is to wage joint warfare, the Israeli version of “blitzkrieg,” so that it can offset 
its inferiority in numbers.  This was demonstrated in the 1967 war and the latter part of the 1973 
war.  
132 Almog, Flotilla 13, 25. 
133 Ibid.  For more details on the operation, see pp. 31–99. 
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Beirut.  Although two paratroopers were killed during the mission, the team 
achieved its main objectives.134  This mission, again, demonstrated SOF’s inter-
operability, to include with the Intelligence agency.  
These successes only tell half the story, however.  In 
contrast to the positive relationships we see in these examples, SOF units do not 
seem to enjoy the same degree of interoperability with elite units from their same 
service (this is especially the case for army units) or with other special units 
expressing expertise in the same area.  One possible explanation for this is that 
there is “territorial competition” between SOF and these other units, which is 
underpinned by the fight over scarce resources.  Arguably, this is not a problem 
within the SOF community because there seems to be a tacit understanding 
regarding each unit’s domain of interest, plus the fact that they are separated by 
the service lines (recall that SOF units fall fully under the services).135 
b. Tasks 
In general, the tasks of Israeli SOF and elite units revolve around 
two key domains: (1) short duration, commando-type operations (including 
counterterrorism), and (2) intelligence collection or reconnaissance-type 
operations. At this point, it is important to distinguish between the Matkal and the 
other elite Army Sayeret units.  Although all of them are prefixed with the term 
Sayeret, which means Reconnaissance, Matkal is the de facto “General Staff 
Recon Unit” and is a part of Aman.136  The other Sayerets are the elite recon 
units of the Army Division or Corps.  The more specific definition of Matkal’s 
tasks, as well as those of the rest of the SOF units, are as follows. 
(1)  Sayeret Matkal (or Unit 269): Historically, this unit’s 
mission was to operate and maintain listening devices behind enemy lines for 
                                            
134 Moshe Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel (Jerusalem: Keter, 2000), 59-60; Mike Eldar, 
Flotilla 13 (Tel Aviv: Maariv, 1993), 469–80. 
135 Although my intention is to focus on the four SF units, references have to be made to 
other elite units to bring home the point about the lack of a clear doctrine for SO. 
136 Katz, Israeli Special Forces, 9-10, 20. 
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military intelligence, Aman.  It was modeled after the British Special Air Service 
(SAS) and was conversant with small unit operations.  However, with the onset of 
LIC, it has become more of a counterterrorism than an intelligence unit.137  
(2)  Shayetet 13 (or Ha’Kommando Ha’Yami as it is known in 
Israel): is comprised of Israel’s naval commandos and is modeled along the lines 
of the British Special Boat Service (SBS).  This unit is expert not only in short 
duration and small-scale naval assault and underwater operations, but also para-
infantry maneuvers in coastal areas.  Additionally, Israel’s naval commandos 
operate their own small craft, like kayaks and mini-submarines (called “pigs”).138  
In more recent times, CT (especially maritime CT) has become another of this 
unit’s missions due to the high incidence of terrorism. 
(3)  Yechidat Shaldag (or Unit 5101):  This is a special 
operations aviation unit that resembles the U.S. 160th Special Operations 
Aviation Regiment. Apart from its main mission of marking targets behind enemy 
lines for air strikes, it is also capable of long-range patrolling in enemy-held 
territory.139 
(4)  Sayeret Maglan (or Unit 212):  This unit is the youngest 
of the four; it is a special task force attached to the three regional commands, but 
reports directly to the General Staff.  It specializes in long-range missile warfare 
using Anti Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), and it is also capable of operating 
jointly with the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to mark targets using laser-targeting. 
However, when LIC became an “existential threat” to Israel, this unit shifted its 
focus to CT as well, and fielded “terrorist hunters” in the LIC environment.140 
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Given that these SOF units fall under their respective 
services’ C2, their areas of responsibilities are tied to their “natural” operational 
domains.  Again, although there is some overlap in the area of CT especially, 
there has been no reported antagonism or competition between them.  Rather, 
in-fighting occurs more often at the intra-service level or between different 
security establishments—for example, between Sayeret units in the Army, or, 
between Sayeret Matkal and Yamam (Police), or between Aman and GSS 
(Israeli National Intelligence Agency). The ambiguous delineation of job 
responsibilities in the realm of LIC is the root cause of this unhealthy culture.  
Still, to fully account for this in-fighting, we need to take into consideration at least 
two other factors. 
First, most of these elite infantry units are built for war. With 
the likelihood of a conventional war much diminished, commanders needed to 
find a new niche area for their units.  Hence, when LIC became the dominant 
concern among policy makers, it became a magnet for these commanders.141  At 
first glance, this might seem like just another manifestation of the bituist  
(improvisational) culture of the IDF; however, on closer inspection, there may be 
a career-enhancing aspect to commanders’ interest in LIC and CT.  Closely 
related to this, is the continual need to “fight” to secure resources. As mentioned 
previously, most of the IDF’s budget goes to the IAF. Consequently, everyone 
else operates in a resource-constrained environment and, hence, needs to not 
only project the image of being indispensable, but must also prove to be good in 
their role to ensure their survival.   
Cumulatively, these factors would push any ambitious 
commander to put LIC at the top of his agenda, and, by so doing, would also lead 
those who are especially ambitious to either “form new units or wings within units 
                                            
141 When the terrorist threats against Israel peaked in the early 2000s (in tandem with the 
second Intifada), they caught the eye of both the political-military leadership and the public.  In 
order to show the public the government was combating the problem, the leadership was willing 
to give all the means necessary to whichever units were successful in such missions.   
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that already exist, [or] divert forces to counterterrorism missions...”142  This, in 
turn, would be sufficient to create unhealthy and unnecessary competition 
between units, generating antagonism and sub-optimal cooperation at best, and 
sabotage at worst. Other problems include units not being able to adequately 
perform their newly acquired tasks due to insufficient/improper training, or, units’ 
core skills becoming so degraded that the unit becomes the master of none.  
Below are some examples that illustrate these problems: 
• Antagonism and Sabotage.  The deep seated rivalry 
between Matkal and Yamam in the domain of domestic CT dates back to the 
1980s, not long after Yamam was formed as the designated agency to prosecute 
domestic CT.143 However, due to political favoritism shown to Sayeret Matkal, 
Yamam often became the back-up force instead of the force of choice as 
mandated.   
The first manifestation of this rivalry occurred during the 
Misgav Am incident in April 1980.  A cell from the Arab Liberation Front seized 
hostages at a children’s nursery in Kibbutz Misgav Am. Both the Sayeret Matkal 
and Yamam teams were called to the site.  However, the Chief of Staff, who was 
the on-site commander for the operation, decided to entrust Sayeret Matkal with 
the mission.  He did so despite Yamam’s having been designated the unit to 
handle this type of mission.  In the end, although the Matkal teams managed to 
kill all the terrorists, they suffered six wounded, one infant killed, and one nursery 
staff member wounded.  The entire episode angered the Yamam fighters and, in 
protest, they collected their police passes in a bag and threw them in the face of 
the on-site commanders.144 
                                            
142 Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services, 113, 137.  
143 Yamam was born in the aftermath of two infamous hostage rescue missions conducted 
by Sayeret Matkal – Ma’alot in May 1974, and the Savoy Hotel in May 1975.  After the failure of 
these two operations, the Israeli government decided to act on the recommendations made by 
the inquiry commission for the Ma’alot incident, which was to set up Yamam.  Yamam, to this day, 
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see: Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel, 108–116. 
144 Zonder, The Elite Unit of Israel, 188–9; Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services, 62–4. 
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The antagonism and competition between the two units did 
not abate.  In an April 1984 incident, called the “Bus 300 Affair,” and in July 2003 
when a taxi driver (Eliyahu Gurel) was kidnapped, the IDF commanders in 
charge once again sidelined the Yamam teams.  This incensed the Yamam 
fighters to such an extent that several resigned.145 
Intense competition between units occasionally even gave 
rise to sabotage.  In April 2002, Sayeret Matkal and a Duvdevan unit were 
activated to conduct a high profile kidnap rescue operation against the Tanzim 
forces in the West Bank.  The Duvdevan soldiers, in their overzealous bid to be 
the “chosen unit” for this mission, sabotaged the Matkal team by hiding the truck 
it was to use to move to the mission area.146 
• Ineffectiveness Due To Inadequate Training/Preparation.  In 
August 2006, during the Second Lebanon War, Operation Sharp and Smooth 
was launched with teams composed of the Shaldag commandos and the Sayeret 
Matkal. This kidnap operation took place in the city of Baalbek.  The target was 
the Hezbollah leader, Hasan Nasrallah.  For some reason, the Shaldag 
commandos were chosen for the main task (the abduction) even though they 
were the less experienced of the two forces involved.  In the end, the Shaldag 
commandos managed to take five men hostage based purely on their names, but 
all five had to be released because of mistaken identities.  Although it is not clear 
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146 Ibid., 80; Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, The Seventh War (Tel Aviv: Miskal, 2004), 
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they abducted the men, nor is it certain the Matkal could have done a more 
professional job, what is clear is that the Shaldag commandos did not perform 
adequately for the assigned task.147   
In a second operation, the IDF deployed a team of S’13 
divers to the Lebanese City of Tyre in yet another attempt to kidnap high-ranking 
Hezbollah leaders.  Although the tasks involved in this mission were clearly 
antithetical to S’13’s operating principles, its divers were assigned. This mission 
took place in the heart of a city and required operators to dominate a five-story 
building before the actual kidnap could proceed.  In the end, the S’13 not only 
failed to achieve the mission (the Hezbollah leaders managed to escape), but 
also suffered eight wounded.148 
• Dilution of Core Expertise.  Since the onset of the Second 
Intifada, the S’13 has been increasingly deployed for land operations in a LIC 
environment.  This can be attributed to a deliberate decision made by former 
Israeli Navy Commander Yedidya Yaari.  According to Yaari, who was the 
commander when the Intifada started, “enemy ports had become less relevant 
and the commandos needed to be retrained to work in the alleys of the 
Casbah.”149  This decision led to many divers being sent to operate in the “alleys” 
and, consequently, affected their ability to operate in the water.150  As a result, it 
caused some concerns and unhappiness within the S’13 community, among  
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participate. The collaboration with the army helped “break new ground” for them, in terms of 
promotion and progression within the army ranks. 
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veterans in particular, as they felt that S’13 participation in these operations had 
undermined the unit’s ability to conduct the tasks for which it was originally 
established.151 
c. Human Capital and Culture 
Despite several initiatives over the past decade to reduce the 
burden on reservists and draftees, Israel still has a “people’s army.”152  Today, 
Israeli SOF still rely on draftees and, to some degree, reservists.  Pertinent to this 
thesis, the employment of draftees in SO tasks, specifically in CT missions, 
proves to be especially challenging for SOF, and will likely be even more so in 
the future. 
Draftees in SOF enter service around age eighteen and serve for a 
period of three years.153  To be full-fledged SOF members, they have to go 
through a selection phase, known as Gibush; the actual SOF training then lasts 
(on average) about a year.154  This means that by the time a draftee joins the 
SOF community, he would have less than two years of service time left.  In 
addition to a short service time, draftees present another problem: their maturity 
level.  
The ill effects of using draftees for CT missions may be literal and 
not just figurative.  As recently as 2002, Israel set up a rehabilitation village to 
help former soldiers cope with the mental anguish that they suffered during and 
after their tours of duty in the IDF.  According to Ethan Rabin, “many of them [the 
soldiers] were veterans of the most prestigious elite units such as Sayeret 
                                            
151  Amos Harel, “Shayetet Commander Price of Choice,” Haaretz, July 7, 2004; Amos Harel, 
“Elite Shayetet unit often carries army's heaviest, most secretive burdens,” Haaretz, June 1, 
2010, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/elite-shayetet-unit-often-carries-army-s-heaviest-
most-secretive-burdens-1.293406 (accessed March 14, 2011). 
152 Arikan, Transformation of the Israeli Defense Forces, 77–84. 
153 “Israel Defence Budget,” IHS Jane’s. 
154 Katz, Israeli Special Forces, 42, 58.  The Israelis call the Gibush a “filter” that separates 
“those we can use from all those who should find employment elsewhere.”  In terms of training, 
the S’13 course lasts for as long as 16 months. Equally important to note is that SOF entrance 
training is still very much tailored for wartime requirements. 
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Matkal, the Naval Commandos, and Duchifat.”155  He adds that many only came 
to realize their mental problems or crises after they finished their mandatory 
service.  To try to overcome these problems on their own, “Dozens of them went 
on backpacking trips to the Far East where they became addicted to heroin, 
cocaine, and other hard drugs. Some tried to commit suicide.”156  
At least some of the mental problems experienced can be attributed 
to the demands of the jobs these soldiers undertook during their service in SOF 
or other elite units.  First, they were subject to the elite ethos of “failure is 
unacceptable.”  Second, killing may have been an integral part of their missions. 
This may have involved innocents or, worse yet, fratricide..157 Factors like these 
are bound to exert tremendous pressure on young minds; without the emotional 
and mental maturity to cope with such pressures, it is understandable that 
soldiers may just collapse at some point. 
Virtually all militaries with SOF recognize that CT tasks require 
more than just physical preparation, i.e., skills, aptitude, stamina, and strength. 
Mental toughness and resilience are equally important, and this is where the 
maturity of individuals is key.  In fact, this is precisely the reason why many CT 
units in the world only employ older volunteers. Not only does Israel’s use of 
draftees for CT tasks seem questionable, but changing attitudes of youth toward 
the concept of “national service” makes it even clearer that relying on draftees is 
not a good idea. 
4. Connecting the Dots 
To recapitulate thus far, essentially there are two aspects of culture that 
bear emphasizing: one is the relationship between a SOF unit, its respective 
service, and the IDF leadership; the other is the relationship between SOF and 
                                            
155 Ethan Rabin, “What Have I Done! A Hundred Soldiers Treated for ‘Intifada Syndrome’,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (2003): 100. In November 2002, there were as many 
as 900 ex-soldiers seeking treatment in the village. 
156 Rabin, “What Have I Done!” 
157 Ibid., 100–1. 
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other units (to include adjacent SOF units). As we have seen, SOF are generally 
well regarded and respected by the IDF leadership and their respective services.  
This is underpinned by the IDF’s strong elitist culture and organizational memory, 
and is further demonstrated by the numerous examples of SOF officers enjoying 
a successful career not only in the IDF, but also in the Israeli government.158  
However, this favorable environment does not translate into guaranteed support 
for SOF in terms of budgetary resources or attention.  Also, there are two 
problem areas within SOF. First, there are tensions between SOF and elite units 
from the same service (mainly Army), and second between SOF from different 
establishments (i.e., Police, and between Intelligence agencies).  
Now that we have examined the structural challenges that plague Israeli 
SOF, it is time to connect the dots.  This is the third step of the four-step process.  
To be sure, all four components within the Israeli SOF system—Structure, Tasks, 
Human Capital, and Culture—reveal infirmities in one way or another.  To fully 
understand all the causes and effects of these symptoms, we need to conduct a 
trace analysis.  The trails are shown in Figure 4. 
                                            
158 As mentioned under Resources, many SOF commanders rose to become the top men in 
their services.  Some even went on to serve on the General Staff and as ministers.  Also, in one 
earlier example, S’13 officers were so well regarded by their army comrades during their 
collaboration in land operations that many received promotions through the army ranks. 
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Figure 4.   Pathological Analysis of Israeli SOF 
a. Trails 1 and 2 
The first set of symptoms of infirmity point to a misalignment 
between the Tasks and Threat Environment, and are manifested in two ways. 1) 
the inadequacy of SOF units in meeting their assigned LIC missions; 2) the 
dilution of SOF’s core skills that may render them unable to meet other core 
tasks outside the LIC realm (i.e., in the WMD and conventional warfare realms). 
These two weaknesses result from a poor division of labor, which is a function of 
both Tasks and Structure.  The root causes of such ambiguous task distribution 
are an unclear national security and unclear military doctrine for SO (for LIC 
especially), and no oversight organization for SOF.  Taking the analysis further, 
we can also see that this lack of clarity in doctrine is actually the product of a 
poor political-military relationship.   
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The second set of weaknesses is to be found in the unhealthy 
relationships between SOF and elite units, and between SOF from different 
establishments.  This is caused by a misalignment between Tasks and Culture.  
Although problems flow from relationships with groups outside the four focal 
units, their consequences have significant impacts on SO and therefore need to 
be considered. Here, too, we see a poor division of labor and, as such, the rest of 
the trail follows Trail 1. 
Separately, there are two other aspects of Culture that need to be 
taken into account here, which fall under the Tasks-Culture relationship as 
depicted in the diagram.  The first is the IDF commanders’ bituism, or, more 
specifically, their knack for improvisation. This cultural aspect contributes to the 
ambiguity of the task distribution among SOF/elite units.  Second is the strong 
organizational memory and conventional thinking that biases leaders toward 
high-tech systems.  This contributes to the scarce budget availability for SOF 
which, in turn, affects its task performance.  Hence, these factors are seen as a 
feedback loop feeding from Culture to Tasks and back. 
b. Trails 3 and 4 
The third set of weaknesses can be attributed to allowing draftees 
to be used for CT missions, which results from a misalignment between Human 
Capital and the Threat Environment.  This can be linked to both poor job design 
and the human resource management system—both of which are Structural 
features [See Table 1 of Chapter II].  To find the root cause, one again ends up 
at doctrinal issues and the political-military relationship or as we saw with Trails 1 
and 2. 
Social and economic changes have also caused considerable shifts 
in the perceptions of the population toward the IDF, including (to some degree) 
SOF.  One salient concern for SOF has to be youths’ evolving attitude toward 
service, which will undoubtedly affect the IDF’s ability to recruit the right people 
for SOF. This will pose particular challenges if SOF continue to rely on draftees. 
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This may feed a fourth set of weaknesses as shown in the diagram, represented 
by a misalignment between Human Capital and the Social Environment (the 
population). Whether this will come to pass depends on the actions the IDF or 
Israeli government is willing to take at leverage points along Trail 4. 
5. Generating Insights 
In sum, my examination of Israeli SOF strongly suggests that a Service-
centric macro-SOF organization is ineffective not only for the long-term 
stewardship of SOF, but also to meet the short-term demands any government 
may need to make of SOF. In the end, the macro-structure becomes a conduit 
for problems at the strategic level to flow through to the operational and tactical 
levels. One thing the Israeli case demonstrates is what happens when there is a 
failure to adapt the SOF organization to the prevailing environment. This also 
reinforces the point that Structure is often, if not always, the critical interface that 
connects all three levels.   
 
a. In an environment where the political-military doctrine for SOF is 
not clear and there are several (or in the Israeli case numerous) 
SOF/elite units operating, the military most likely needs to make 
sure that it has sufficient oversight of these units and their 
operations.  This need will be accentuated if the strategic 
environment calls for active involvement by SOF (and elite units) in 
both peacetime and war-time tasks.  Under such circumstances, it 
is imperative that the military set up an oversight body; a key task 
of this body should be to clearly delineate and enforce the roles and 
responsibilities of these different units.159  In addition to 
establishing a clear division of labor, this body also needs to 
maintain a long-term view of the strategic environment, and ensure 
                                            
159 For example, in the Israeli case, this may entail the elevation of elite units to SOF status, 
or expansion of the force size, so as to fulfill the demands for SOF expertise. 
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that SOF’s core skills remain relevant to all threat domains.  This 
may require that the overarching organization work closely with its 
partners, such as Police and Intelligence agencies, on task 
distribution so that SOF can maintain the capacity to readily meet 
all its assigned missions.160  This organization should, thus, have 
the official mandate to be the node for SO, not only within the 
military, but also with other government agencies that carry out 
similar SO work at the national level.  Meanwhile, to decide which 
oversight structure to adopt (out of the three recommended by 
NATO), the Culture of the organization and Human Capital, along 
with other considerations, need to be factored in.  
b. When a military has a favorable SOF-conventional environment (to 
include good relations with the top military leaders), SOF may enjoy 
proper support and attention for operations and their development 
even when under the conventional services’ C2.  However, this 
may not translate into guaranteed resources for SOF, as the Israeli 
case demonstrates.  Although Israel is a unique case where there 
are many SOF/elite forces competing for the SOF budget, this 
underscores how important it is to have an oversight agency that 
can act as a voice for SOF at the strategic level.  Better yet, a 
separate budget for SOF should be given to this agency so that 
proper SOF development can be assured. 
c. When a military has a well-developed joint culture, as does the IDF, 
any of the three macro-structures recommended by NATO should 
work well.  Significantly, the organization will not need to be self-
sufficient in every aspect, and should be able to lean on adjacent 
services for support in order to be more cost-effective.  However, if 
such an organization has a strong culture that privileges 
                                            
160 This is especially important for small militaries where human resources are a key 
concern. 
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improvisation (bituism), and has an ethos of leaders who seek 
autonomy, a macro-structure with no executive power may prove 
easy to undermine.  In such a case, the organization should only 
choose between the Component Command or Service structures. 
For instance, with its favorable SOF-conventional relationship and a 
strong joint culture, the Component Command would certainly 
make a great deal of sense, to include economic sense for Israeli 
SOF. 
d. Israel is probably one of the few countries in the world that still 
relies heavily on draftees in SO.  Consequently, there are a few 
important things we can learn from its experience. First, draftees 
should not be deployed for CT missions if this can be avoided.  
Second, draftees have a limited service life and, so, if they are used 
for SO, they are better suited for more specific tasks where the 
needed skills are easily trained and maintained. Lastly, the Israeli 
experience further highlights the need to look to more professional 
forces for SO, especially when it comes to CT. 
C. NORWAY 
Next we turn to Norwegian SOF (NORSOF) and its macro-organization.161 
NORSOF has an NMSE macro-organization, which is a variant of the Service-
centric construct. As described in Chapter I, the NMSE model is comprised of a 
military staff element at the strategic level that acts as a coordinating body for 
SO; however, peculiar to the Norwegian model, an additional component in the 
Norwegian Joint Headquarters (NJHQ, see Figure 4) assists with this function.  
As we shall see, despite these coordinating mechanisms, problems still exist at 
the operational and tactical levels between NORSOF’s two SOF units. These 
                                            
161 Tom Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces (Monterey, CA: 
Naval Postgraduate School, June 2006), 37-8.  According to Tom Robertson, “the term NORSOF 
was first used when both units deployed to Afghanistan in 2001/2002 in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF), and is now a common term for the two units. It has no organizational 
meaning and merely serves as a common denominator.” 
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problems are largely a consequence of an ineffective NORSOF macro-structure, 
coupled with vague strategic guidance on SO from the political-military 
leadership. Interestingly, these problems are not readily apparent given Norway’s 
safe and stable environmental conditions. 
1. Norway’s Environment and National Strategy 
Norway’s circumstances in terms of its environment and national strategy 
are, in many ways, diametrically opposite to those of Israel.  For one, its 
environment, including threats and social conditions, is safe and stable.  Second, 
the political-military relationship is much less ambiguous; there is a distinct 
separation between the two spheres.162  Finally, there are also clear national 
security strategies to guide the transformation of the military to meet political 
objectives. Nonetheless, because the broader environment in which Norway has 
been operating is changing, NORSOF faces certain challenges. 
Unlike Norway’s concerns during the Cold War years, today it has to worry 
about more than just its territorial defense; there is an equal, if not greater, 
impetus to worry about global security and stability, especially in the Euro-
Atlantic region.163 Norway recognizes it will continue to need NATO as a hedge 
against any sizable potential enemy when it comes to national survival. 
Consequently, NATO has a strong influence on Norway’s strategic thinking, 
which is why NATO is repeatedly referred to as “the cornerstone of Norwegian 
                                            
162 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 4-5, discusses the 
interaction between political and military spheres vis-à-vis the policy making process. 
163 Kjetil Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces (Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010), 18, 23; Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces, 47-53.  Norway treats  “collective security” of the Euro-Atlantic region, societal 
security and protection of its maritime interests as its main priorities in the order presented. 
Norway considers collective measures through its various alliances (e.g., NATO and the UN), as 
critical instruments to ensure its national survival.  However, in recent time, NATO has become 
the more important alliance of the two. Norway’s second security priority “concerns the 
safeguarding of the population and the protection of key societal functions and important 
infrastructure against” attacks perpetrated by terrorists.  Although Norway is safe from such 
threats now, it recognizes that it may not be insulated forever.  Finally, Norway’s maritime 
interests encompass the maritime economic zone and the high seas. “More than 70 percent of 
national revenues are extracted from activities in NEZ [Norway’s Economic Zone], and more than 
80 percent of national import and export are shipped through the NEZ.” 
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security policy.”164  Thanks to this reliance on NATO, and to remain a credible 
member, Norway has to support NATO’s strategic concept, which means it has 
to contribute forces to NATO’s “out of area” operations.  This, for its part, has 
helped to make NORSOF an important strategic instrument for policy-makers, 
with NORSOF considered one of those “relevant capabilities” in Defense Minister 
Grete Faremo’s repertoire of national tools. 165  
To help the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) transform to meet new 
national security objectives in the post-Cold War, to include meeting NATO’s 
needs, the government has issued a series of strategic directives over the past 
decade. The most recent was issued in 2008 and is known as “Parliamentary Bill 
No. 48” [A Defense for Protection of Norway’s Security, Interests, and 
Resources].166  
                                            
164 Petter Hellesen, Counterinsurgency And Its Implications For The Norwegian Special 
Operations Forces (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008), 18; Mellingen, 
Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 22.  According to Mellingen, 
“[Minister of Defense Grete] Faremo proposes a tight relationship between Norwegian interests 
and the future NATO … [because] the Norwegian Armed Forces is too small to defend Norway’s 
territory alone.” 
165 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 5, 56; Mellingen, 
Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 23; Torgeir Gratrud, Norwegian 
Special Forces: Their Role in Future Counterinsurgency Operations (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 2009), 1.  In 1999, NATO set forth its Strategic Concept which states that member 
countries must be prepared for operations on a global scale (out of area operations).  This also 
resulted in the creation of the NATO Response Force (NRF), of which NORSOF is an active 
component today.  Further, according to Col Gratrud, “A recent Norwegian Chief of Defense white 
paper clearly states that Norwegian Special Forces (NORSOF) will continue to be an important 
force multiplier in future multinational out-of-area operations.” 
166 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 2; Mellingen, Strategic 
Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 15, 16.  According to Robertsen, a former 
Chief Of Defense recognized the need to bring the two tactical forces together, and issued a 
recommendation in 2004 to create a new SOF unit that would contain all the SOF components in 
Norway.  However, the recommendation was not implemented. 
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2. NORSOF and the NMSE Organization 
a. Structure and Tasks 
According to Bill No. 48, NORSOF “consists of [only] FSK-HJK and 
MJK, and that (sic) air assets are support to the two units.”167  FSK-HJK stands 
for Forsvarets Spesialkommando and Hærens Jegerkommando; it is the Army’s 
SOF.  MJK, which is the acronym for Marinejegerkommandoen, is the Navy’s 
SOF.  Both units possess overlapping capabilities and are able to undertake the 
following four types of missions: (1) Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, 
(2) Offensive Operations, (3) Military Assistance, and (4) Counter-Terror 
Operations.168  NORSOF’s organizational set-up is shown in Figure 4.  In 
addition to the staff element at the Military-Strategic level (i.e., Special 
Operations Section in the Defense Staff), an additional Joint component is built 
into the NJHQ that is peculiar to Norway.  This J-3 SOF is meant to enhance the 
coordination and C2 functions of the macro-level structure; the C2 function is 
designed specifically for operations.   
                                            
167 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 16; “Norway’s 
Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, 
http://jasf.janes.com/docs/jasf/browse_country (accessed March 14, 2011). 
168 Gratrud, Norwegian Special Forces, 10-12; Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special 
Operation Forces, 35.  See Gratrud’s paper for the exact description of the missions. 
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Figure 5.   NORSOF Units and Representation at the Three Levels [From 
Mellingen, p. 95] 
Further, the Bill also dictates that the force production function for 
NORSOF remains with the individual services.  Hence, the control that the 
services have is more than just “administrative;” it is “the total process and 
activity that conduce to prepare forces ready for effort and includes education 
and training, human resources management, development of tactics, 
organization of forces, and material procurement.”169  As a result, the 
overarching SOF elements at the strategic and operational levels are relegated 
to playing nothing more than a coordination role except during operations.  
According to a Norwegian SOF officer, the NMSE structure has “little power to 
influence or decide the development of tactical units, budget priorities and 
                                            
169 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 96. 
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training objectives,” as these are the services’ prerogatives.170  This inability to 
influence a coherent long-term plan, coupled with unclear strategic direction from 
the top about SOF’s employment and development leads to two other issues 
described below.171 
(1)  Failure to Optimize NORSOF.  Because the services 
have the authority to develop NORSOF tactical units, they are able to develop 
the units in ways that best benefit them, and/or their commanders (somewhat 
akin to what we saw with Israel).172  Consequently, the two tactical units have 
become almost identical in terms of their capabilities with both focusing on “direct 
capabilities.”173  Not only has this led to redundant rather than complementary 
capabilities in NORSOF, but also to a “lack of crucial capabilities in other 
areas.”174  It has also caused competition not just between the SOF units, but 
also with the police.   
Equally detrimental to NORSOF (and the state) is the fact 
that the NMSE structure has not been able to re-orient NORSOF to better meet 
Norway’s long-term strategic goals.  As several Norwegian SOF officers have 
noted, NORSOF needs to shift its focus beyond direct capabilities if it wants to 
continue to be a relevant strategic instrument for policy-makers.  This is because 
the alliances that Norway heavily depends on increasingly need contributions of 
forces with indirect capabilities given the changed realities of the security 
                                            
170 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 25; Mellingen, Strategic 
Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 96.   
171 Ibid., 61.  According to Robertsen, “there is no coherent military strategy from which 
NORSOF roles and missions can be easily derived. Therefore, existing practice and recent 
political statements are used to grasp the essence of a national military strategy.” 
172 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 100.  
173 As mentioned in an earlier footnote, maritime interests are one of the key priorities for 
Norway because of Norway’s dependence on the sea.  This includes the many offshore oil 
platforms that are found within the NEZ. Hence, Maritime CT is an important capability in the eyes 
of the SOF units, both in and outside of NORSOF. 
174 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 8.  
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environment. In fact, the international operations that Norway has participated in 
since 2001 reflect just such a demand.175  
(2)  Unfavorable C2 structure for MJK.  Although NORSOF 
has an effective structure for good relations at the strategic level during 
operations,176 the same cannot be said when it is under administrative control. 
As Figure 4 indicates, MJK is “as far away from the strategic level as a command 
unit can get in Norway.”177  Even if we only consider MJK’s position within the 
Navy, it is still undesirable.  In contrast to HJK’s optimal C2 relationship in the 
Army, there are too many layers between MJK and the Chief of Navy.  To 
exacerbate matters, SO are often better understood by the Army than the Navy 
due to the nature of SO.178 This distance has deleterious implications for MJK’s 
development from both the resource perspective, and with regard to whether 
appropriate attention is given to MJK in general. This, in turn, contributes to 
uneven development of the two units in NORSOF.179 
We can identify two additional infirmities associated with 
NORSOF’s macro-structural design. 
(3)  Proximity to Decision Makers.  A critical feature for 
analysis under Structure is the physical location of the different interrelated 
agencies. The fact the staff element is located in Oslo does not help when it 
comes to coordinating with the service chiefs, who are at their respective bases 
in Bardufoss and Bergen. This issue of physical location has added significance 
                                            
175 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 73-5; Gratrud, Norwegian 
Special Forces, 13–5; Hellesen, Counterinsurgency And Its Implications, 18. 
176 Ibid., 25.  Robertsen shows that NORSOF has the appropriate C2 during operations, and 
is normally at the military-strategic level unless delegated to the operational level (J-3). 
177 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 97. 
178 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 7.  According to 
Robertsen, “Arguably, HJK is better integrated in the Army than MJK is in the Navy. Small unit 
tactics, the essence of SOF operations, are more familiar to the Army than the Navy.” 
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for NMSE structures because NMSE structures rely more heavily on informal 
rather than formal relationships for their coordination work. In the same vein, J-3 
SOF, or, for that matter, the entire NJHQ, is too far from the Defense Staff in 
Oslo.  Since NJHQ (currently in Bodo, Northern Norway) is often the executive 
arm of the Defense Staff for the C2 of operations, it only makes sense that they 
should be located close to each other to facilitate the closest possible 
cooperation during operations, especially during crises.  For now, NJHQ relies on 
Video Teleconferences (VTC) for this purpose. This contributes to unnecessary 
risk and anxiety during operations.180 
(4)  Linkages to Conventional and Intelligence Forces.  For 
small SOF like NORSOF, working closely with their conventional and intelligence 
counterparts is not a choice but a must.181 Appropriate linkages with these 
support forces are imperative. For example, air capabilities are often a crucial 
element in SO.  But in Norway, air capabilities clearly belong to the conventional 
forces and do not form part of NORSOF.  As Kjetil Mellingen asserts, “The letter 
[Bill No. 48] mentions 137 Air Wing as a supporting unit, … [hence] 
organizational arrangements must be optimized in order to facilitate as good 
support as possible to NORSOF.”182 An equally crucial component of SO is 
Intelligence.  From what Torgeir Gratrud writes,  
Based on lessons learned from operations especially in 
Afghanistan, Norwegian Special Forces need to strengthen and 
further develop their intelligence organization … The interaction 
                                            
179 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 25-6; Mellingen, Strategic 
Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 97-8. Two examples illustrate this uneven 
development. First, is the rank of the commander of the two units. Commander MJK is an O-5, 
whereas Commander HJK is an O-6. Robertson, a MJK officer, writes that “It is commonly known 
that the further down the chain a unit is located, the more resources are filtered.” 
180 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 100–1. 
181 Ibid., 98, 100, 106; Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 65–6. 
According to Robertsen, “Although NORSOF can conduct independent missions in the 
operational or strategic realm, its mission potential is highest in conjunction with conventional 
operations … It thus seems important for NORSOF to continue to integrate with the conventional 
parts of NAF, not only to gain support for its own operations, but also to support naval operations 
in the littoral. The same logic will apply to new concepts within land and air warfare.” 
182 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 98. 
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and joint tasking of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence 
assets in a tactical operation will certainly provide a more complete 
picture of an adversary than each of these assets operating 
alone.183  
b. Human Capital and Culture 
Although the NAF still utilizes conscripts, NORSOF mainly employs 
volunteers.  Therefore, NORSOF does not face the same challenges Israeli SOF 
faces in using conscripts.  But NORSOF does face other human capital 
problems. First, it bears repeating here that NORSOF’s poor division of labor is 
largely a consequence of vague strategic guidance, together with an ineffective 
Structure.  For a small nation like Norway, human resources are extremely 
valuable, and hence, every effort must be made to ensure they are gainfully 
employed.  Having overly redundant capabilities detracts from full 
optimization.184  Second, the poor division of labor also leads to unhealthy 
competition.  Although the situation in NORSOF is not as bad as it is in the IDF, 
in the CT realm there is competition not just between the two NORSOF units, but 
with the police CT unit as well, which adds an additional complicating factor.185   
                                            
183 Gratrud, Norwegian Special Forces, 17. 
184 Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 40-42, 71.  According to 
Robertsen, “Consequently, both units have acquired expertise and tasks that naturally should 
have been in the other SOF unit’s domain.” He further latches onto the US SOF as an example of 
redundant and niche capabilities.  For example, the USSF is expert in UW missions, while the 
SEALs are the masters in maritime operations. Between the two forces, there are certain small 
unit capabilities that are redundant. 
185 Mellingen, Strategic Utilization of Norwegian Special Operations Forces, 8, 100; 
Robertsen, Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 39-40, 42, 67-70.  A case in point 
is the Elektron incident in October 2005.  In this case, the MJK, rather than the designated HJK 
unit, was deployed to intercept the Russian trawler running for Russian territorial waters with the 
two Norwegian inspectors still onboard.  Further, the police also contested the HJK being put on 
operational duty for domestic onshore CT.  Here, Mellingen suggests, the atmosphere between 
the units was more competitive than cooperative. 
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3. Connecting the Dots 
 
Figure 6.   Pathological Analysis of NORSOF 
Now that I have described all the weaknesses, the next step is to conduct 
the trace.  The outcome of the trace is illustrated in Figure 6 above.  As indicated, 
the problems stem largely from the poor macro-structure design of NORSOF and 
strategic guidance on the employment and development of NORSOF that is too 
vague.  The ineffective Structure is evidenced by two main weaknesses—
Weakness 1: failure to optimize NORSOF, and Weakness 2: uneven 
development of the two tactical units.  These two symptoms illuminate the fact 
that the NMSE structure has no executive power and, hence, is limited in its 
ability to provide long-term stewardship of NORSOF. The structure is not able to 
harmonize and integrate the two tactical units.  In the end, the NMSE structure 
behaves more like a coordinating agency than a command body, even though it 
does command and control the forces during operations.  Two other factors that 
hint at the structural weakness of the macro-organization are—Weakness 3: 
more desirable linkages to conventional and intelligence support, and Weakness 




Further, the poor Structure and Strategy then lead to a poor division of 
labor between the SOF units.  This, in turn, gives rise to the two final 
weaknesses, which are—Weakness 5: unhealthy culture, and Weakness 6: 
redundant capabilities.  
4. Generating Insights 
In sum, studying the Norwegian case suggests that the NMSE structure is 
an ineffective way to organize SOF, which further reinforces the NATO SOF 
Study’s findings.  This is so even for a small organization like NORSOF, which 
has only two SOF tactical units.  I will now summarize the insights garnered from 
these NORSOF-specific lessons. 
a. Even in a small organization like NORSOF, with only two tactical 
units, an oversight authority with executive power is essential for 
the coherent long-term development of SOF.  This is even more 
important when there is no clear strategic direction from the 
political-military leadership for SOF.  Without an executive 
mandate, the overarching organization cannot be effective in 
providing long-term stewardship of SOF; nor will it be able to 
harmonize and integrate SOF units to strategic ends for the state.  
However, if the NMSE structure is deemed necessary, then the 
political-military leadership needs to ensure that there is clear 
direction for SO.  This should include a clear division of labor to 
preclude unnecessary competition and redundant capabilities. 
Attention should also be paid to how each service develops the 
tactical units, to ensure that these units are developed evenly. 
b. When using the NMSE structure, two other critical factors need to 
be taken into account to help enhance effectiveness.  The first 
relates to the NMSE components vis-à-vis the decision makers.  
These components have to be located as close to the decision 
makers as possible so as to provide the necessary impact. 
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Although it can be argued that proximity is important in all types of 
structure, it is even more so for the NMSE structure because it 
lacks executive power.  This makes it more dependent on informal 
relationships. The second factor pertains to the linkages with 
adjacent support agencies, such as the Air Force and Intelligence.  
These linkages need to be institutionalized as part of the structure 
to ensure adequate support is given to SOF. 
c. Lacking the IDF’s elitist culture, there are hints in the Norwegian 
case that Navy SOF could be marginalized when placed under the 
service’s C2.  This is because SO is often less understood by the 
Navy than by the Army. 
d. In a small, developed country, such as Norway, where the 
population numbers around six million people, human resources 
are extremely valuable.  Therefore, special attention must be paid 
to fully optimize SOF’s human capabilities.  To this end, redundant 
capabilities should be deliberately avoided to prevent wastage of 
human resources, while still ensuring that the full spectrum of 
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IV. COMPONENT COMMAND AND SERVICE CONSTRUCTS: 
LESSONS FROM FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines France and Australia, which illustrate the SO 
Component Command and SO Service constructs, respectively. According to the 
NATO SOF study, these two models represent a more optimal way to organize 
SOF at the national level.   
B. FRANCE 
The current French macro-organization for SOF is the Special Operations 
Component Command and is known as the Commandement des Operations 
Speciales (COS, or Special Operations Command).186  According to the NATO 
SOF Study, the Component Command bears certain similarities to the NMSE 
model and, yet, they are significantly different.  To the degree that they are 
similar, both are “umbrella” SOF organizations that represent SOF at the military-
strategic level and oversee tactical SOF units that are still under the 
administrative control of the military services.  They coordinate and integrate SO 
to meet the national objectives, and also command and control the tactical units 
during operations.  However, the key difference (and a major one) between the 
two is that the Component Command has “greater influence and involvement in 
force management and force development activities” of SOF.187  As the French 
case demonstrates, thanks to this difference, the COS is able to provide effective 
stewardship. It is able to harmonize, integrate, and unify France’s SOF 
capabilities to meet French national objectives in the immediate term, and, at the 
same time, orient forces as necessary for the longer-term.  
                                            
186 Eric Micheletti, French Special Forces: Special Operations Command (Paris: Histoire & 
Collections, 1999), 16. 
187 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 26. 
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1. French Environment, Strategy and Doctrines 
a. Genesis of COS 
COS was set up in 1992 in the wake of the Gulf War.  In many 
ways, the Gulf War was to France what Operations Eagle Claw and Urgent Fury 
were to the U.S. in terms of lessons learned and changes made in their wake.188  
Prior to the Gulf War, French SOF was organized via a Service-centric structure, 
as Israeli SOF is today.  The tactical units were fully under military services’ C2, 
and there was no Joint authority to provide oversight and lateral linkages 
between and above these units for SO.  Consequently, there was considerable 
friction and little cooperation between these elite units both within and across the 
services (particularly the Army and Navy).189  Major interoperability issues 
surfaced during the Gulf War. As Eric Micheletti notes, “while many assets were 
available for use at the time . . . these did not form a coherent group of military 
operational assets.”  There was “little commonality of equipment and an absence 
of set operational procedures.”190  The Gulf War experience proved humbling, not 
                                            
188 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations As An Instrument of US 
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 114-151; Thomas K. Adams, US 
Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Oregon: Frank 
Cass, 2001), 189-93.  In November 1979, a mob of Islamic fundamentalists overran the US 
embassy in Tehran, seizing 63 diplomats and embassy personnel, which began the Iranian 
hostage crisis that lasted for 444 days.  The US then launched a rescue operation, called 
Operation Eagle Claw (otherwise known as Desert One), in April 1980 to rescue the hostages.  
The operation ended in a fiasco, largely because of poor operational planning and C2, and 
numerous interoperability and aircraft problems.  Urgent Fury was another rescue operation 
conducted in October 1983 on the Caribbean island of Grenada to evacuate up to 600 Americans 
trapped there.  In this operation, SOF units (SEALs, Delta Force, and Rangers) were the first 
ashore.  Once again, as in Desert One, the effectiveness of SOF left much to be desired.  These 
two operational failures are the events many cite as leading to the transformation of the US SOF 
system. 
189 Stephan Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces: Experiences from the 
Past, Adapted for the Future (Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Defence Research Agency, June 
2004), 32–4.   
190 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 8. 
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only for French SOF, but also for the armed forces as a whole.191  As former 
Socialist President François Mitterrand (1981–95) remarked:  
France’s experience of participating in a multinational force 
commanded by a US general under NATO procedures . . . was 
both humiliating and revealing—particularly for the military. Any 
illusion which might have remained about France’s (and Europe’s) 
capacity to underwrite the collective security of the continent was 
shattered in the Saudi Arabian desert.192 
Not long after the end of the Gulf War, the French military was put 
to work by the new Armed Forces Chief of Staff to resolve deficiencies exposed 
during the campaign. Major General Maurice Le Page was tasked to conduct a 
feasibility study to improve the use of SOF from the three services.  The outcome 
of his study pointed to the need for a joint special forces command, one that 
reported directly to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff.  Not surprisingly, this 
proposal of a “joint” command was readily accepted by the new Chief of Staff, 
whose new focus for the French Armed Forces was in the areas of jointness, 
deployability, and mobility.  In addition to the COS, several other joint entities 
were created, namely the Joint Command Staff (COIA, Centre Operationnel 
Inter-Armees), Joint Planning Staff (EMIA, Etat-Major Inter-Armees), and Military 
Intelligence Agency (DRM, Direction du Renseignement Militaire).193 
COS faced a number of coordination and integration issues from 
the force providers as it tried to blend French SOF into an effective asset.194  As 
                                            
191 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 34-5.  In the Gulf War in 1990, the 
French military demonstrated that it did not have the intervention capacity it officially said it did.  
While Britain had a smaller military force at the time, it was able to deploy four times as many 
troops as France.  More importantly for SOF, the lack of capacity resulted in its inability to 
perform roles like those carried out by its Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
192 Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, France’s New NATO Policy: Leveraging a Realignment 
of the Alliance? (Maxwell AFB: Air University, Winter 2009), 96–7. 
193 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 8, 35–6; Micheletti, French Special 
Forces, 8-10; Lars Zimmermann, Britain, France, And Germany: Priorities For The European 
Union’s Security And Defense Policy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 
2009), 22-3. 
194 From the outset, the French SOF already had units from all three conventional services – 
Navy, Army, and Air Force. 
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one former COS commander commented, “we were perceived as trouble-makers 
and competitors.”195  There are at least two plausible explanations for such 
negative reactions toward COS initially: (1) a conventional mindset left over from 
the Cold War era, and (2) the lack of a clear and coherent doctrine on the 
employment and development of SOF.196  Although General Page did try to 
answer to the latter when he was designing COS, it could be that the boundaries 
he set were not clear enough to be effective or that the idea gained insufficient 
traction with the other services.  Suffice it to say, it took COS some (or even 
many) years of working with the services to create a coherent doctrine for the 
employment and development of SOF.  Arguably, what also helped was a 
change in the national-military strategy and mindset through the Defense White 
Paper 1994 and MPL 97-02.197 
In the U.S., the aftermath of Operations Eagle Claw and Urgent 
Fury led to legislation (e.g., Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Nunn-Cohen 
Amendment, both adopted in 1986) that aimed to not only overhaul SOF, but 
also the way the U.S. military conducted business.198 The various French 
Defense White Papers and Military Program Laws (MPLs) that came after the 
Gulf War could be said to have had similar aims.  The 1994 Defense White 
Paper set the tone for transformation of the French Armed Forces. Apart from 
describing the new strategic environment, the White Paper emphasized key 
capabilities (such as a joint armed forces and a strong logistical support 
                                            
195 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 12. 
196 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 38.  According to Sjoberg, many 
problems during and before the Gulf War were related to a complete lack of doctrine pertaining to 
SO. 
197 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 11–2.  According to Micheletti, it took COS years to 
“overcome the reluctance of the different services” and years to be able to bring French SOF 
together as an effective mixture.  To do this, COS had to work with the units as well as the Chiefs 
of Staff of the different services to draw up coherent doctrine on common procedures, explicit 
training, and acquisition directives. 
198 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 117–46; Senate Committee on Armed 
Services, Defense Reorganization: The Need for Change, Staff Report, 99 Cong. 1 Session 
(Government Printing Office, October 1985), 1–12.  For more details, see Marquis and the Staff 
Report. 
 79
capability) for the new era.  More importantly, it underlined the strategic role and 
importance of SOF.199 The concepts in the White Paper were then put into action 
by the MPLs; there were three in total—MPL 97-02, 03-08, and 09-15.  These 
were designed to move the French Armed Forces to a “2015 armed forces 
model.”200 
MPL 97-02 was as important for SOF as the decision to set up 
COS was for the Armed Forces. Its clear delineation of roles and responsibilities 
helped to provide a focus for COS and the tactical SOF units which, in turn, 
minimized the likelihood of unnecessary competition and antagonism between 
these agencies.201  Clearly, this is a strength of the French system that sets it 
apart from the Israeli and Norwegian cases. 
 
                                            
199 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 7–8. 
200 Thierry Tardy, “France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy,” in Global Security 
Governance: Competing Perceptions of Security in the 21st Century, ed. Emil J. Kirchner and 
James Sperling (New York: Routledge, 2007), 29, 35–7.  The MPL 97-02 means for years 1997 
to 2002.  The same applies to the other two MPLs. 
201 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 9-11, 36–7.  According to Sjoberg, 
this division of labor was part of General Page’s concept when he was designing COS.  However, 
it was not clear from my research whether this was officially endorsed and implemented along 
with COS’s establishment. Given the dynamics between COS and the other services at the time, 
along with the fact that this proposal implicated more than just the military agencies, it seems 
more prudent to assume that a far- reaching change like this needed to be made through a more 




Figure 7.   Division of Labor Between COS and Other Agencies  
[From Sjoberg, p. 37] 
A testament to COS’s effectiveness as an overarching organization 
for French SOF lies in the fact that there has been no need for any major 
changes since its implementation more than a decade ago. As will be shown in 
the next two sections, COS has been able to orient and adjust the French system 
effectively over the past two decades, ensuring that SOF remains a relevant 
strategic instrument.202  Consequently, as acknowledged by the latest 2008 
Defense White Paper (known as Livre Blanc 2008), SOF continues to be 
regarded as a critical national asset by the French government.  It fulfills not only 
what Colin Gray terms the economy of force role, but also offers an expansion of 
                                            
202 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 13; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 39. 
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choice for policy makers.203  To better understand how French SOF satisfies 
these roles in current terms, let us turn to the French national security strategy. 
b. French National Security Strategy, Livre Blanc 2008 
As we saw for Norway, the new security environment for France 
after the demise of the Soviet Union has been dominated by diffuse threats 
“originating from non-state actors, and containing an important non-military 
dimension.”204  In the new era, the probability of a total war is close to zero; 
however, France “has grown more vulnerable than it was at the end of the Cold 
War.”205  In Livre Blanc 2008, the top security concerns are “international 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and deepening ties between state and nonstate 
actors.” Among these, President Nicholas Sarkorzy singles out terrorism as the 
“immediate threat.”206  Further, the White Paper also identifies two overall 
security objectives for the national strategy: 
• To enable France to contribute to European and international 
security: this corresponds both to its own security needs, which 
also extend beyond its frontiers, and to the responsibility 
shouldered by France within the framework of the United Nations 




                                            
203 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1998), 168-74.  For 
Economy of Force, Gray means SOF can be a force multiplier providing disproportionate effects 
with its relatively small size and resources required. By Expansion of Choice he means SOF can 
provide additional options (military force) to policy/military leaders in the form of a flexible, small 
visibility, and precise instrument.  This is on top of other alternatives like diplomacy or economic 
tools.  However, in some cases, these tools will be ineffective, which is when SOF will come in 
most handy.  
204 Tardy, “France: Between Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy,” 26. 
205 Zimmermann, Britain, France, And Germany, 25. 
206 Leo G. Michel, Defense Transformation à la française and U.S. Interests (Washington, 
D.C.: National Defense University, September 2008), 2. 
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• To defend the values of the ‘republican compact’ that binds all 
French people to the State, namely the principles of democracy, 
and in particular individual and collective freedoms, respect for 
human dignity, solidarity and justice.207 
Underlying these objectives is the deeply rooted French political-
military culture, which is “based on the sacrosanct principles of autonomous 
decision-making and independent defence (sic) capabilities.”208 The latter means 
that France must have the capacity to act alone or to apply force when its 
national interests so dictate. It is this attachment to “freedom of action” that 
makes French SOF a key strategic instrument.  More precisely, it is this 
willingness to act alone when push comes to shove that allows SOF to provide 
France an “expanded option” when all other measures fail.209  As the White 
Paper suggests, “French military operations undertaken on a national basis 
would henceforth be limited to ‘special’ operations” and “middle-scale 
operations.”  In more specific terms, these SOF-related operations were to most 
often be conducted under the ambit of either the Protection, Intervention or even 
Prevention functions identified in Livre Blanc 2008.210 
Under Protection, the White Paper identifies SOF as a key asset in 
the fight against terrorism.  Although domestic terrorism issues mainly fall under 
                                            
207 Zimmermann, Britain, France, And Germany, 26. 
208 Bastien Irondelle and Sophie Besancenot, “France: A Departure from Exceptionalism,” in 
National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance, ed. Emil J. Kirchner and James 
Sperling (New York: Routledge, 2010), 22. 
209 Zimmermann, Britain, France, And Germany, 30; Tardy, “France: Between 
Exceptionalism and Orthodoxy,” 25–45, 37.  According to Tardy, “France has a preference for 
persuasive rather than coercive instruments in meeting security threats, but does not rule out the 
use of force in principle or practice; the use of force is part of France’s political-military culture.”  
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210 Michel, Defense Transformation à la française, 3.  The five strategic functions are: 
Knowledge and Anticipation, Prevention, Protection, Deterrence, and Intervention.  
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the jurisdiction of the national police and Gendarmerie Nationale,211 the 
government recognizes that “there is a growing interconnection between threats 
and risks and a continuity between internal and external security.”212  Most of 
these threats originate from overseas, such as from failed or unstable states. 
Accordingly, “there is an increasing role for the military” in the foreign dimension 
of Protection, especially “with regard to special covert operations.”213 The idea of 
employing SOF to protect French citizens and national interests by preventing 
the emergence of such threats from overseas can also be considered a 
Prevention function.214   
For Intervention, the paper outlines three possible scenarios when 
France would intervene unilaterally: to protect French citizens overseas, to fulfill 
bilateral defense arrangements, and in “a specific, fast-breaking event directed 
against [French] interests.”215  According to the paper, SOF can be employed to 
“free hostages or pursue terrorists,” or for “middle-scale operations such as the 
evacuation of French people in hostile environments, or selective . . . operations 
as a response to a direct action against French interests.”216 There are at least 
1.5 million French citizens living overseas. The paper notes that these citizens 
are especially exposed to asymmetric threats in the new era. 217 
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To date, there have been a number of instances when French SOF 
have been used for these purposes: 
(1)  Intervention to protect French citizens overseas.  The 
year 2008 can be considered a very successful year for French SO.  In April 
2008, COS units were deployed to Northern Somalia to help resolve a hostage 
situation involving a French luxury cruise ship. “An hour after the pirates had 
accepted a $2m (£1m) ransom and released the yacht and its 30-strong crew,” 
they were attacked by COS units on shore in Northern Somalia (assets involved 
were mainly the helicopters and a sniper).  The SOF units captured six Somali 
pirates and recovered part of the ransom.   
Five months later, in September 2008, a similar hostage 
situation occurred again in the now-infamous Gulf of Aden. A retired French 
couple was taken hostage onboard their yacht by seven Somali pirates.  As soon 
as the French forces stationed in Djibouti received the hijack signal, the French 
Commando Hubert unit based in France was activated and flown to the incident 
area. Initially, the French government attempted to negotiate with the pirates for 
the release of the couple, and also to “dissuade them from taking the yacht to 
Eyl, the main lair of Somali pirates.”  However, when the French forces realized 
the pirates were not going to comply, military action became inevitable.  In the 
end, the Hubert unit had to be deployed (involving first parachuting and then 
diving to the target).  The rescue mission ran like clockwork, and the two 
hostages were freed.  Six of the pirates were captured and one killed, with no 
other casualties.218 
                                            
218 Charles Bremner, “French special forces seize pirates in operation to free yacht 
hostages,” The Times (London), September 17, 2008, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview (accessed January 26, 
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Following the second operation against Somali pirates, one 
that Mr. Sarkorzy personally supervised, the president warned at a news 
conference: 
This operation is a warning to all those engaged in this criminal 
activity. France will not accept that crime pays . . . These are not 
isolated cases, but a fully fledged criminal industry. (It) endangers 
our fundamental rights, freedom of movement and international 
trade. The world must not remain indifferent or passive. I call on 
other countries to take their responsibilities as France has done 
twice.219 
(2)  Protection and Prevention through Military Assistance, 
Peacekeeping, and Intervention.  Because Africa remains “a top strategic 
concern for France” even in post-colonial times, SOF’s advisory or peacekeeping 
role on the continent retains strategic significance.220 The French government 
has also recently committed French forces, including SOF, to NATO operations 
in Afghanistan.  It did so after renewing its allegiance to NATO.  By committing 
an important asset like SOF to such a mission, the government not only fulfills 
the Protection dimension of its national strategy, but demonstrates its 
commitment to NATO.  According to some senior British military chiefs, French 
SOF represented “a highly flexible force, able to roam the country, attacking 
Taliban forces wherever they posed a threat.”221   
Although domestic threats are normally taken care of by the 
national police and Gendarmerie, COS units can be called upon to protect 
national security or interests at home in the area of maritime CT or intervention.  
Two such operations occurred in July and September 1995.  The two incidents 
were similar in nature and were carried out by Greenpeace activists against 
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French nuclear testing.  In both operations, the French Commando Hubert unit 
successfully intercepted the “Rainbow Warrior” as it attempted to cross into 
French territorial waters.222 
Finally, France’s re-entry into NATO is certainly likely to 
boost SOF’s strategic value in the government’s eyes.  Because of the “La 
grande nation” mentality that is rooted in France’s political-military culture, 
France continues to harbor the hope of remaining “a great military power.”223 The 
White Paper emphasizes that “France must be able to serve as a ‘framework 
nation’—that is, capable of commanding a joint and combined force; lead any 
one of its components (land, air, maritime, special forces); and be among the 
‘first entry’ forces.”224  This statement also very much reflects the French 
realization that in the post-Cold War world, it has no choice but to embrace 
multilateralism.225  To this end, in addition to the usual SOF tactical units the 
French government depends on as strategic instruments, it can now also turn to 
COS for the same strategic purpose. In fact, with COS, France will be able to be 
the framework nation for SO in NATO.  
2. COS and French SOF 
a. Structure and Tasks 
“The Special Operations Command (COS) is a joint operational 
command under the direct authority of CEMA, the French Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff.”226  It is an overarching organization that brings together in a single entity 
the disparate SOF units from the different services.  Its official mission is “to plan, 
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coordinate and conduct at the command level all operations carried out by units 
that are specifically organized, trained and equipped to attain military or 
paramilitary objectives as defined by the Armed Forces Chief of Staff (CEMA—
Chef d’Etat-Major des Armees).”227  This involves, but is not limited to, 
standardization of procedures and equipment between SOF units to ensure full 
interoperability and the actual C2 of SOF operations.  COS only has operational 
C2 of the executive SOF units, while the services retain the raise-train-sustain 
functions.  However, COS also has the authority to influence and be involved in 
the force management and development of SOF.  Hence, it has to work very 
closely with the services to ensure all SOF’s activities are aligned with its “grand 
masterplan.” Additionally, COS also has to “share” employment of the tactical 
units with the services. 
To ensure that COS has the capacity to execute all its mandated 
functions, COS headquarters (HQ) is staffed with about 60 personnel, distributed 
as follows: Army (39%), Navy (25%), Air Force (25%), Others (e.g., 
representatives of the Gendarmes) (11%,). These representatives are further 
divided into six Bureaus that each oversees one core task area.  The six Bureaus 
are:  Operations, Specialized Training, Research and Development (R&D), 
Telecommunications and Information Systems, Civil/Military Action, and General 
Services.228  These Bureaus are designed to facilitate accomplishment of COS’s 
core tasks.229  In addition, to ensure that COS has a tight connection with the 
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liaison.  These liaisons come not only from the three conventional services, but 
also from the Medical Corp and the French Gendarmerie (GSIGN).230  The set-up 
of COS is shown in Figure 8: 
 
 
Figure 8.   The COS Organization [From Micheletti, p. 158]  
At COS’s direct disposal are the SOF units from the three 
conventional services; these action and support/projection units belong to what is 
known as the First Circle.  Because the French system recognizes that SOF 
might not have all the expertise necessary to confront the diffuse threat 
environment, SOF has to be able to reach out to other support entities.  This 
gives rise to units in the Second Circle, which are prepared, trained for, and able 
to support SOF activities.  Examples of these Second Circle units are elite units 
                                            
230 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 150; Katz, The Illustrated Guide to the World’s Top 
Counter-Terrorist Forces, 116–124.  GSIGN (Groupement de Securite et d’Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale) is the elite organization of the French Gendarmerie that contains the 
EPIGN (Escadron de Protection et d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale – Parachutist 
Security and Assault team), and the famous GIGN (Groupe d’Intervention Gendarmerie Nationale 
– French domestic CT unit). 
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of GSIGN (mainly GIGN and EPIGN), 17th RGP (Airborne Engineer Regiment) 
and GCP parachutists. This thesis focuses only on units in the First Circle, shown 
in Figure 9.  Taken together, the entire size of the French SOF system, which is 
composed primarily of these units, has close to 3,000 personnel.231 
 
 
Figure 9.   SOF Units in the First Circle [From Synthesis of Sjoberg and 
Micheletti] 
According to the official mission statement for units in the First 
Circle, these units: “Undertake wide-ranging, targeted and control (sic) actions, 
limited in both time and space, against the enemy’s centres of gravity.”232  The 
essential tasks are: military assistance, military support operations, counter-
terrorism, and influence operations.233  Although the SOF units may need to 
                                            
231 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 156; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS 
Jane’s: Defence & Security Intelligence Analysis, http://jasf.janes.com/docs/jasf/browse_country 
(accessed March 15, 2011).  The 17th RGP is a specialist bomb disposal unit, and the GCP units 
are conventional elite commandos. 
232 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 22.  
233 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 9.  A key point to highlight is that the personnel in 
these SOF units are all volunteers.  The French government scrapped its conscript system in 
1996. 
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possess overlapping capabilities to perform this spectrum of tasks, such as in the 
area of insertions/extractions, each has its own niche area.  
(1)  Commandement des Fusiliers et Commandos 
(COFUSCO) is the Navy organization that is responsible for the naval 
commandos.  As shown in Figure 9, it has under its command the four assault 
units, one close quarter battle group (Groupe de Combat en Milieu, GCMC), and 
the Underwater Action Unit (Hubert).  Additionally, it has at its direct disposal the 
support elements for naval SO, for example, the diving support vessel Poseidon.  
COFUSCO reports directly to the Navy Chief of Staff and is “both the Navy 
equivalent of COS and the Navy representative to the Joint Commission.”  More 
importantly, COFUSCO and its units do not perform tasks only for COS.  They 
have to be shared with the French Navy.234  The action units within COFUSCO 
are: 
• GCMC:  “Only the best get through the selection process—
about four per year.” This statement speaks for itself.  
GCMC is the crème de la crème of the French naval 
commandos.  It is the maritime counter-terrorist unit that 
specializes in resolving maritime hostage situations and 
recovering ships from terrorists.  The average age of the 
members in this unit is 28. The unit works regularly with the 
B platoon of Commando Hubert, as the latter can be the 
supplementary or back-up force when needed.  GIGN 
personnel are also often involved in cross-training to make 
sure CT procedures are harmonized across units.235 
• Commando Hubert specializes in underwater special 
warfare.  It has four platoons (A, B, C, and D), with each 
                                            
234 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 158; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS 
Jane’s; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 39.  Apparently, there is no reported 
animosity between COS and the services (Navy and Air Force) when it comes to sharing of the 
SOF units. 
235 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 74–5. 
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platoon having its own sub-specialty. For example, as 
already mentioned, the B platoon has CT capabilities similar 
to those of GCMC.  However, it also possesses underwater 
capabilities that the GCMC does not have. Another example 
is C platoon.  This platoon operates the swimmer delivery 
vehicles (PSM), and takes care of the crew and maintenance 
as well.  According to Micheletti, “[Commando Hubert] is 
completely unique, with underwater capabilities specific to 
no other organization of the French Navy.”  The average age 
of the members is 30.236  
• Commando Assault Units (Jaubert, Trepel, de Penfentenyo, 
and de Montfort) specialize in amphibious landings, maritime 
assaults, and reconnaissance. Each unit also has a sub-
specialty. For example, de Penfentenyo is expert in maritime 
reconnaissance while de Montfort undertakes mostly 
maritime sabotage and air guidance missions.237 
(2)  Brigade des Forces Speciales Terre (BFST) is the Army 
equivalent of COFUSCO; it contains all the Army SOF units.  As the figure 
illustrates, units that make up army SOF are: 1st RPIMa, DAOS and 13 RDP.  
This brigade structure was only adopted in July 2002, as a result of the addition 
of 13 RDP to the Army SOF fold.  Unlike Navy SOF, that has a dual COS and 
Navy role, units in BFST are solely obligated to COS’s missions.  However, 
BFST still acts as the interface between the Army Staff and COS.238   
• 1er Regiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine (1st 
RPIMa):  “This unit is the direct descendant of French World 
                                            
236 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 83; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 26. 
237 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 58-68; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS 
Jane’s; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 26. 
238 Although units in BFST are solely for COS, the raise-train-sustain function is still under 
the Army.  Hence, there is this need for an interface between COS and the Army Staff.  
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War II SAS trained paratroops and has kept up not only the 
esprit de corps of its predecessors . . . but also its mission.”  
Its main missions are land-based strategic direct action and 
reconnaissance, and military operational assistance to third 
countries allied to France.239 The regiment has some 
members trained in specialized areas, including combat 
diving, CT missions, and military free-fall.240  But the aim in 
having these specialties is to make the regiment self-
sufficient when deployed, and not to enable it to compete 
with other forces.241 
• 13 Regiment de Dragons Parachutistes (13 RDP) 
specializes in intelligence collection, particularly Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT).  It was originally part of the Military 
Intelligence agency (DRM).  However, after the Gulf War and 
other combat engagements in the 1990s, the decision was 
made to incorporate it into COS.242 
• ALAT243 Special Operations Detachment (DAOS): This 
detachment consists of helicopters that are dedicated to 
supporting SO carried out by all COS units.  It comprises two 
arms—1st and 2nd EOS (Escadrille, or squadron— the former 
is responsible for transportation and the latter for  
 
                                            
239 Strategic reconnaissance involves long range, behind-enemy-lines infiltration and 
intelligence collection. Direct action involves traditional commando raiding, urban operations, 
sniping, and inland CSAR operations.  Lastly, military assistance includes personnel security 
missions like VIP-escort. 
240 The CT missions are more along the lines of general close quarter battle, sometimes 
known as urban warfare, and not specialized hostage rescue.  Military free-fall skills are 
HALO/HAHO (High Altitude Low Opening/High Opening) and include tandem capabilities. 
241 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 37-49; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 24–5. 
242 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 152; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 25; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS Jane’s. 
243 ALAT stands for Aviation Legere de l’Armee de Terre – French Army Light Aviation. 
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combat fire support.  The 1st EOS flies Pumas and Cougars, 
while the 2nd EOS uses Gazelles and newly added Tiger 
helicopters.244 
(3)  Special Air Operations:  Apparently, unlike the Army and 
Navy, there is no centralized organization in the French Air Force that acts as an 
interface between COS and the Air Staff. There does seem to be a partially 
centralized organization in CFCA (Special Airborne Infantry Command)245 that 
oversees Air Force-related commando operations, which may help fill this gap. 
The CFCA is composed of the Air Force Commando Unit 10 (CPA 10) and the 
special operations helicopter squadrons (EHS).  The other Air Force units 
dedicated to support COS are DOS/C-160 and DOS/C-130. Also of note is that, 
as with Navy SOF, these units do not only support COS, but also the larger 
French Air Force.  The detailed tasks of these action and support units are: 
• Commando Parachutiste de l’air No. 10 (CPA 10): The core 
missions of this unit encompass laser target designation and 
ranging, reconnoitering and securing landing zones, and 
restoration of airport facilities.  These capabilities are unique 
to this unit.246  
• Escadrille des Helicopteres Speciaux (EHS):  This unit was 
re-organized in 2000, to include being moved to Cazaux to 
ensure better support to COS units.  In Cazaux, EHS is 
physically closer to the SOF action units it is designed to 
support, especially the naval commandos.  The squadrons 
fly mainly Super Pumas and Fennec helicopters.  However, 
its Super Pumas are different from those flown by DAOS, 
                                            
244 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 117-20; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 25–6; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS Jane’s. 
245 CFCA stands for Commandement des fusiliers de l’air. 
246 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 87-111; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 27–8.  Although this unit also possesses some other enabling capabilities that are 
common with the other SOF units, for example sniping and military free-fall, these capabilities 
again aim to ensure flexibility and independence. 
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and are better suited for the maritime environment.247  
Consequently, COS designated EHS to be the “naval 
operations oriented unit.”  This maritime orientation sets the 
EHS apart from the DAOS.248  
• Division des Operations Speciales (DOS) Transport:  This 
division consists of two arms—DOS/C-160 and DOS/C-130.  
As the names imply, the former flies the C-160R Transall 
and the latter the C-130 Hercules.  Like the EOS and EHS 
pilots and aircrew, personnel assigned to DOS are carefully 
selected.  In fact, DOS pilots and aircrew are normally 
among the most experienced because of the demanding 
tasks they have to perform for COS (e.g., night flying and 
working behind enemy lines). Most are instructors at the 
training center concurrently. In addition to supporting COS, 
they also support the Forward Air Command (CFAP).  
Another interesting point about DOS is that it does not have 
organic aircraft, but only pilots and crew.249 
From the above descriptions, it is clear that most COS units have 
access to the strategic level for both operational and administrative matters.250  
This is crucial for strategic assets like SOF.  However, it is still worth posing the  
 
 
                                            
247 The Super Pumas are fitted with the French designed Coupleur de Vol Stationnaire 
(CVS, hover coupler system).  This allows the Pumas to maintain a balanced hover even in bad 
visibility conditions. 
248 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 128–147; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French 
Special Forces, 28; “France’s Amphibious and Special Forces,” IHS Jane’s. 
249 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 128-35; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 28–9.  While the two DOS detachments do not have organic air assets, the French Air 
Force ensures that they have ready access to at least one aircraft everyday for either training or 
operations.  
250 Only the units in the Air Force seem not to have such access when under administrative 
control.   
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question “has COS facilitated or ensured better employment and development of 
SOF to meet France’s national objectives?”  To answer, I will cite a few 
examples:  
(1)  Harmonize, Integrate and Unify SOF capabilities.  To 
harmonize and integrate different SOF units requires clear doctrine about SOF’s 
employment and development. It took COS many years of working with the 
services to put in place such a coherent doctrine.  Once COS overcame this 
initial hurdle, as well as the services’ parochialism, the foundation for an effective 
French SOF system began to come together.  In addition to doctrinal issues, like 
the development of a concept of operations and common procedures, as well as 
equipment and training directives,251 other processes carried out by the HQ are 
equally vital to ensuring interoperability and integration.  This is the responsibility 
of the six bureaus; their job is to put processes in place, and then glue them 
together so that COS has a system that functions as a coherent whole.  Here, I 
will use the work done by the Training and R&D Bureaus as cases in point. 
To ensure interoperability and integration between France’s 
SOF units, the Training Bureau organizes and conducts combined exercises and 
training.  It also coordinates joint exercises and training with other French 
agencies or allied SOF units.  In some of these exercises, COS will participate to 
exercise the C2 structure and linkages.252  In addition to exercises and combined 
                                            
251 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 32.  This is the job of the R&D Bureau. 
252 Ibid., 12–3, 32; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 31.  There are at 
least two combined exercises every year.  They are mostly conducted at night, including the flying 
missions.  Some examples of joint exercises are EXCOM 2002 when CPA 10 exercised with the 
Gendarmes, national police, and other civilian agencies; and the allied exercise, Strong Resolve, 
conducted in 2002 when COS acted as the CJSOTF.  Another was the CT training between 
Hubert, GCMC, and GIGN as mentioned earlier that helped to standardize CT procedures 
between these three units. 
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training, the Training Bureau sets up common basic SOF training in areas like 
parachuting, Commando Training, and Diving Training.253   
To ensure commonality of equipment and to ensure that the 
services can adequately support SO, the R&D Bureau works closely with the 
individual services since “the major acquisition programs are organic” to the 
latter. COS does not have a separate budget to fund most of these acquisition 
programs, but, ever since COS’s acceptance by the services as a partner, this 
process seems to have gone smoothly.  Consequently, the interoperability issue 
pertaining to equipment, which was a major issue during and before the Gulf 
War, is now no longer a problem. One proof of this can be found in the French 
FTM vehicle. This is a lightweight vehicle designed by the French Air Force 
specifically to support helicopter refueling in out-of-area operations.  The 
invention of this vehicle has helped French SOF significantly, since rotary aircraft 
are an important part of SO.254   
Clear doctrine, especially in regard to the employment of 
SOF, also helps to unify units. And, here is where French SOF differs from our 
two earlier cases. COS has been able to implement an unequivocal and relevant 
division of labor among the different SOF units under its command. This does not 
just apply to tasks and niche areas.  COS also works with other government 





                                            
253 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 30-1; Micheletti, French Special 
Forces, 47, 87.  This common training is normally conducted at centralized institutions.  For 
example, airborne training is conducted at Airborne School in Pau, and Commando training is 
conducted at National Commando Training Centers.  Further, to qualify for CPA 10, one must first 
go through the airborne training and the Commando Level II training conducted at these centers.  
Also, the 1st RPIMa sends its troopers to the Navy Diving School for dive training.  Of course, 
besides harmonizing the units, this helps maximize/save resources. 
254 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 13, 32, 130–1.  According to Micheletti, this is why 
most COS officers will say, “We’ve come a long way since 1992!” 
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Consequently, COS units are able to work cooperatively and in harmony among 
themselves and also with other special units outside of COS that closely support 
them, such as DRM and Gendarmes units.255  
(2)  Effective Stewardship of SOF.  This refers to what 
Chapter II describes as deviation-amplifying feedback. Is COS able to keep 
French SOF relevant and effective as a strategic instrument?  Here, three 
examples suggest that COS is able to effectively orientate French SOF to meet 
the national objectives without over-committing them.  
In the 1990s, the idea of civil-military activities was still very 
new and just starting to take hold in the French military.  Consequently, COS was 
tasked to be the “Laboratory” for this capability, and it managed to build up a 
credible unit, Section d’Influence (Section for Influence), to perform this role.256  
During the late nineties there was a growing demand for influence operations 
given the new security environment.  From COS’s perspective, this was not 
SOF’s main focus.  Therefore, instead of expanding SOF to support this demand, 
or shifting units away from COS’s core foci, COS gave up this role to the Army, 
maintaining only a small capability to meet SO requirements.257 
A second example of effective stewardship concerns reform 
of Navy SOF in 2001. Under the previous system, there was very little 
specialization or modularity The impetus behind reforming Navy SOF was two-
                                            
255 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 16-23; Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special 
Forces, 44-8.  The examples to support this claim can be found in operations from the 1990s 
through today in Afghanistan.  What these examples indicate is that COS has a knack for utilizing 
a force package concept that picks and chooses SOF from the different units to make up the 
force to be deployed.   
256 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians: Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University, 1978), 31-2.  According to Eliot Cohen, “Elite units are often 
defended as military laboratories for new tactical systems.  Such units … can try out new 
doctrines, test their validity, and then spread the doctrines to the rest of the army.” 
257 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 20–1.  The Army set up a Civil 
Military Center in the late nineties to fulfill this demand.  In the end, COS only kept a small force in 
the EIT (Expertise Initiale du Theatre – Initial Expertise in the Theatre) for its own needs. 
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fold: one, to make the Navy SOF more effective and deployable;258 two, to align it 
with the overall direction of the French Armed Forces, toward greater modularity 
and mobility.  In the end, it also gave COS more flexibility as COS could now pick 
and  choose the relevant forces to make up force packages for deployment. 
Finally, we have the example of 13 RDP being absorbed into 
COS in July 2002. Army SOF was expanded to include 13 RDP to allow a more 
seamless integration between SO and tactical/operational intelligence.  Even 
when 13 RDP was with the DRM, it was already supporting many of the COS’s 
operations.  Hence, it can only have helped make COS more effective to add 13 
RDP.259 
(3)  Capabilities/Technology Development. Another key 
aspect of ensuring better employment of SOF is to make sure that SOF have 
access to all the equipment and assets they need to fulfill their tasks.  As 
mentioned, this job falls under the purview of the R&D Bureau.  Beyond the 
earlier example of the FMT vehicle, another important step was the addition of 
new helicopters to COS’s inventory.  This came in the wake of the French SOF 
experience in Afghanistan in 2001 when it was deployed as part of the 
international force (ISAF). The French lacked helicopters to support tactical 
transportation of SOF units in out-of-area operations.  As a consequence, and 
most likely with COS’s influence, the French government agreed to acquire 14 
new helicopters at the price of EUR 460 million to support SOF.  In addition, 
                                            
258 To underline the earlier point on a clear division of labor, one can also argue that this 
made the roles and responsibilities clearer between the different navy units.  
259 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 25, 27, 41–2.  
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purchases were made of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and patrol vehicles, 
which specifically met SOF requirements.260 
b. Human Capital and Culture 
As we saw with the previous case studies, Human Capital and 
Culture are often closely intertwined with Structure and Tasks.  It is no different in 
this case. However, rather than recapitulate some of the key points made earlier, 
here I offer two new observations about expansion of career options for SOF, 
and power sharing between COS and the services. 
A critical underlying factor for COS’s effectiveness appears to lie in 
its ability to fill its HQ with a sufficient number and a good distribution of SOF 
members from the different services.  Since the HQ is the core of the COS 
organization, an inherently joint environment enables it to effectively support all 
the demands from the various tactical units adequately.  Further, the joint 
environment also ensures that every SOF issue is looked at from the point of 
view of all three services, to include potential second and third order effects of 
proposed courses of action. Second, the strict selection system the COS has for 
its CT groups underscores the seriousness it places on CT missions.  This is 
starkly different from the Israeli case.  In the French case, CT troopers not only 
need to have seniority in time of service, but also in chronological age (and by 
extension, maturity).  Lastly, the establishment of COS bodes well for the career 
system of the SOF community, particularly for officers. This turns out to be 
especially helpful for Navy and Air Force SOF because, as is often the case in 
                                            
260 Robert Wall, “Special Delivery; French special operations helicopter force grows,” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 9, 2007, 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview (accessed January 30, 
2011); Gareth Jennings, “French Special Forces Choose Skylark,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 
2, 2008, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/lnacui2api/results/docview (accessed 
January 30, 2011); J A C Lewis, “France buys 10 EC 725s to bolster special forces,” Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, December 11, 2002, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId (accessed January 30, 
2011); “France receives first Special Patrol Vehicles,” International Defence Review, July 1, 2006, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId (accessed January 30, 
2011). 
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smaller militaries, they have more limited opportunities.261  With COS, their 
career options are not only expanded, but they can stay within their field of SO.  
This also opens an additional position for officers within the SOF system to 
aspire to be COS Commander.262 
As for Culture, it is clear that French SOF get along internally, as 
well as with supporting agencies inside and outside of the military.  What might 
account for this?   First, doctrine is unambiguous about the employment and 
development of SOF, to include a clear division of labor. Second, troops go 
through common basic training, which has a harmonizing effect. Such training 
helps build bonds and trust among soldiers from different units, which then 
facilitates further exchanges and interactions as these soldiers subsequently 
embark on their SOF careers. Third, is the inherent joint culture in the French 
Armed Forces.  
Notwithstanding all the positive things said about French SOF, 
there remains at least one potential downside to its set up: namely, the 
arrangement by which COS is supposed to share power with the conventional 
services over their SOF.  Although there have been no reports to suggest that 
this relationship is problematic, it is one area where things potentially could go 
awry.  Perhaps the liaison officers help COS keep the relationship with the key 
supporting agencies even-keeled.  But to maintain balance via such informal 
                                            
261 Katz, Israeli Special Forces, 59, 63.  A case in point is the Israeli Navy SOF. Officers are 
forced into a career in the Israeli Navy since Flotilla 13 is too small to hold them all, especially as 
they reach a more senior level.  The other reason to emphasize the Navy and Air Force is 
because the nature of their work is very different from SOF.  As was noted in Chapter III, the 
conventional Army normally has more in common with its SOF as compared to either the Navy or 
the Air Force (in this case, the CPA 10). 
262 Micheletti, French Special Forces, 10.  The second commander of COS, Major General 
Jacques Saleun, was formerly a pilot who supported SO missions when he was in the Air Force.  
His appointment proves that the French system recognizes the expertise one needs to have to be 
a COS commander.  It also means that officers from all three services stand an equal chance of 
being appointed. 
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relations certainly takes time and effort.263 For a Component Command structure 
like COS, this then becomes, and remains, one of its key tasks. 
3. Connecting the Dots 
 
 
Figure 10.   Pathological Analysis of French SOF 
From the evidence presented, it is clear that the credit for this well-
functioning system lies with having a clear national strategy.  This includes the 
decision to set up COS to oversee SO performed by the three services. The most 
important aspect of the doctrine COS itself has implemented has guaranteed an 
unequivocal division of labor between the different SOF units, as well as between 
COS and other agencies.  This clear task differentiation has granted the tactical 
units the ability to focus their energies in the right areas (e.g., they have been 
able to develop the right human capabilities). The division of labor overseen by 
COS has also helped ensure good relations among the different units, which 
                                            
263 Sjoberg, The Evolution of the French Special Forces, 27, 39.  COS’s earlier experiences 
before it gained traction with the conventional forces reinforce the potential weak point this type of 
matrix structure possesses.  But, for COS, this factor was alleviated by the favorable joint 
environment of the French Armed Forces.  
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bodes well for the SOF community as a whole.  However, a clear SOF doctrine is 
only one dimension of COS’s tasks.  Others involve R&D, training, and 
operational support. COS’s overall effectiveness at executing its tasks (via the six 
Bureaus) has resulted in SOF units that are well oriented to the threat 
environment for which they were built.  For simplicity’s sake, all of these are 
represented by Trail 1 in Figure 10. 
Trails 2 and 3 depict the interactions between the Structure and Human 
Capital.  Trail 2—Structure to Human Capital—refers to the career expansion 
option that COS offers to the whole SOF community, albeit more for Navy and Air 
Force assets.  Trail 3—Human Capital to Structure—reflects the capacity and 
distribution of human capital in the HQ that makes the latter an effective entity. It 
is important to emphasize this feedback loop because it shows the 
interconnection between the product and the system itself.  As the HQ draws its 
human capital from the tactical units (which is the product produced by the 
system), the effectiveness of the HQ is thus also a function of how well it does its 
job in producing the product.  To this end, French SOF seem to have gotten it 
right.264 
Finally, Trail 4 illustrates the alignment between the national strategy and 
the threat environment.265 
4. Generating Insights 
When COS was initially established in 1992, the French SOF system did 
not hit the road and run immediately.  It took the macro-organization several 
years to fight the bureaucratic inertia of the conventional military before it could 
do what it was designed for.  The turning point came after the release of the 1994 
White Paper, or, more precisely, during the implementation of MPL 97-02, whose 
                                            
264 This is what the evidence has revealed from reading about the French SOF.  However, 
like in all things, reality may be a bit messier – something that only further investigation could help 
to determine. 
265 This alignment (with the social environment) also speaks for the French Armed Forces in 
regard to the removal of the draft system. 
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strategic initiatives re-oriented the entire French Armed Forces toward a joint 
concept.  This re-orientation, coupled with COS’s own efforts in vying for the 
services’ buy-in, finally resulted in COS being able to overcome initial resistance, 
and subsequently allowed COS to put the key pieces of the French SOF system 
into place.  Once this happened, the only direction in which the system could 
head was toward the positive.  Today, at least a decade since things came 
together, the SOF system, which is driven by COS, is one that is effective and 
aligned with France’s national objectives.  To say the least, this French case 
seems to provide many answers to the organizational conundrums raised by the 
previous two case studies. Key insights from the French experience follow: 
a. The French case illustrates that changing the organizational 
structure of SOF alone is not a foolproof way to resolve all the 
organizational issues at the system level.  What needs to 
accompany this change is to have a clear national strategy for 
SOF, as well as other doctrinal guidance that will help the new 
organization and others accept its role. Further, the SOF 
organization has to be given sufficient and appropriate power in 
strategy and doctrine (over and above what is implicit in the 
construct) to enable it to be effective. This is because the nature of 
this overarching SOF organization requires it to share power with 
the conventional services. When provided with the proper authority, 
it can better focus its efforts on more important tasks, such as 
capability development, rather than wasting time and energy on 
maintaining an informal relationship with the conventional services. 
Further, to lessen the weight put on this informal relationship, the 
organization should also be given a separate budget so that it can 
pursue SOF-specific equipment and address SOF-specific 
requirements as it deems fit. Time and again the French case 
reveals the importance of such a budget. 
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b. The French case reinforces how important it is to have a clear 
division of labor.  More importantly, it underscores that developing a 
doctrine detailing this should be the first thing any new SOF 
superstructure does. This is because doctrine forms the base 
document from which all other equally important processes and 
directives take reference.  
c. The French case also helps reiterate a point made earlier in regard 
to Israeli SOF, which is that when there are many SOF units in the 
SOF system, an oversight agency is imperative. More importantly, 
the French example offers insights into how such an agency (i.e., 
Component Command) should be designed.  These insights 
concern issues such as what type of subunits the HQ should have 
(e.g., the six Bureaus), their roles and responsibilities, the size and 
distribution of manpower, and the kind of linkages the HQ needs to 
have with other agencies (e.g., a joint environment, particularly with 
similar units like Gendarmes and Intelligence).266  This case also 
makes clear how important it is for SOF to have dedicated air crew 
and assets; since supporting SO can be very (or, read: extremely) 
different from supporting conventional operations, the airmen need 
to know intimately both the operations and the troopers. 
d. For small and medium militaries where manpower is a key 
constraint, the Component Command can provide a very efficient 
solution.  In the French case, the size of the HQ is only about 60 
personnel, but it is able to effectively support a total SOF 
community of close to 3,000 members. Critical, too, is a favorable 
environment in which the services willingly fulfill their raise-train-
sustain functions. The existence of a Component Command can  
 
                                            
266 Comparing the Israeli with the French case, one possible explanation for Israel’s inability 
to act on its SOF’s ineffectiveness is its challenging security environment – it is always busy 
reacting and has no time to think strategically. 
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also help to provide additional career options for SOF.  This bodes 
well not only for individuals, but also for the whole system as SOF 
can retain highly experienced personnel. 
e. For a Component Command, a pro-joint environment may be 
especially important. Particularly since the organization does not 
hold actual assets but depends on the conventional services for 
support. Even when a favorable joint environment exists, the 
organization still needs to ensure that it has tight and appropriate 
linkages with its supporting intelligence agencies, whether within 
the military or at the national level.267 The premise here is that the 
SOF system is dependent to some degree on external intelligence 
support.  To this end, the SOF organization needs to also make 
sure that the division of labor between it and the intelligence 
agencies is clearly delineated (the same, actually, goes for all 
agencies that perform similar functions).268  
f. As strategic instruments, the Component Command and the tactical 
units should have access to the top leadership of the military and 
the services, respectively.  This pertains not only to operational, but 
also administrative matters.  To this end, the geographical location 
of the Command vis-à-vis its “master” can be an important factor. 
269  This is because the Command needs to work closely with the 
top leadership, especially in operations, and be able to influence or 
turn around decisions fast enough to be effective.   
g. The geographical location of the Component Command (HQ) vis-à-
vis its tactical units may not be quite as critical since one thing the 
                                            
267 This emphasis on intelligence is because it is a critical part of SO.  Further, depending on 
the SOF missions and how well the external intelligence agencies can support SOF 
requirements, it may be necessary for SOF to have organic HUMINT capabilities. In general, 
having such capabilities as part of the SOF organization will most likely be more boon than bane. 
268 In general, SOF, intelligence, and special police agencies often have some overlapping 
functions. 
269 This seems to be what this case suggests, especially for COS versus CEMA.  COS is just 
north of Paris where CEMA is located. 
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French case suggests is that even when COS is not in close 
proximity to its units, the French system continues to be effective. I 
would argue that the reason this is so is that the French system is, 
to a large extent, underpinned by a well-staffed and well-designed 
HQ.  If the converse is true, geographical proximity may well 
become a critical consideration. 
h. As with Norwegian SOF, all the personnel in the French SOF 
system are volunteers.  This may again indicate the importance of 
using only volunteers for SO, especially for CT operations.270  For 
the latter, SOF should only select the most experienced and mature 
troopers.   
i. Another way to maximize, or save, resources is to have common 
basic SOF courses (e.g., Commando and Airborne courses in this 
case), in addition to common processes in the HQ, such as with 
R&D. These common basic courses help to make interoperability 
possible.  On this note, SOF leadership should also think about 
having a common selection process and basic SOF training. These 
common selection and basic SOF training processes should 
encompass identifying the strengths of the different candidates 
early, which can then help “stream” candidates into more 
specialized training related to the tactical units’ niche areas.  There 
are at least two benefits to having such common processes.  First, 
common selection and training will help match a man’s aptitude and 
competencies to the task requirements early, and hence reduce the 
costs of attrition later on. Second, common selection and training 
helps to build a common SOF identity which also eases 
interoperability.271   
                                            
270 If we think in terms of the risk and operational security aspects of the job, it becomes 
even clearer that doing the opposite is a nonstarter. 
271 Certainly a lot more is involved if an organization chooses to have such common 
processes.  But this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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C. AUSTRALIA 
In this final case study, we are going to look at Australian SOF and its 
macro-organization, known as the Special Operations Command (SOCOMD).  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will consider SOCOMD to be a Service 
Command as it has all the characteristics that a service-like structure possesses: 
This model [Service Command] provides SOF senior leadership the 
authority, control, and resources necessary to optimize national 
SOF capabilities within the defence establishment.  However, this 
model also diverts the attention of the SOF senior leadership from 
joint operational matters to service force management . . . and force 
development . . . matters.272 
As per the description, SOCOMD is able to provide coherent stewardship 
for Australian SOF and, comparatively speaking, does so in a much more 
effective fashion than COS for the French. The reasons are three-fold: (1) the full 
command authority that comes with the Service-like organization, (2) the 
implementation of clear doctrine from the outset, and (3) its reach to and 
influence on the strategic leadership.  Consequently, while SOCOMD has spent 
the better part of its existence as a “work in progress,” it fulfills what it was 
designed to do.273   
1. Australia’s Environment and National Strategy 
Like its western allies, Australia’s strategic environment underwent 
significant changes in the past two decades.  The harbingers of these changes 
were two watershed events—the end of the Cold War and the September 11 
attacks on the United States.  While the end of the Cold War heralded a huge 
                                            
272 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 27. 
273 Christopher Wayne Gillies, The Cutting Edge: Origins, Implementation, and Lessons 
Learned from the Creation of Australia’s Special Operations Command – With Recommendations 
for Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2006), 21; Micheletti, French Special Forces, 12.   While SOCOMD was officially 
established in May 2003, it reached its maturity only in 2008.  Further, according to Micheletti, it 
took USSOCOM ten years to establish itself, while Britain’s macro-organization for SOF took 
almost fifty years to secure its  place in the UK defense system. 
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(positive) change in the conventional threat environment for Australia’s allies,274 it 
was the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent wave of Islamic terrorism that affected 
Australia the most.  As Michael Evans writes: 
Between 1999 and 2003, Australia entered the new age of 
globalised security, in which it became apparent that … the spread 
of radical Islamism into South-East Asia, symbolized by the Bali 
and Jakarta bombing attacks, has confronted Australia with a long-
term regional security problem … linked to a global jihadist 
movement.275 
While this Islamic terrorism threat was not new prior to the 9/11 incident, it 
was not a huge concern for Australia’s authorities because Australia and its 
people were never a direct target.  Things began to change with the 9/11 attacks, 
and more so with the Bali Bombing on 12 Oct 2002.  The latter marked the first 







                                            
274 Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of 
War 1901-2005 (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, February 2005), 63; Hugh 
White, “Australia’s Strategic Weight and Role in the Asia,” Proceedings of the ASPI International 
Conference: Global Forces 2010, 
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=288&pubtype=13 
(accessed April 10, 2011), 28. The conventional threat countenanced by Australia has always 
been low even during the Cold War period.  According to Michael Evans, the 1970s and 1980s 
were a period of relative stability for Australia.  This is because Australia’s physical geography 
confers on it the benefits of insularity.  For Australia, the more significant effects from the end of 
the Cold War were those associated with globalization, which in some ways also contributed to 
the rise of non-conventional threats. 
275 Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance, 95. 
276 Australian Government, Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010: Securing Australia, 
Protecting Our Community, http://www.dpmc.gov.au/publications/counter_terrorism (accessed 
April 10, 2011), 7.  As stated in the white paper, “Terrorism affected Australia before the 11 
September 2001 attacks … Various overseas terrorist groups have long had a presence in 
Australia – focused largely on fundraising and procurement, occasionally escalating to violence. 
But prior to the rise of self-styled jihadist terrorism fostered by al-Qa’ida, Australia itself was not a 
specific target. We now are.” 
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the Australian government took a slew of counter-measures.  Pertinent to SOF, 
one of these involved the expansion of SOF capabilities that culminated in the 
establishment of SOCOMD in May 2003.277   
Beyond the expansion of SOF capabilities, the government also 
undertook, in a progressive fashion, a series of other system-level initiatives. To 
address the threat of terrorism the government adopted a so-called “whole of 
government approach.”  Other examples of these initiatives include the 
establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC) and the new 
National Counter-Terrorism Plan in 2002, and, in more recent times, the creation 
of the National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC, 2009) and Counter 
Terrorism Control Centre (CTCC, 2010).278  Further, periodic national-level 
policies helped ensure that these national entities/agencies work hand in glove 
with one another.  More recently, there have been the 2009 Defense White 
Paper and 2010 Counter Terrorism White Paper.279  Pertaining to Australian 
SOF, it is worth noting that Commander SOCOMD (SOCAUST) is part of the 
NCTC, which is the national-level coordinating body for CT that also provides 
policy advice to the government.280  Equally noteworthy is the fact that the first 
SOCAUST, Major General (retd) Duncan Lewis, was appointed the “First 
                                            
277 Malcolm Brailey, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary 
Conflict: Strategy, Missions, Organisation and Tactics (Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, November 2005), 35; Major General Duncan Lewis, “Guarding Australians Against 
Terrorism,” Australian Army Journal, vol. 1, no. 2 (2003): 45–52.  In May 2002, the Australian 
government announced the creation of a second Tactical Assault Group (TAG). It would cost the 
government A$219.4 million, and was meant to strengthen the overall CT capabilities of the ADF.  
The TAG members were drawn from the Australian SAS. 
278 Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010, 27–8; Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 51.  According to 
Gillies, the main roles of NCTC include: “provision of strategic policy advice to heads of 
government and ministers, coordination of national counter-terrorism capability, and maintaining 
an effective flow of intelligence and information across jurisdictions.”  Also, its members are 
leaders of “states and territories at senior policy level, including deputy police commissioners.”  
For NICC and CTCC, they mainly coordinate intelligence at the national level.  The NICC is more 
of a strategic advisory body for making policies, while the CTCC is an operational agency doing 
the actual coordination.  See the White Paper for more details on their roles and responsibilities. 
279 The last CT white paper was before the Bali Bombing, and the last defense white paper 
was in 2000.  In between, there were some update papers. 
280 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 51.  The SOCAUST’s role in NCTC is officially captured in the 
“Inter-Governmental Agreement on Australia’s National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements” on 24 
October 2002. 
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Assistant Secretary for National Security in the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet in 2004, and as Deputy Secretary in the same department in August 
2005.”  Besides SOCAUST, a number of former Australian Special Air Service 
(SAS) personnel were also recruited by NCTC to work between the government 
and SOF.281 
Taken together, the two most recent white papers underscore three key 
points salient to this thesis.  First, they reveal the government’s perception of the 
terrorism threat, which is that it “has become a persistent and permanent feature 
of Australia’s security environment.”282  Second, they render the traditional 
concept of security invalid. Australia deems that it is no longer possible to 
delineate between external and internal, or national and societal threats.  This is 
because instability in Southeast Asia (specifically Indonesia) and Afghanistan 
can equally affect the security and interests of Australia and its people. As such, 
the white papers advocate Australia’s participation in both regional and 
international operations. The papers recognize these operations as necessary for 
a secure and stable world order.283  As noted by Hugh Collins, the world order is 
one with which Australia’s fate is closely intertwined: 
[Australia’s] future and its fate lie on the complex networks of global 
interdependence. The conditions of world order are the immediate 
conditions of Australian security and prosperity.  This gives the 
country a high stake in defining these international conditions, but 
also means that changes in international norms and transnational 
regimes will have direct impact upon domestic politics.284  
                                            
281 Brailey, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict, 16–
7. 
282 Counter-Terrorism White Paper 2010, 7.  It is important to highlight that the terrorism 
threat is subsumed under the broader unconventional threats (such as failed states and energy 
resource crisis) in both white papers.  However, it still stands out amongst these other threats. 
283 Ibid., 21; Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 
2030, http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (accessed 
April 10, 2011), 20–3. 
284 Hugh Collins, “Political Ideology in Australia: The Distinctiveness of a Benthamite 
Society,” in Australia: The Daedalus Symposium, ed. Stephen R. Graubard (Sydney: Angus & 
Robertson, 1985), 162. 
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Third, the papers establish a clear division of labor between the different national 
agencies so that no conflict of interests will impede the government from bringing 
to bear all these assets.  Specifically, in the 2009 white paper, SOF’s role is 
clearly discernible when it comes to the fight against terrorism, in both domestic 
and offshore/overseas operations.  
Apart from unconventional threats, the 2009 Defense White Paper also 
emphasizes maintaining Australia’s alliance with the U.S.  For Australia, this 
alliance has been and continues to be an important feature of its national 
security.285 To this end, the Coalition/U.S-led operations in which the Australian 
Defense Force (ADF) participates, serve not only Protection/Prevention functions 
(per French parlance), but also fulfill Australia’s alliance commitments (not unlike 
Norway vis-à-vis NATO).  As with its role in the fight against terrorism, SOF also 
serve as a national policy instrument.  Invariably, being small, mobile, flexible, 
but capable of making an impact lends SOF value in the eyes of policy makers.  
This is exemplified in the many recent instances when SOF’s involvement in 









                                            
285 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, 93-4; Nick Bisley, “Australia’s strategic 
relationships in the 21st century,” and Mark Thomson, “What sort of defence force does Australia 
need?” Proceedings of the ASPI International Conference: Global Forces 2010, 
http://www.aspi.org.au/publications/publication_details.aspx?ContentID=288&pubtype=13 
(accessed April 10, 2011), 25-52. Recently, critics are concerned with the changing global and 
regional dynamics caused by the rise of China.  Because of this, they question Australia’s long-
standing reliance on its alliance with the U.S., and in broader terms, the whole approach to 
defense force restructuring.  Nevertheless, it is sufficient for this thesis simply to recognize that 
this relationship is still a key part of Australia’s defense strategy. 
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participation in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom and, 
more recently, the 2005 Special Operations Task Group deployment to 
Afghanistan.286   
From the anecdotal evidence presented in this segment, it is clear that 
SOF are well regarded and valued by the political-military leadership. According 
to David Horner, “the government and the Chief of the Defence Force would be 
unlikely to authorise (sic) special forces operations unless they had confidence in 
the ability of the special forces and the maturity of its commanders.”287  
Notwithstanding this favorable relationship, the strategic direction for SOF has 
not always been so clear. As Evans contended in February 2005: 
…there has been, and continues to be, a ‘tyranny of dissonance’ 
between Australian strategic theory and its warfighting practice.  
While peacetime Australian strategic theory has frequently upheld 
the defence of geography as a foundation stone of defence policy, 
strategic activity in wartime and security crisis has usually been 
undertaken to uphold Australia’s liberal democratic values and vital 
political interests.288 
The point to be highlighted here is that, even without clear strategic guidance in 
previous decades, Australian SOF were nonetheless able to remain relevant as a 
                                            
286 Hugh McManners, Ultimate Special Forces (London: Dorling Kindersley, 2008) 64–7; 
Greg Sheridan, “Special Forces Take the Brunt,” Weekend Australian, August 2, 2008, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/iw-search (accessed April 10, 2011); Ian Bostock, 
“MAJ GEN Duncan Lewis: Special Operations Commander Australia,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 
May 28, 2003, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId 
(accessed April 10, 2011).  According to Greg Sheridan, “It seemed that while the regular army 
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287 David Horner, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1989), 458. 
288 Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance, ix.  What this means is that while the government 
advocated “continental defense” (guarding of the maritime and air approaches for Australia’s 
homeland defense), it kept deploying the ADF (particularly SOF) on overseas operations that had 
nothing to do with that strategy.  Further, it also seems that the government has accepted some 
of Evans’ points.  Particularly, he argued for the “whole of government approach” in his paper and 
now this has become the new buzzword in the Australian system. 
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national policy instrument.  Arguably, this is because Australian SOF have long 
had an oversight authority orchestrating and synchronizing SO, even before the 
establishment of SOCOMD. As we see next, a semblance of SOCOMD (more 
like a Component Command) was already in existence as early as 1997. 289 
2. SOCOMD and Australian SOF 
a. SOCOMD (Structure, Tasks, Human and Culture) and 
Brief History 
The first iteration of a macro-structure overseeing SO was stood up 
in 1979, and was known as the Directorate Special Action Forces (DSAF). As 
Australian SOF grew, DSAF expanded, first to become Headquarter Special 
Forces (HQSF) in 1990, and later Headquarter Special Operations (HQSO) in 
1997.290  By 1997, HQSO already had Service-like responsibilities.  It had 
command over tactical SOF and other assigned units, was required to fulfill 
SOF’s raise-train-sustain functions and, finally, was responsible for overseeing 
the overall employment and development of SOF capabilities.  At the time, 
HQSO was commanded by a brigadier general and had a staff of 42. Important 
to note is that Australian SOF in this period was comprised mainly of Army SOF 
units and was relatively small.291 
Following the Bali bombing in 2002, the government decided to 
establish SOCOMD. On 5 May 2003, SOCOMD officially came into being.  Unlike 
                                            
289 One way to make this apparent is to engage in a small thought exercise. Imagine if there 
was no oversight agency (or the agency had no authority, such as in Israel and Norway). What 
would likely have happened is that all the SOF units would have shifted their efforts to CT, just as 
in Israel. Bearing in mind that the terrorism threat was picking up at this time and the government 
was advocating homeland defense, the government then would have had no SOF specialized in 
traditional SOF capabilities that it could deploy to assist in the US-led operations in the early 
2000s.   
290 DSAF and HQSF are more like the NMSE structure. 
291 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 20-22; Katz, The Illustrated Guide to the World’s Top Counter-
Terrorist Forces, 240.  The only exception was during the 1980s, when a group of divers from the 
Royal Australian Navy was converted to be part of the SAS for the maritime CT mission.  This 
group was subsequently called the Offshore Assault Team (OAT).  The main SOF units at that 
time were the SAS and the Commandos. 
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previous structures, it was the first joint organization with a command status for 
SOF (equivalent to Land, Maritime, and Air Command; the rank of SOCAUST 
was elevated to a Major General—2-star).  At the same time, the headquarters 
was also renamed Special Operations HQ (SOHQ) and was expanded to a staff 
of around 82 persons.292  With this new status, SOCOMD reported directly to the 
Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) for CT operations, and to the Chief Joint 
Operations (CJO) for all other operations.  However, it remained under the 
command of the Chief of Army for the raise-train-sustain functions.293  Today, the 
organization of SOCOMD remains much as it was when established in 2003.  
The organization chart depicting SOCOMD is shown in Figure 11: 
 
Figure 11.   Organization of SOCOMD [From Gilles, p. 22] 
                                            
292 While the full complement of the Australian SOF is classified, it is estimated to be around 
2,500 personnel. 
293 In the ADF, the Service Chiefs have no command responsibilities.  They are mainly force 
providers.   
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Most of the units in the figure above are from the Australian Army; 
the only exception is the aviation unit (A Squadron).294  Tellingly, this does not 
affect the squadron’s support to SOF; the squadron continues to receive priority 
in its development to support SO.295 In terms of geographical location, SOCOMD 
has to maintain two HQs; the primary in Sydney (co-located with Joint 
Operations), while the other is in Canberra (co-located with ADF HQ).296  Last but 
not least, SOCOMD is the official CT node in ADF, and is entrusted with the 
responsibility of maintaining links with other government agencies for CT 
operations (this includes the SOCAUST’s role in the NCTC). 297   
SOCOMD does not have many tactical units.  In fact, it has only 
four action units (to again borrow language from the French case), and two 
others mainly for support functions (SFTC and SOLS). Within the four action 
units, roles and responsibilities are clearly demarcated. Tasks for these units are 
generally in the domains of counter-terrorism, long-range reconnaissance, and 
strategic strike.  While there may be overlaps in some of their capabilities, these 
overlaps are meant to make the whole SOF system more effective, just as in the 
                                            
294  As noted in a previous footnote, the Navy divers are not considered SOF.  Based on the 
brief history presented, it seems that the Australian SOF wants to keep the executive SOF units 
purely Army.   
295 Perhaps this could also be attributed to the favorable relationship SOF has with the 
political-military leadership. 
296 SOHQ Canberra is the SOCOMD interface with the strategic level military leadership 
(i.e., in the ADF); it also has with it the R&D element (S8) for future capability, strategy, and 
doctrine development to support the larger ADF community.  Meanwhile, Sydney is the main HQ 
because it is nearer to most of the tactical units and, at the same time, is together with the Joint 
HQ (operational-military level).  Based on the data in 2005, there were supposed to be plans for 
the HQ to be consolidated in Canberra.  However, there is no evidence to indicate that this has 
happened. 
297 Brailey, The Transformation of Special Operations Forces in Contemporary Conflict, 35-
6; Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 23–7. 
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French case.298 The unequivocal delineation between the SASR and 
Commandos, for example, is reflected in the following statement made by the 
first SOCAUST, Major General (MG) Duncan Lewis: 
The SASR and 4th Battalion lie at opposite ends of the Special 
Forces spectrum in their approach to the conduct of operations. 
The 4th Battalion … [is] a ‘major muscle mover,’ designed to be 
deployed and reach out and apply a great deal of concentrated 
military force and then return home. The SASR . . . is a very 
different kettle of fish. It is an organisation designed for a more 
surgical approach to warfare. They operate in smaller numbers in a 
more discreet [sic] fashion than the commandos.299  
Based on the analysis thus far, and with some more examples to 
follow, SOCOMD’s model seems to be fairly effective given that it has been 
established for less than a decade. What, we might wonder, differentiates it from 
the French case?  First, full command authority comes with its Service-like status 
(including its own budget). This grants SOCOMD the power and flexibility to do 
what it needs to do to make sure plans stay on track.  Unlike COS, SOCOMD 
does not need to share its SOF units, which could otherwise have retarded its 
progress.   
Second, the ADF was mindful of the need to put in place proper 
doctrine before SOCOMD was established.  A directive from the CDF to the 
Service Chiefs was issued on 11 April 2003 detailing the latter’s responsibilities 
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vis-à-vis SOCOMD.  Then, on 23 April 2003, the Chief of Army followed with 
additional guidance regarding the formation of SOCOMD.  The latter was 
formulated as part of the overall program to create SOCOMD.300   
Finally, SOCOMD has reach into, and influence on, the strategic 
leadership.  SOCOMD has clear access to not only the ADF leadership, but also 
the national decision-making body (NCTC).  This allows SOF to exercise some 
influence on decision/policy making, as well as to keep abreast of the latest 
strategic developments.  It also bears emphasizing that the MG rank of 
SOCAUST helps in this regard.  Because he has the same rank as the other 
conventional commanders, SOCAUST has the clout to stand against the tide if 
required.  This further helps SOF retain its uniqueness and, to some degree, its 
value.301 
Taking these factors together, SOCOMD has been able to 
effectively harmonize, integrate, orientate, and ensure proper employment and 
development of SOF even before it reached maturity.302  Now, I will highlight 
some examples to support this claim.  However, I will only focus on those that 
contribute fresh insights to the thesis.   
• Orienting SOF to meet short and long term objectives. Two early 
examples are relevant: the Direct Recruitment Program (known as 
SFDRS), which aimed to expand Australian SOF to meet its short-
term manpower shortfall; and, the adoption of a training command 
distinct from that of the Army Training Command.  The latter, stood  
 
 
                                            
300 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 27–8, 33. 
301 Ibid., 53. 
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up in July 2004, was designed to facilitate better command and 
control, and a more responsive system with respect to the training 
and doctrinal aspects of SO.303   
• Human Capability Development. The absorption of SFTC has 
allowed SOCOMD to implement/refine courses to meet SO 
requirements.  This has led to tighter linkage between training and 
operational requirements which, in turn, has helped yield more 
effective SOF operators. In addition, as a Command, SOCOMD is 
able to implement special allowances which help with recruitment 
and retention.  These allowances are designed to be 
commensurate with the skills and qualifications of the operators 
and the risks they need to undertake.  Finally, a service-like 
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resonates with Anna Simons’s assertion as she writes, “This is why a blended unit with one chain 
of command, under an authoritative leader who has been given strategically clear (and 
achievable) civilian guidance would be the most logical way to facilitate interoperability (which 
would then simply become operability).  Barring that, however, we’re back to figuring out ways to 
achieve cross-tribal and – ultimately, literally – cross-cultural interdependence.” 
303 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 42-6; Ian Bostock, “Australia seeks more special forces 
troops,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 29, 2003, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId (accessed March 15, 
2011).  Special Forces Direct Recruitment Scheme (SFDRS) was implemented to meet the short-
term manpower demand of SOCOMD due to the SOF expansion.  It started in January 2004 and 
ran for three years (with re-evaluation by SOCAUST at the end of the three-year cycle).  
Traditionally, SOF recruitment was limited to only serving members of ADF with at least 12 
months of service.  However, this old scheme would not prove sufficient to meet SOCOMD’s 
immediate needs. It would also place significant strains on ADF’s current manpower situation if 
SOCOMD had relied on it.  Hence, SOCOMD had to create a new avenue to supplement the 
manpower shortfalls, which was the SFDRS.  Two important factors underlying the SFDRS were: 
(1) no more than one-third of SOF reinforcements would be from the scheme, and (2) there would 
be only one training system for SOF.    
     SFTC was established in 1998 and was formerly under the command of HQ Training 
Command-Army. Previously, it proved to be very ineffective for SOF because all SOF 
requirements had to be approved by the Training Command (TC) first, before SFTC could act.  
Suffice it to say, it took lots of time and effort to get over this process (as TC could hardly 
understand SO; a case in point, it often took 3-30 months to get most of these requests through).  
After the establishment of SOCOMD in July 2004, SFTC was shifted under the command of 
SOCOMD, retaining a technical relationship with TC for Training Advisor responsibilities, doctrine 
development, and training system compliance.  In this new structure, “more effective solutions 
and more timely development and implementation of training, policy and doctrine” were 
actualized.  Also, SOCOMD could now better support SFTC in its training requirements, such as 
helping to supplement or replace instructors when the need arose. 
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structure also helps to expand the career options for SOF 
members.  While this is somewhat similar to what we saw with the 
French, SOCOMD has the added ability to attach its members to 
other international partners, such as USSOCOM and British SOF. 
304   
• Capabilities Development.  There are numerous examples that 
illustrate SOCOMD’s effectiveness in acquiring the resources 
needed to enhance/support SO.  Two such examples are (1) the 
acquisition of additional rotary-wing aircraft to support SO (Project 
AIR 9000 in 2004), and (2) the boosting of the CBRNE capabilities 
for IRR at a cost of A$100 million (in 2011).305 Taken together, all 
such examples underline one important factor for SOF, which is the 
need to have its own budget.   
• Operational Effectiveness. One way to assess effectiveness is to 
examine the system’s output.  To this end, there are numerous 
success stories demonstrating Australian SOF’s interoperability and 
effectiveness in the field. One such example is the operation 
conducted in April 2010 in Afghanistan that aimed to reduce the 
Taliban threat in the Mirabad Valley. SOF operated together with 
the Afghan police to eliminate the Taliban’s key leaders and bomb-
making facilities in that area.  In this operation, the SAS conducted 
months of surveillance before it could confirm the target.  Once the 
target was confirmed, the SAS called in the Commandos and the 
Afghan police to conduct the raid and snatch operation.  They 
                                            
304 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 46, 54, 60–1.  Besides the training requirements for shooters, 
SFTC also takes care of officers’ and NCOs’ academic and SOF-specific leadership training.  
305 “Australia chooses multirole helicopter based on NH90 TTH,” Jane’s International 
Defence Review, October 1, 2004, 
http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId (accessed March 15, 
2011); Jon Grevatt, “Australia launches counter-CBRNE effort,” Jane's Defence Industry, January 
28, 2011, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId (accessed 
March 15, 2011); “Australia bolsters Special Forces,” Jane’s International Defence Review,  
August 1, 2003, http://search.janes.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Search/documentView.do?docId 
(accessed March 15, 2011). 
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captured some key Taliban leaders and destroyed a large quantity 
of bomb-making components. In addition to surveillance-raid 
missions, Australian SAS has conducted successful leadership 
targeting missions.306  
Notwithstanding all the positive things mentioned, it would be naïve 
to think that SOCOMD’s early years were problem-free.  To better understand 
what accounts for SOCOMD’s success, it is worth examining the program that 
established SOCOMD: JP-199. 
b. Joint Project (JP)-199 
To accomplish the complex and time-consuming amalgation of 
Australia’s SOF units, the ADF instituted what was known as JP-199, whose role 
it was to oversee SOCOMD’s establishment from inception to the time of its 
maturity.  With hindsight, this process took almost five years (mid-2003 to mid-
2008).  It was run by a joint committee made up of members who had a stake in 
SOCOMD.  As part of this project, the very first task given to the committee was 
to formulate the Chief of Army Directive, which provided the foundation for the 
establishment of SOCOMD.307   
Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to go into a full-length 
study of the project-management aspects of this case, there are certainly some 
important insights to be gleaned:  
                                            
306 Ian McPhedran, “Long manhunt triumphs in war zone - Aussie stealth nabs Taliban,” 
Herald Sun (Melbourne, Australia), April 22, 2010, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/iw-search/we (accessed March 15, 2011); “Troops 
capture two Taliban bomb makers,” Townsville Bulletin (Australia), March 26, 2010, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/iw-search/we (accessed March 15, 2011); Mark 
Dodd, “SAS `assassinate' Taliban leader,” The Australian (Australia), May 7, 2009, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/iw-search/we (accessed March 15, 2011); “Aust 
soldiers kill 80 Taliban fighters in Afghanistan 172,” AAP News (Australia), April 26, 2009, 
http://infoweb.newsbank.com.libproxy.nps.edu/iw-search/we (accessed March 15, 2011).  These 
are just some recent examples. 
307 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 31–42. 
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(1)  Manpower Shortfall.  One of the most critical challenges 
faced in the establishment of SOCOMD was to fully staff the new command.  In 
being a command, SOCOMD would need to expand its strength to fill the new 
positions created.  These new positions were from three main areas: (1) SOHQ 
in Canberra, (2) a new company (D Company) and a new Rigid Hull Inflatable 
Boat (RHIB) section in 2 Cdo, and (3) the new Special Operations Logistics 
Squadron (SOLS). The creation of SOCOMD also required an additional 334 full-
time personnel.  While JP-199 postulated that these positions would be filled 
within two and a half years, it took SOCOMD almost five years to fully staff these 
positions.  Fortunately, SOCOMD had the flexibility to shift manpower resources 
around so that these manpower issues did not have any adverse effects.  Also, 
SOCOMD was able to implement the SFDRS as a stop-gap measure to ramp up 
the manpower resources in the short term to fill these gaps.308 
(2)  Logistics Support and RHIB Shortfall. Unlike in the 
previous cases, where the services maintain the raise-train-sustain function, 
SOCOMD felt it needed to have its own indigenous logistics support to remain 
effective.309  As such, JP-199 called for the creation of SOLS, whose initial role 
was to support operations without playing a garrison role.  However, as things 
evolved, this concept became untenable.310 Consequently, SOLS had to become 
a more command-oriented organization, one that provided more value-added 
                                            
308 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 32–35, 39–42. 
309 Similar to the conventional services, the SO Service should have its own logistics support 
in order to be self-sufficient.  More importantly, this would ensure that the requirements of the 
tactical units are supported adequately and expeditiously. 
310 SOCOMD initially requested for SOLS to be staffed with 250 personnel.  But, because of 
significant shortage of combat service support (CSS) personnel across the whole ADF, it was 
given only 101 positions to work with.  Thanks to this reduced number, SOLS’s initial role was 
designed to provide support to operations only.  This means it had no role when the units were 
not deployed.  Clearly, the initial concept of SOLS was fundamentally flawed.  
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support to all the SOCOMD units.311 While this seems to be working well for 
SOCOMD right now, it has been suggested this is still not the optimal design.312 
Besides the SOLS challenge, another issue in the logistics 
realm pertains to the acquisition of the RHIBs for 2 Cdo, which seems 
symptomatic of challenges with the Australian government’s acquisition system 
overall.  Simply put, the RHIBs’ acquisition was delayed for three years because 
the government required Australian manufacturing content in the program.  While 
the delay did not adversely affect 2 Cdo’s effectiveness (5 RHIBs were borrowed 
from the Navy), it reflected a deeper issue vis-à-vis the broader defense 
acquisition system.  More precisely, it brings to the fore timeliness issues versus 
the costs involved in meeting high-readiness demands.313 
(3)  Budget & Infrastructure.  It should not be hard to see that 
the budgetary resources required for a project on the scale of JP-199 were 
considerable. Resources were devoted to three key areas—manpower, 
equipment, and infrastructure costs.  The former arose from the additional 334 
new positions created, while the latter came about because of the need for new 
offices and infrastructure to accommodate the consolidation (as well as the 
expansion) of the units.  Although the total cost for JP-199 is not known, figures 
available help indicate the magnitude of the resources required for an endeavor 
like this.  For example, the Holsworthy program (infrastructure for 2 Cdo and 
                                            
311 What this means is that the services provided by SOLS should be those that affect most, 
if not all, of the SOF units.  One example is the planning and management of vehicle fleet 
refurbishment. Given the manpower level of SOLS and geographical dispersion of SOF units 
(with SASR in Perth, and the rest of the units in Sydney), SOLS has to focus on a more strategic 
role.  It does not have the capacity to be a standard, second/third line CSS unit. 
312 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 40–2, 66. A senior SOCOMD staff officer has commented, “the 
unit deserved compliments for trying, but it had not achieved the expected results.” Nevertheless, 
no clear suggestions were given with regard to what further actions SOLS needs to take to better 
meet SOCOMD’s requirements. 
313 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 59.  One may wish to question the value of such regulation vis-
à-vis SOF’s equipping.  This is because SOF’s requirements are often small–scale and 
specialized (unique).  The Return-on-Investment (ROI) may not be worth pushing for local 
manufacturing content, either from an economic perspective or when considering the timeliness 
factor.  Worth noting is that the Australians actually could have bought a suitable RHIB design 
directly from the U.S. 
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IRR) cost A$245 million, the equipment and material costs for SOCOMD were 
A$78 million, and refurbishment costs for the old offices were around A$1 million.  
Beyond pointing to the costliness of transformation, another important lesson 
relates to giving due diligence to the budgeting exercise.  Many of the plans in 
JP-199 suffered shortfalls in funding because of oversights during the planning 
phase.  Further, Australia’s experience also points to the importance of being 
able to redress these shortfalls when they do occur.   
As already mentioned, apart from the costs involved in 
creating new infrastructure, planners also had to think about geographical 
location and how to co-locate certain forces to optimize SOF as a whole.  One 
example of what was done was relocating A Squadron so that it could better 
serve the action units.314 
Although the examples just cited represent only a handful, 
they should be sufficient to indicate that the process of establishing SOCOMD 
was not so straightforward after all.  Fortunately for SOCOMD, having been 
granted the authority and flexibility as a command, it was able to negotiate these 
challenges fairly successfully and prevented them from turning into show-
stoppers.  
3. Connecting the Dots 
In Figure 12, it is clear that Trail 1 actually resembles Trail 1 in the French 
system.  Therefore, instead of repeating what was said in that section, here I will 
simply highlight the differences between the French and Australian cases.  These 
differences are, to some degree, factors that make the Australian system 
preferable to the French system.  Broadly, they are: (1) the full command 
authority given to SOCOMD, (2) a more expeditious system for implementing 
doctrine, (3) an organic SOF training system, and finally (4) a clear reward and  
 
                                            
314 Gillies, The Cutting Edge, 36–9, 58. 
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remuneration system. Another strength of SOCOMD is also its reach into and 
influence on the strategic leadership, especially the national decision-making 
body; this is represented by Trail 2. 
Nevertheless, there is a cost to every strategy (or model).  The potential 
downsides to what the Australians have are mainly those discussed in the 
previous section on the JP-199 program, which are represented by Weaknesses 
3 and 4.315  Weakness 3 speaks to the additional manpower resources required 
to establish such a service-like structure.316  Weakness 4 refers to the additional 
budgetary resources that need to be committed (especially for new 
infrastructure), as well as the extraneous tasks that distract the command from its 
operational priorities.  Additionally, there is also a misalignment between the 
Australian defense acquisition system and SOF’s technology requirements, 
which is represented by Weakness 5.  The need for Australian manufacturing 
content should not be imposed too strictly on SOF’s equipping due to SOF’s 
unique and often small-scale requirements.   
 
                                            
315 The term ‘potential’ is used deliberately, as the challenges may not exist if existing 
resources are sufficient to meet the new requirements.  
316 A comparison between the French and Australian cases will help to give an indication.  
The COS HQ has about 60 personnel; French SOF comprises about 3,000 members. SOHQ has 
more than 80 personnel for an Australian SOF of about 2,500 in total strength (not all of whom 
are SOF per se). 
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Figure 12.   Pathological Analysis of Australian SOF 
4. Generating Insights 
In sum, this case study reveals that the Service structure can be a very 
effective overarching organization, provided the country has the necessary 
resources to accommodate such growth and the expansion of SOF.  The 
following points summarize the insights gleaned from the Australian case. 
a. While a clear national strategy for SOF is important, Australia’s 
example proves that a Service Command structure (or more 
broadly, an oversight agency with sufficient authority, e.g., HQSO) 
is able to keep SOF relevant as a strategic instrument even when 
the former is absent.  Further, this can be greatly facilitated by the 
command’s clear access to the country’s leadership (e.g., NCTC) 
and when the commander is given the appropriate authority (i.e., 
rank) that allows him to speak for SOF. 
b. A Service Command structure will mean expanded responsibilities 
for SOF as a whole.  In turn, the command will require more  
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resources in terms of manpower, budgeting, and even 
infrastructure.  Also, the command must be prepared to divert some 
of its attention to these extraneous tasks.  
c. A Service Command should have a training organization organic to 
it for a tighter fit between training and operational/strategic 
requirements.  As was covered in Chapter II, this is known as the 
positive feedback loop.  On the other hand, having such a system 
can also constitute a negative feedback loop when it allows the 
maintenance of standards and implementation of SOF-related 
programs to affect the upkeep of SOF tactical effectiveness.   
d. Inherent in such a Service Command structure is a more 
expeditious system for implementing and redressing SOF-related 
doctrine to keep SOF relevant and effective. Under its own 
authority, a command should be able to adjust the SOF system as 
necessary to prevent issues from having adverse effects on the 
SOF system as a whole. 
e. The Service Command structure is favorable for SOF human 
resource development for the following reasons: (1) it allows 
implementation/adjustment of rewards and remuneration, (2) 
provides better career advancement prospects for SOF members 
within the SO domain, and (3) may even provide other 
advancement opportunities that would not have been possible 
without the additional capacity (e.g., attachment to international 
SOF). 
f. When the Service Command has its own SOF budget, acquisitions 
will be more SOF-focused and expeditious.  However, as 
Australia’s case reminds us, there can be potential misalignment 
between the broader defense acquisition system and that of SOF.  
To maintain effectiveness, such potential misalignments need to be 
addressed. 
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g. While it is not clear how SOF’s logistics organization should be 
organized, it is certain that a Service Command should have its 
own organic logistics support given its raise-train-sustain function. 
h. As we saw in the French case, it is important for SOF to have its 
own dedicated aviation support and also tight links with the 
intelligence agencies. Australia’s “whole of government” approach 
that includes SOCOMD in the national/strategic system ensures 
such support is there.  
i. Taking the French and Australian cases together, we might 
conclude that a favorable political-military culture for SOF is a 
necessary condition for establishing an oversight agency with 
authority.  This makes sense because only when such a culture 
prevails will SOF be viewed as an instrumental national asset in the 
eyes of the top leadership.317 
j. A Service Command may not be cost-effective if there are too 
many SOF tactical units.318  This is because it may take too many 
resources to consolidate these units, as well as to provide them 
with administrative support.319  Also, the consolidation process may 
be especially challenging if these units are from all three (or more) 
services.   
 
                                            
317 One may ask, what about Israel? For Israel, the Bituist ethos seems to have dominated 
the political-military culture.  In addition, Israel also confronts unremitting security challenges that 
keep its leadership fully occupied. 
318 Unfortunately, research did not help shed light on what this ideal number should be. 
319 Resources are in terms of budget and manpower to support new infrastructure and the 
heavier administrative tasks, respectively. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Whenever there are SOF units from two or more services, it is imperative 
that there also be a national-level oversight agency with authority for SOF. This 
holds even for a small military like Norway’s, which has only two SOF tactical 
units.  One conclusion this thesis comes to is that either the Component 
Command or the Service structure are the macro-organizations that a nation 
should strive for. Not only are both structures able to integrate and harmonize 
tactical SOF units, but they also have what it takes to align SOF with the nation’s 
strategic requirements.  In other words, they are well placed to utilize both 
positive and negative feedback, as well as adapt their forces to environmental 
demands.  In contrast, the Service-Centric and NMSE structures are both 
ineffective as an overarching organization for SOF.   
Given the above, I will now attempt to actualize the second objective of 
this study.  This entails working through all the insights garnered from the case 
studies.  Also, it bears repeating here that these considerations are more 
relevant to SOF organizations belonging to small to medium sized militaries.  
Finally, these considerations do not apply only to the Component Command and 
Service structures; some are applicable to any model.   
a. While neither Service-Centric nor NMSE structures are adequate 
as the macro-level organization for SOF, there may still be 
circumstances under which either would prove useful.  One such 
scenario is during the initial establishment of SOF, when they can 
help to build up initial capabilities of SOF more quickly.   However, 
once these initial capabilities have matured, the overarching 
organization should aim to transition to a form that resembles either 
a Component Command or a Service structure.  On this note, this 
thesis finds that the Service structure is probably preferable to the 
Component Command because it operates with full authority and 
maximum flexibility.  However, it requires far more resources than 
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the other three models, both in manpower and budgeting terms.  
Beyond resource demands, the Service structure means also being 
prepared to take on extraneous tasks vis-à-vis force management 
and production.   
When choosing this macrostructure, another key question 
that a military needs to ask is whether it is ready for the SOF 
Commander to take on the same rank as commanders of the other 
services (or commands). Or, to put this another way, the military 
needs to ask whether the SOF community has the human capital to 
field such a candidate.  As this thesis has noted, an organization’s 
effectiveness is closely related to the Commander’s ability to wield 
influence at the strategic level.  Since SOF is nested within a larger 
hierarchical organization, the rank of the Commander is a critical 
consideration.  Inevitably, this rank issue may also reflect broader 
political-military attitudes toward SOF.  Insofar as the Service 
Chiefs are willing to accept the SOF Commander as an equal, this 
would signal that the military’s attitude toward SOF is favorable.  
Then, by extension, the likelihood that the services would be willing 
to give up their SOF units to this new organization should be 
greater. 
In the case of smaller militaries, a Service Command may 
well be beyond reach.  This is not because there are attitude 
problems, but more due to resource challenges.  In such militaries, 
apart from manpower and financial issues, it may be far-fetched to 
expect SOF to maintain full command over air operations 
resources, such as helicopters.  Nevertheless, if the issue is mainly 
with air assets, then an Australia-like SOCOMD variant of the 
Service Command may be a suitable alternative.    
b. Even when a nation has the wherewithal for the Service 
organization, there are factors that may make the Component 
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Command Structure more attractive. When a favorable joint culture 
and attitude toward SOF exist in the military, it is probably more 
cost-effective to adopt the Component Command structure as SOF 
need not be self-sufficient in every aspect.  A second consideration 
could be the number of SOF tactical units.  When there are too 
many SOF tactical units, as in the French case, it may not make 
economical or operational sense to adopt a SO Service. A 
Component Command model would be more appropriate instead.  
The disadvantage would be that there will then be less flexibility 
and more constraints which, in turn, will cause the whole SOF 
system to be less responsive and effective.  This may be so even 
when the “environmental climate” for SOF is favorable.   
To help mitigate the inherent challenges a Component 
Command would face, it is important to make sure its relationship 
with the conventional services is clear.  Appropriate authority 
should be given to it so that it can concentrate on operational 
matters rather than on maintaining the informal relationship.  Also, 
the organization should be given its own separate budget for SOF-
specific requirements.  Finally, given that the services are 
responsible for the raise-train-educate-sustain function, the 
Component Command needs to ensure that SOF units are 
developed evenly.  To this end, it is worth emphasizing the 
likelihood that Navy SOF will be marginalized when there is no 
proper supervision.  This is because SO are often less understood 
by the Navy than by the Army.   
c. Insofar as SOF are considered a strategic instrument for a nation, 
there should be clear strategic guidance from the political-military 
leadership about how SOF will be employed.  This will create the 
necessary context for the macro-organization to design a coherent 
military doctrine for SOF that not only addresses immediate goals, 
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but also longer-term national objectives.  A critical element of this 
doctrine is to have an unequivocal division of labor for all the 
different SOF units.  While there is bound to be an overlap of 
capabilities between SOF units due to the nature of SO, this 
redundancy should serve to make the whole SOF system more 
effective and robust.  In other words, the division of labor should 
aim to delineate the niche areas for each tactical unit clearly, 
keeping redundant capabilities only in absolutely essential areas.  
This is particularly important for small militaries as human 
resources and other capabilities are at a premium. At the same 
time, the macro-organization needs to ensure that all threat areas 
are covered, because without a clear division of labor, the forces 
may risk being stretched too thin, especially if left to their own 
devices. Equally important is establishing a clear military doctrine at 
the earliest possible time; this doctrine is the cornerstone of an 
effective SOF system. 
The clear delineation of roles should also be extended to 
special units of different government agencies, such as the police 
and national intelligence agencies.  This will ensure that an 
effective SO capability can be maintained at the national level. One 
possible way to accomplish this is to have a national oversight 
agency, such as the NCTC, and grant the SOF macro-organization 
a seat at the table. Finally, in addition to a clear strategy and 
military doctrine, having a joint culture is also an important enabler 
for SO as SOF are, more often than not, joint assets.   
d. As a strategic instrument, SOF need to have access to the strategic 
leadership.  This is not only critical for operations, but also for 
administrative matters. Exchanges allow SOF leaders to educate 
and advise those at the top on proper SOF employment and 
development. The “number of layers” separating the macro-
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organization from the strategic-level leadership should be kept to a 
minimum.  One way to facilitate this is to locate the macro-
organization as close to the top military echelon as possible.  
Meanwhile, if the conventional services are still responsible for C2 
of the SOF units, it is imperative that these units have access to the 
services’ top leadership as well.   
The design of the HQ is another feature critical to the macro-
organization’s effectiveness.  Taking a leaf from the French and 
Australian cases, the HQ should be a joint entity with as equal a 
distribution as possible of SOF (and non-SOF) members from the 
different services/agencies.  Second, the HQ should be sufficiently 
staffed to be able to carry out all its tasks effectively.  Third, the 
roles and responsibilities of the sub-units within the HQ need to be 
clear and aligned with the HQ’s tasks. For example, if the HQ is a 
Service Command, it will most likely have the same HQ functions 
as a conventional service, such as S1 to S8.320  Last, are the 
institutionalized linkages the HQ needs to have with its key support 
agencies, including those outside the military.  Two in particular 
have turned up repeatedly in our case studies:  the linkages with 
the Air Force (dedicated air assets of crew and aircraft) and with 
the Intelligence agencies. 
e. Optimally, SOF should have their own organic training organization, 
much like the SFTC.321  In cases where this is not possible, SOF 
should then have a tight enough relationship with the training 
authority that they can influence to be responsive to SOF’s needs.  
This will ensure a tight fit between the strategic requirements for 
SOF and SOF’s capabilities, which in turn, will keep SOF relevant 
                                            
320 For the purposes of illustration, the typical functions are: S1 – manpower, S2 – 
Intelligence, S3 – Operations, and S4 – Logistics, etc. 
321 Alternatively, it would have separate training organizations within different SOF units.  In 
this case, the macro-organization will still have C2 over SOF’s training matters. 
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as a national instrument.  Going further on the subject of training, 
SOF should have common basic training not only in selected 
specialized skills, but also in broader aspects.  As described earlier, 
this can be done via a common SOF selection and basic training.  
In addition to maximizing resources (used for the actual training), 
this approach would provide two other potential benefits: one, it 
would help to match a candidate’s aptitude and competencies to 
the task requirements early, and hence reduce attrition costs; two, it 
would help to build a common SOF identity and skills base from the 
outset, and thus make the integration of the tactical units easier. 
f. Aside from a separate budget that could help SOF pursue SOF-
specific requirements (such as equipment and contingency 
response demands), the macro-organization should also be 
cognizant of how the larger defense acquisitions system can affect 
SOF’s procurement. One such example was found in the Australian 
case.  If such issues exist, some provision should be made to 
ensure that SOF’s capability development is not adversely affected. 
g. In the Human Resource realm, there are three key considerations.  
While the first is directly related to the design and establishment of 
a SOF macro-organization, the other two considerations are more 
generic.  Nonetheless, all three affect the overall effectiveness of 
SOF at the system level. First, both Component and Service 
Commands offer expanded career opportunities so that SOF 
members can stay within the SO domain.  This is especially 
important for Navy and Air Force SOF.  In this respect, the Service 
Command provides more options because of its enlarged HQ.  
Further, it also has an added pinnacle position for SOF officers, 
which is the equivalent of a Service Chief or Component 
Commander. Second, it is necessary to have a clear allowance and 
remuneration system for SOF that is commensurate with 
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individuals’ qualifications and the risks which they are asked to 
take.322  This becomes even more important if there is some kind of 
a tiered system within the SOF community itself.  Concomitant with 
such a tiered allowance system is also the need to maintain 
unequivocal standards that separate the different groups. This 
should help both motivate and harmonize SOF, and should help 
with recruitment and retention.  Lastly, as far as possible, SOF 
should employ only volunteers.  This is especially important for CT 
missions. Apart from physical aptitude and competencies, troopers’ 
maturity is an extremely important factor that needs to be taken into 
account as early as the recruitment process.   
                                            
322 While the Service Command has an inherent advantage due to the authority and 
flexibility it has, this consideration has been generalized to make it more applicable to SOF in 
general. 
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APPENDIX A 




The roles and responsibilities of the NMSE as given by the NATO study 
are: 
• Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the Minister of Defence and 
Chief of Defence to educate and inform on the capabilities, 
limitations, optimal employment, and requirements of national SOF 
• Develop a joint SOF vision to serve as a guide for unifying the 
service SOF units 
• Develop national SOF policy, doctrine, training, exercises, 
operational procedures, and acquisition 
• Integrate the SOF perspective and capabilities into defence 
guidance, strategic plans, joint operational plans, joint publications 
and doctrine 
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• Serve as the primary coordinating authority among the service SOF 
units and with conventional forces 
• Work cooperatively with the military services to ensure that SOF 
units maintain and develop their capabilities 
• Monitor and reporting on SOF operations, activities, joint training 
and exercises 
• Represent national SOF in multinational organizations and bilateral 
situations323 
                                            
323 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 22–4. 
 139
APPENDIX B 
Here is the SO Component Command structure: 
 
 
Component Command Structure 
 
The roles and responsibilities of the Component Command as given by 
the NATO study are: 
• Serve as the senior SOF advisor to the Minister of Defence, Chief 
of Defence, and conventional joint operations commanders 
• Develop joint SOF vision, policy, long term strategy, and doctrine to 
integrate and harmonize service SOF units and enabling 
capabilities 
• Plan, coordinate, and conduct joint special operations 
independently or in combination with a joint conventional force 
commander 
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• Identify operational requirements and the necessary resources 
(equipment, assets, enablers, logistics support) 
• Establish a standing deployable joint task force headquarters for 
the command and control of national joint special operations or 
combined joint force special operations 
• Manage programming and acquisition of SOF peculiar equipment, 
and rapidly procuring mission-specific equipment, supplies, and 
services 
• Resource, plan, coordinate, and conduct joint and combined SOF 
training and exercises to standardize SOF tactics, techniques, and 
procedures 
• Establish evaluation criteria to certify the ability of the service SOF 
units to meet the necessary standards for executing designated 
SOF missions 
• Design tailored educational opportunities for SOF personnel and 
those personnel that support or enable SOF324 
 
                                            
324 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 25–7. 
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APPENDIX C 
Here is the SO Service structure: 
 
 
SO Service Structure 
 
The roles and responsibilities of the Service as given by the NATO study 
are: 
• Develop the SOF vision and long term strategy that is aligned with 
national defence guidance 
• Develop SOF-specific policy derived from broader defence policy 
guidance 
• Advise and educate senior defence leadership, service chiefs, and 
joint force commands on the capabilities and limitations of SOF 
• Develop and manage the Service budget, which includes 
establishing resourcing requirements and priorities 
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• Advocate for service resources  
• Develop SOF doctrine  
• Manage the professional development of SOF personnel and SOF 
enabling personnel  
• Design, develop, and manage SOF educational and training 
programs  
• Develop and manage a SOF acquisition system for identifying SOF 
requirements and priorities and for developing and procuring 
service common and SOF-peculiar material  
• Resource and develop SOF-specific logistics capabilities325 
 
 
                                            
325 NSCC, NATO SOF Study, 27–9.  
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